Entries Tagged "web"

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Vote Someone Else's Shares

Do you own shares of a Janus mutual fund? Can you vote your shares through a website called vote.proxy-direct.com? If so, you can vote the shares of others.

If you have a valid proxy number, you can add 1300 to the number to get another valid proxy number. Once entered, you get another person’s name, address, and account number at Janus! You could then vote their shares too.

It’s easy.

Probably illegal.

Definitely a great resource for identity thieves.

Certainly pathetic.

Posted on November 24, 2005 at 10:41 AMView Comments

Possible Net Objects Fusion 9 Vulnerability

I regularly get anonymous e-mail from people exposing software vulnerabilities. This one looks interesting.

Beta testers have discovered a serious security flaw that exposes a site created using Net Objects Fusion 9 (NOF9) that has the potential to expose an entire site to hacking, including passwords and log in info for that site. The vulnerability exists for any website published using versioning (that is, all sites using nPower).

The vulnerability is easy to exploit. In your browser enter:
http://domain.com/_versioning_repository_/rollbacklog.xml

Now enter:
http://domain.com/_versioning_repository_/n.zip, where n is the number you got from rollback.xml.

Then, open Fusion and create a new site from the d/l’ed template. Edit and republish.

This means that anyone can edit a NOF9 site and get any usernames and passwords involved in it. Every site using versioning in NOF9 is exposing their site.

Website Pros has refused to fix the hole. The only concession that they have made is to put a warning in the publishing dialog box telling the user to “Please make sure your profiles repository are [sic] stored in a secure area of your remote server.”

I don’t use NOF9, and I haven’t tested this vulnerability. Can someone do so and get back to me? And if it is a real problem, spread the word. I don’t know yet if Website Pros prefers to pay lawyers to suppress information rather than pay developers to fix software vulnerabilities.

Posted on November 21, 2005 at 12:31 PMView Comments

Security Skins

Much has been written about the insecurity of passwords. Aside from being guessable, people are regularly tricked into providing their passwords to rogue servers because they can’t distinguish spoofed windows and webpages from legitimate ones.

Here’s a clever scheme by Rachna Dhamija and Doug Tygar at the University of California Berkeley that tries to deal with the problem. It’s called “Dynamic Security Skins,” and it’s a pair of protocols that augment passwords.

First, the authors propose creating a trusted window in the browser dedicated to username and password entry. The user chooses a photographic image (or is assigned a random image), which is overlaid across the window and text entry boxes. If the window displays the user’s personal image, it is safe for the user to enter his password.

Second, to prove its identity, the server generates a unique abstract image for each user and each transaction. This image is used to create a “skin” that automatically customizes the browser window or the user interface elements in the content of a webpage. The user’s browser can independently reach the same image that it expects to receive from the server. To verify the server, the user only has to visually verify that the images match.

Not a perfect solution by any means—much Internet fraud bypasses authentication altogether—but two clever ideas that use visual cues to ensure security. You can also verify server authenticity by inspecting the SSL certificate, but no one does that. With this scheme, the user has to recognize only one image and remember one password, no matter how many servers he interacts with. In contrast, the recently announced Site Key (Bank of America’s implementation of the Passmark scheme) requires users to save a different image with each server.

Posted on July 1, 2005 at 7:31 AMView Comments

Password Safe

Password Safe is a free Windows password-storage utility. These days, anyone who is on the Web regularly needs too many passwords, and it’s impossible to remember them all. I have long advocated writing them all down on a piece of paper and putting it in your wallet.

I designed Password Safe as another solution. It’s a small program that encrypts all of your passwords using one passphrase. The program is easy to use, and isn’t bogged down by lots of unnecessary features. Security through simplicity.

Password Safe 2.11 is now available.

Currently, Password Safe is an open source project at SourceForge, and is run by Rony Shapiro. Thank you to him and to all the other programmers who worked on the project.

Note that my Password Safe is not the same as this, this, this, or this PasswordSafe. (I should have picked a more obscure name for the program.)

It is the same as this, for the PocketPC.

Posted on June 15, 2005 at 1:35 PMView Comments

Attack Trends: 2004 and 2005

Counterpane Internet Security, Inc., monitors more than 450 networks in 35 countries, in every time zone. In 2004 we saw 523 billion network events, and our analysts investigated 648,000 security “tickets.” What follows is an overview of what’s happening on the Internet right now, and what we expect to happen in the coming months.

In 2004, 41 percent of the attacks we saw were unauthorized activity of some kind, 21 percent were scanning, 26 percent were unauthorized access, 9 percent were DoS (denial of service), and 3 percent were misuse of applications.

