Schneier on Security
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May 31, 2005
Eric Schmidt on Secrecy and Security
From Information Week:
InformationWeek: What about security? Have you been paying as much attention to security as, say Microsoft—you can debate whether or not they've been successful, but they've poured a lot of resources into it.
Schmidt: More people to a bad architecture does not necessarily make a more secure system. Why don't you define security so I can answer your question better?
InformationWeek: I suppose it's an issue of making the technology transparent enough that people can deploy it with confidence.
Schmidt: Transparency is not necessarily the only way you achieve security. For example, part of the encryption algorithms are not typically made available to the open source community, because you don't want people discovering flaws in the encryption.
Actually, he's wrong. Everything about an encryption algorithm should always be made available to everyone, because otherwise you'll invariably have exploitable flaws in your encryption.
My essay on the topic is here.
Posted on May 31, 2005 at 1:09 PM
• 10 Comments
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In context, he's advocating security through obscurity for link-spamming and related issues, not encryption. (Though he's clearly wrong about encryption.)
And for things like link-spamming which are really fraud issues rather than security ones, he's right - there's no magic bullet the way that there is with cryptography. Concealing your strategy so that your opponent is uncertain of it will get you better payoffs.
There certainly are places where security through some amount of secuirty may be quite valuable even for cryptographic algorithms. For instance if you are the NSA your in house analytic capabilities probably greatly exceed any contribution you might get from interested outsiders. Furthermore knowledge of the algorithm may greatly aid attacking countries and it is perfectly reasonable that this aid causes more harm than the free eyeballs gained by releasing it.
On a more pragmatic example suppose you are going to make an irreversable commitment to an encryption algorithm, e.g., DVD encryption, and for some reason you can't use a well tested off the shelf solution. Now if your algorithm is only availible in hardware obscurity will likely slow any attacker somewhat and extend the lifetime of the device encryption (some benefit is also had putting it in software). Conversely, releasing the algorithm from the general community is not likely to attract much aid before it is released (would *you* go do some free analysis for the MPAA to help make their encryption better). Since the commitment to the algorithm may be irreversable I hardly see how finding out what the flaw is in the algorithm once it is deployed helps them.
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