Talks in the Category “Talks”
Bruce Schneier, Fellow at Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard University, discussed the complex balance between privacy and security in the golden age of data surveillance in a session titled “Privacy and Prosperity How Can Governments Strike the Balance?” We live in a world where our data is collected all the time and everywhere (e-mails, social media, credit cards, etc.), what is the limit we are willing to accept? What are the consequences, and what can we do about them?
Bruce Schneier gave a keynote address at the Nairobi 2016 Blockchain Workshop.
We have created a world where information technology permeates our economies, social interactions, and intimate selves. The combination of mobile, cloud computing, the Internet Things, persistent computing, and autonomy is resulting in something altogether different — a world-sized web. This World-Sized Web promises great benefits, but it is also vulnerable to a host of new threats from users, criminals, corporations, and governments. These threats can now result in physical damage and even death.
Bruce Schneier testified before two U.S. House of Representatives subcommittes at a joint hearing on "Understanding the Role of Connected Devices in Recent Cyber Attacks." Other witnesses were Dale Drew of Level 3 Communications and Kevin Fu of Virta Labs and the University of Michigan.
Information technology permeates all aspects of our lives. The combination of mobile, cloud computing, the IoT, persistent computing and autonomy are resulting in a World-Sized Web with great benefits but is vulnerable to a host of new threats. This talk looks at attempts to secure these systems and at technologies, laws, regulations, economic incentives and social norms we need to secure them in the future.
We've created a world where information technology permeates our economies, social interactions, and intimate selves. The combination of mobile, cloud computing, the Internet of Things, persistent computing, and autonomy are resulting in something different. This World-Sized Web promises great benefits, but is also vulnerable to a host of new threats. Threats from users, criminals, corporations, and governments.
You are under surveillance right now.
Your cell phone provider tracks your location and knows who’s with you. Your online and in-store purchasing patterns are recorded, and reveal if you're unemployed, sick, or pregnant. Your e-mails and texts expose your intimate and casual friends.
Bruce Schneier - CTO of Resilient Systems - showed up for a guest appearance at the Wix Meetup Space, thanks to a certain military unit.
In this talk Bruce elaborates on his own perspective in the everlasting, ever growing, conflict between security and privacy.
In cyberspace and out, we're increasingly confronting extremely-low-probability, extremely-high-damage attacks. Protecting against these sorts of risks requires new ways of thinking about security; one that emphasizes agility and resilience, while avoiding worst-case thinking.
Bruce Schneier spoke at Harvard Book Store about his new book Data and Goliath.
You are under surveillance right now.
Your cell phone provider tracks your location and knows who’s with you. Your online and in-store purchasing patterns are recorded, and reveal if you're unemployed, sick, or pregnant. Your e-mails and texts expose your intimate and casual friends. Google knows what you’re thinking because it saves your private searches.
Do you have secrets? Security expert Bruce Schneier has little patience for those who say they don't.
When asked about government and corporate surveillance, there are some who shrug their shoulders and say they have nothing to fear because they have nothing to hide. Schneier's response?
Protection and detection can only take you so far, and breaches are inevitable. As a result, response incident response has stepped into the spotlight. This session will examine the economic and psychological forces within the computer security field and describe the future of incident response (IR) and thus, the industry. It will discuss how response technology, unlike detective and preventative controls, must augment people rather than replace them.
2nd Annual Front Line Defenders Lecture, Dublin, Ireland
Co-sponsored by University College Dublin and Trinity College Dublin
What we've learned from the Snowden documents is that the NSA has turned the Internet into a giant surveillance platform.Part 2: Society & Technology Today
Data is a byproduct of our information society socialization; a lot of the conversations we have - with friends, with college, with family members - happen in digital format.Part 3: Metadata & Surveillance
Metadata fundamentally equals surveillance.Part 4: Subverting the Internet
We've made it so that surveillance is much easier than security.Part 5: Encryption
Do we build an internet that is vulnerable to all attackers or secure for all users?Part 6: Solutions
The NSA might have a larger budget than everyone else in the world combined, but they are not made of magic.Part 7: Secure Internet
A secure internet is in everyone's best interest.
The New America Foundation held a discussion on National Security Agency (NSA) surveillance threats to cybersecurity, Internet freedom and the economy, and what could be done at both a personal and policy level to counter these threats.
Bruce Schneier spoke at the closing session of "Don't Spy On Us: Day of Action."
Do you ever have the feeling you are being “watched?” If not, perhaps you should. According to security expert Bruce Schneier, who recently teamed up with The Guardian to review the Snowden documents, NSA surveillance through the Internet is far more robust and pervasive than most of us have ever imagined. In today’s hyper-connected society, with our ever-increasing dependence on the Internet, are we making ourselves increasingly more vulnerable? Or does our connectivity actually make us more secure?