Over the past few months, the two attack vectors that we saw in volume were against the Windows DCOM (Distributed Component Object Model) interface of the RPC (remote procedure call) service and against the Windows LSASS (Local Security Authority Subsystem Service). These seem to be the current favorites for virus and worm writers, and we expect this trend to continue.

The virus trend doesn’t look good. In the last six months of 2004, we saw a plethora of attacks based on browser vulnerabilities (such as GDI-JPEG image vulnerability and IFRAME) and an increase in sophisticated worm and virus attacks. More than 1,000 new worms and viruses were discovered in the last six months alone.

In 2005, we expect to see ever-more-complex worms and viruses in the wild, incorporating complex behavior: polymorphic worms, metamorphic worms, and worms that make use of entry-point obscuration. For example, SpyBot.KEG is a sophisticated vulnerability assessment worm that reports discovered vulnerabilities back to the author via IRC channels.

We expect to see more blended threats: exploit code that combines malicious code with vulnerabilities in order to launch an attack. We expect Microsoft’s IIS (Internet Information Services) Web server to continue to be an attractive target. As more and more companies migrate to Windows 2003 and IIS 6, however, we expect attacks against IIS to decrease.

We also expect to see peer-to-peer networking as a vector to launch viruses.

Targeted worms are another trend we’re starting to see. Recently there have been worms that use third-party information-gathering techniques, such as Google, for advanced reconnaissance. This leads to a more intelligent propagation methodology; instead of propagating scattershot, these worms are focusing on specific targets. By identifying targets through third-party information gathering, the worms reduce the noise they would normally make when randomly selecting targets, thus increasing the window of opportunity between release and first detection.

Another 2004 trend that we expect to continue in 2005 is crime. Hacking has moved from a hobbyist pursuit with a goal of notoriety to a criminal pursuit with a goal of money. Hackers can sell unknown vulnerabilities—”zero-day exploits”—on the black market to criminals who use them to break into computers. Hackers with networks of hacked machines can make money by selling them to spammers or phishers. They can use them to attack networks. We have started seeing criminal extortion over the Internet: hackers with networks of hacked machines threatening to launch DoS attacks against companies. Most of these attacks are against fringe industries—online gambling, online computer gaming, online pornography—and against offshore networks. The more these extortions are successful, the more emboldened the criminals will become.

We expect to see more attacks against financial institutions, as criminals look for new ways to commit fraud. We also expect to see more insider attacks with a criminal profit motive. Already most of the targeted attacks—as opposed to attacks of opportunity—originate from inside the attacked organization’s network.

We also expect to see more politically motivated hacking, whether against countries, companies in “political” industries (petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals, etc.), or political organizations. Although we don’t expect to see terrorism occur over the Internet, we do expect to see more nuisance attacks by hackers who have political motivations.

The Internet is still a dangerous place, but we don’t foresee people or companies abandoning it. The economic and social reasons for using the Internet are still far too compelling.

This essay originally appeared in the June 2005 issue of Queue.

Posted on June 6, 2005 at 1:02 PMView Comments

New Feature: 100 Latest Comments

If you look to the right, under the “Recent Entries,” you’ll see a link to the “100 Latest Comments.” This link takes you to a single page with the 100 most recent comments to this blog, in reverse chronological order.

It’s a quick and easy way to stay abreast of the various conversations going on here at Schneier on Security. I wish other blogs would do this.

Posted on May 18, 2005 at 12:36 PMView Comments

Fixing Unicode

The Unicode community is working on fixing the security vulnerabilities I talked about here and here. They have a draft technical report that they’re looking for comments on. A solution to these security problems will take some concerted efforts, since there are many different kinds of issues involved. (In some ways, the “paypal.com” hack is one of the simpler cases.)

Posted on March 13, 2005 at 9:31 AMView Comments

Unicode URL Hack

A long time ago I wrote about the security risks of Unicode. This is an example of the problem.

Here’s a demo: it’s a Web page that appears to be www.paypal.com but is not PayPal. Everything from the address bar to the hover-over status on the link says www.paypal.com.

It works by substituting a Unicode character for the second “a” in PayPal. That Unicode character happens to look like an English “a,” but it’s not an “a.” The attack works even under SSL.

Here’s the source code of the link: http://www.p&amp#1072;ypal.com/

Secuna has some information on how to fix this vulnerability. So does BoingBoing.

Posted on February 16, 2005 at 9:17 AMView Comments

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.