Talks in the Category “Audio”
We've created a world where information technology permeates our economies, social interactions, and intimate selves. The combination of mobile, cloud computing, the Internet of Things, persistent computing, and autonomy are resulting in something different. This World-Sized Web promises great benefits, but is also vulnerable to a host of new threats. Threats from users, criminals, corporations, and governments.
Bruce Schneier gave the closing keynote at The Second Annual Cato Surveillance Conference.
For this week's Friday Roundtable, we dive into the issues of data security discussed in Bruce Schneier's new book "Data and Goliath."
Schneier writes in his introduction: "Here is what's true: Today's technology gives governments and corporations robust capabilities for mass surveillance."
Schneier and two other technology and security experts joined the Roundtable to talk about the state of data security.
Highlights from the conversationCell phones have become surveillance devices - for better or worse.
"The cell phone knows who you talk to, what time you talked to them, what time you wake up in the morning, what time you go to sleep at night. It knows who you sleep with because you've both got a phone," said Schneier. "It is an amazing surveillance device and something we would never allow if the government mandated it.
Bruce Schneier spoke at the closing session of "Don't Spy On Us: Day of Action."
Bruce Schneier of the Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard Law School gave a keynote address at the National Security Agency at the Crossroads conference Bobby put together at UT-Austin last week. Schneier spoke about the challenges to maintaining privacy in the evolving digital environment, and had provocative and interesting insights about the big picture that has emerged from almost a year of NSA revelations.
Drawing from Snowden documents and revelations from previous whistleblowers, this talk covers types of surveillance the NSA conducts and how it conducts it. Emphasis is on the technical capabilities of the NSA, not the politics or legality of their actions; includes a discussion on countermeasures likely to frustrate any nation-state adversary & raise the cost of wholesale surveillance.
Presented by Bruce Schneier at LISA '13, the 27th Large Installation System Administration Conference.
Feudalism is an apt model for security today. We pledge our allegiance to service providers, and expect them to provide us with security in return. Too often, this security is completely opaque, with results all over the map. Navigating this new world of feudal security is going to be the major challenge for CISOs in the current decade.
Human societies run on trust. Every day, we all trust millions of people, organizations, and systems -- and we do it so easily that we barely notice. But in any system of trust, there is an alternative, parasitic, strategy that involves abusing that trust. Ensuring defectors don't destroy the very cooperative systems they're abusing is an age-old problem.
Mr. Schneier examined the future of cyber war and cyber security. He explored the current debate on the threat of cyber war, questioning whether or not the threat had been over-stated, positing that it had. He then explored the range of attacks that have taken place, including the Latvian DOS attack in 2007 and the Stuxnet worm, which was designed to attack an industry control system.
The address concluded with an exploration of the future of international treaties on cyber war, suggesting possible treaties might focus on the appropriateness of attacking civilian targets, the issue of trojan attacks and other topics.
Security is both a feeling and a reality. You can feel secure without actually being secure, and you can be secure even though you don't feel secure. In the industry, we tend to discount the feeling in favor of the reality, but the difference between the two is important. It explains why we have so much security theater that doesn't work, and why so many smart security solutions go unimplemented.
Surveying current trends in information security, it's clear that a myriad of forces are at work. But fundamentally, security is all about economics: both attacker and defender are trying to maximize the return on their investments. Economics can both explain why security fails so often and offer new solutions for its success. For example, often the people who could protect a system are not those who suffer the costs of failure.
Cory Doctorow welcomed Bruce Schneier for a talk on being a wise consumer of concrete security during the abstract war on terrorism at the USC Center on Public Diplomacy.
Photo of Bruce Schneier by Per Ervland.
Schneier on Security is a personal website. Opinions expressed are not necessarily those of IBM Resilient.