Edward Snowden has given us an unprecedented window into the NSA's surveillance activities. Drawing from both the Snowden documents and revelations from previous whistleblowers, Bruce Schneier's talk described the sorts of surveillance the NSA conducts and how it conducts it. The emphasis was on the technical capabilities of the NSA, and not the politics or legality of their actions. Schneier then discussed what sorts of countermeasures are likely to frustrate any nation-state adversary with these sorts of capabilities.
Bruce Schneier of the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School gave a keynote address at the National Security Agency at the Crossroads conference Bobby put together at UT-Austin last week. Schneier spoke about the challenges to maintaining privacy in the evolving digital environment, and had provocative and interesting insights about the big picture that has emerged from almost a year of NSA revelations.
Edward Snowden has given us an unprecedented window into the NSA's surveillance activities. Drawing from both the Snowden documents and revelations from previous whistleblowers, this talk describes the sorts of surveillance the NSA conducts and how it conducts it. The emphasis is on the technical capabilities of the NSA, and not the politics or legality of their actions. Bruce then discusses what sorts of countermeasures are likely to frustrate any nation-state adversary with these sorts of capabilities.
Drawing from Snowden documents and revelations from previous whistleblowers, this talk covers types of surveillance the NSA conducts and how it conducts it. Emphasis is on the technical capabilities of the NSA, not the politics or legality of their actions; includes a discussion on countermeasures likely to frustrate any nation-state adversary & raise the cost of wholesale surveillance.
In light of recent revelations of the government's surveillance practices, the New America Foundation's Open Technology Institute held a briefing on Capitol Hill on the impact of that surveillance on users, national security, and the private sector. The briefing provided insight into how the technology and regulatory environment has led to the current situation and the ramifications of that surveillance on society and governance overall, while also considering the challenges confronting the Obama Administration's external Review Group. Beyond the well-known issues over civil rights, this was an important presentation on the technological implications of surveillance, and the dangers policy makers need to consider as they look to reform the government's practices.
Rep. Zoe Lofgren (D-San Jose, Calif.)
Member, House Judiciary Committee
Member, House Committee on Science, Space and Technology
Director, Open Technology Institute and Vice President, New America Foundation
Fellow, Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard
Author, Liars and Outliers: Enabling the Trust Society Needs to Survive
Presented by Bruce Schneier at LISA '13, the 27th Large Installation System Administration Conference.
Human society runs on trust. We all trust millions of people, organizations, and systems every day -- and we do it so easily that we barely notice. But in any system of trust, there is an alternative, parasitic, strategy that involves abusing that trust. Making sure those defectors don't destroy the cooperative systems they're abusing is an age-old problem, one that we've solved through morals and ethics, laws, and all sort of security technologies.
"If security doesn't work for the legitimate users, it won't be used. So when you go to the enterprise, the first thing security has to do is not annoy people too much." Renowned security blogger and pundit Bruce Schneier discusses the problems with security and usability and details what must be done to make a more secure interface.
Feudalism is an apt model for security today. We pledge our allegiance to service providers, and expect them to provide us with security in return. Too often, this security is completely opaque, with results all over the map. Navigating this new world of feudal security is going to be the major challenge for CISOs in the current decade.
Human societies run on trust. Every day, we all trust millions of people, organizations, and systems -- and we do it so easily that we barely notice. But in any system of trust, there is an alternative, parasitic, strategy that involves abusing that trust. Ensuring defectors don't destroy the very cooperative systems they're abusing is an age-old problem.
Human societies run on trust. Every day, we all trust millions of people, organizations, and systems — and we do it so easily that we barely notice. But in any system of trust, there is an alternative, parasitic, strategy that involves abusing that trust. Making sure those defectors don't destroy the very cooperative systems they're abusing is an age-old problem, and we've developed a variety of societal pressures to induce cooperation: moral systems, reputational systems, institutional systems, and security systems.
Over 400 people turned out in person to hear Bruce Schneier’s lecture on the topic of his latest book Liars and Outliers. More than 1000 people viewed the live streaming of the event online. This event was hosted by the NZITF and was sponsored by InternetNZ and Telecom New Zealand.
Bruce Schneier spoke on "Cybersecurity, scientific data and public trust" at the H5N1 Research Symposium, organised by the Royal Society in partnership with the Academy of Medical Sciences and the Foundation for Vaccine Research with support from the American Society for Microbiology, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation, Fondation Mérieux, the German National Academy of Sciences Leopoldina, Institut Pasteur, and the Society for General Microbiology.
