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Schneier on SecurityA blog covering security and security technology. « TrackMeNot | Main | What the Terrorists Want » August 23, 2006Privacy Risks of Public MentionsInteresting paper: "You are what you say: privacy risks of public mentions," Proceedings of the 29th Annual International ACM SIGIR Conference on Research and Development in Information Retrieval, 2006. Abstract: Unfortunately, the paper is only available to ACM members. EDITED TO ADD (8/24): Paper is here. Posted on August 23, 2006 at 2:11 PM • 23 Comments To receive these entries once a month by e-mail, sign up for the Crypto-Gram Newsletter. underpaid ACM member • August 23, 2006 4:04 PM ... available only to ACM members that are also either SIGIR members or ACM Digital Library subscribers, that is. It's hard to tell from the abstract just how the "misdirection strategy" would solve the problem. another_bruce • August 23, 2006 4:16 PM just a guess, the misdirection strategy works by populating the sparse relation space with spurious relations. zencoder • August 23, 2006 4:24 PM I'm looking into getting access via my employer; if I get it, I'll try to post my thoughts. @ underpaid ACM member Anonymous • August 23, 2006 4:45 PM I was wondering if you could take this a step further and make the links between the separate identities based on idiosyncrasies of the persons grammar, vocabulary, spelling errors, terminology, etc. Most people tend to speak and write in distinct patterns, but are those patterns unique enough to derive any relationships from one blog to another? Evan • August 23, 2006 4:51 PM Or you could just download the PDF from the author's web site: http://www-users.cs.umn.edu/~dfrankow/pubs.htm Savek • August 23, 2006 5:27 PM or get the video of his talk at http://tinyurl.com/l3r2u (google vid 78mb avi) Filias Cupio • August 23, 2006 6:22 PM This posting is under my "standard pseudonym", which I use here and several other places. I have wondered at various times how hard it would be to connect this to my real name - I have at various points left clues* as to my real identity - which country I live in, information about my job etc. Access to private data from some websites would lead directly to my real-world e-mail address, so it would pose little challenge if (e.g.) the CIA for some reason wanted to find out who I was. * Not deliberately left as clues, but because it was relevant to some point I was making. Jim • August 23, 2006 6:47 PM Solve the problem? Strike no man, do no man wrong, be content with your wages. Problem solved. silkio • August 23, 2006 7:16 PM how is this news? it is blindingly obvious that using a similar name in various places will allow you to be linked. or the fact that you discuss your school in one place, and your teachers in other, and then classmates in one more. that can all be linked? what a unique and interesting discovery... wow. Dido Sevilla • August 23, 2006 10:12 PM @Jim You're forgetting one thing: be innocent of thoughtcrime. Dido Sevilla • August 23, 2006 10:13 PM @Jim You're forgetting one thing: be innocent of thoughtcrime. Michael Hampton • August 24, 2006 1:27 AM The misdirection strategy has an obvious downside, though: Suddenly Netflix is recommending movies you can't stand. http 404 • August 24, 2006 2:46 AM @silkio @Bruce news@11 • August 24, 2006 2:46 AM Summary of paper: In attempting to obfuscate your identity on ratings forums, if you recommend *unpopular crap*, you stand out like a sore thumb. And Britney Spears Rocks! Jungsonn • August 24, 2006 4:39 AM Given the subject, isn't this only a case of cleverly avoiding shame? i guess everybody did some rambling somewhere, it is what makes us human you know: make mistakes and learn from them? I posted under many names, even under my own name on forums and boards. If you are a politician and on some board you ramble about your private ideas and such, which will be used against you, i think this says more about our society as a whole then about the person itself. Why not make mistakes, it proves you're human, not a machine. Panzerkirchetort • August 24, 2006 8:52 AM So the obvious tactic is to avoid making posts. No posts, no cross-references, no trail of breadcrumbs back to you. Oh, crud... Bloodhound • August 24, 2006 4:01 PM @Filias Dunno how hard it is, but I had lots of fun trying to do it "(s)low-tech". Even if one of the possible names that came out of the attempts isn't you, the process still generated a list of readers of this blog (that might be put off by seeing their real names appear) that are close to your "profile". Great fun nonetheless. Unless you are well-known blogger yourself, I don't think I zeroed in on you. Stefan Wagner • August 24, 2006 11:00 PM I thought of this too. Filias Cupio • August 24, 2006 11:18 PM @Bloodhound: After my previous post, I tried Googling "Filias Cupio", and I was surprised at how many hits there were (540, I think.) For some of the hits, it looks like people have randomly harvested text (including my psudonym) from blogs and put it into spam as noise to confuse filters. Anonymous • September 15, 2006 9:45 AM Hi, I'm the author. Thought I'd respond a little for fun. "I was wondering if you could take this a step further and make the links between the separate identities based on idiosyncrasies of the persons grammar, vocabulary, spelling errors, terminology, etc." These people did some work on that, and it did pretty well: Novak, J., Raghavan, P., and Tomkins, A. 2004. Anti-Aliasing on the Web. In Proc. WWW04, pp. 30-39.
it is blindingly obvious that using a similar name in various places will allow you to be linked." True. However, the paper is about being identified by what you mention, not by what your name is. "The misdirection strategy has an obvious downside, though: Suddenly Netflix is recommending movies you can't stand." I agree. Personally, I don't like the misdirection strategy, and it didn't work 100%. It just seemed reasonable and interesting to study it. Dan
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