Today's Internet threats are not technical; they're social and political. They aren't criminals, hackers, or terrorists. They're the government and corporate attempts to mold the Internet into what they want it to be, either to bolster their business models or facilitate social control. Right now, these two goals coincide, making it harder than ever to keep the Internet free and open.
Security systems divide into two types. In direct security there are distinct attackers and defenders. Societal security ensures we adhere to the social contract with no free riders - attackers and defenders are the same. We'll explore the uniquely human implications of societal security: how it follows the rise of society and civilization and protects us from the dishonest minority amongst us.
Security Expert Bruce Schneier spoke about airport security as the last line of defense against terrorists. He was the keynote speaker at a day-long conference examining the Transportation Security Agency's use of body scanners and enhanced pat-downs at airports around the country.
Mr. Schneier examined the future of cyber war and cyber security. He explored the current debate on the threat of cyber war, questioning whether or not the threat had been over-stated, positing that it had. He then explored the range of attacks that have taken place, including the Latvian DOS attack in 2007 and the Stuxnet worm, which was designed to attack an industry control system.
The address concluded with an exploration of the future of international treaties on cyber war, suggesting possible treaties might focus on the appropriateness of attacking civilian targets, the issue of trojan attacks and other topics.
The feeling of security and the reality of security don't always match, says computer-security expert Bruce Schneier. In his talk, he explains why we spend billions addressing news story risks, like the "security theater" now playing at your local airport, while neglecting more probable risks—and how we can break this pattern.
The Internet is the greatest generation gap since rock and roll. The older of us need to be prepared for a younger generation that doesn't understand where their computer or smartphone ends and the Internet begins. Trends like consumerization, cloud computing, and web-based everything result in an Internet generation that is socially sophisticated yet technically naive. What will security look like in this new world?
More companies are outsourcing their IT infrastructure -- treating it as a service more like electricity, office cleaning, or tax preparation -- and this has profound implications for IT security. Organizational users care less about the technical details of security. Products and services change their focus from the end user to the outsourcer. Industry consolidation results, as non-security IT infrastructure companies seek to bolster their security credentials.
Security is both a feeling and a reality. You can feel secure without actually being secure, and you can be secure even though you don't feel secure. In the industry, we tend to discount the feeling in favor of the reality, but the difference between the two is important. It explains why we have so much security theater that doesn't work, and why so many smart security solutions go unimplemented.
On Jan. 26, 2008, at the Technology in Wartime conference at Stanford University Law School, Bruce Schneier delivered the keynote on "Dual-Use Technologies" and received the 2008 Norbert Wiener Award from Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility (CPSR).
Surveying current trends in information security, it's clear that a myriad of forces are at work. But fundamentally, security is all about economics: both attacker and defender are trying to maximize the return on their investments. Economics can both explain why security fails so often and offer new solutions for its success. For example, often the people who could protect a system are not those who suffer the costs of failure.
I am attending the IT Security Summit 2007 here in Johannesburg this week. It’s a busy week for conferences with Interop in Vegas and AusCERT in session in Australia. While smaller than the other two this one is proving very interesting. I originally submitted my cyber crime scenario presentation but that theme proved so popular I was asked to address something else.
Cory Doctorow welcomed Bruce Schneier for a talk on being a wise consumer of concrete security during the abstract war on terrorism at the USC Center on Public Diplomacy.
The last of the protection-detection-response triad to get any real attention, incident response is big business these days. In this talk, Bruce Schneier steps back and looks at the economic and psychological forces that affect incident response as both a business and a technical activity. Nothing seems to be able to keep sufficiently skilled and motivated attackers out of a network. Can incident response save the day?
Since 9/11, we have the Patriot Act, tighter screening at airports, a proposed national ID card system, a color-coded national alert system, irradiated mail, and a Department of Homeland Security. But do all of these things really make us any less vulnerable to another terrorist attack? Security expert Bruce Schneier evaluates the systems that we have in place post-9/11, revealing which of them actually work and which ones are simply "security theater." Learn why most security measures don't work and never will, why bad security is worse than none at all, and why strong security means learning how to fail well. Most of all, learn how you can take charge of your own security - personal, family, corporate, and national.
From encryption to digital signatures to electronic commerce to secure voting, cryptography has become the enabling technology that allows us to take existing business and social constructs and move them to computer networks. But a lot of cryptography is bad, and the problem with bad cryptography is that it looks just like good cryptography; most people cannot tell the difference. Security is a chain: only as strong as the weakest link. In this talk Bruce Schneier takes a look at the future of cryptography: the needs, the threats, the limits of technology, and the promise of the future.
Photo of Bruce Schneier by Per Ervland.
Schneier on Security is a personal website. Opinions expressed are not necessarily those of IBM Resilient.