Friday Squid Blogging: Squid Birth Video
Amazing video of squid giving birth.
Entries Tagged "videos"
Page 16 of 17
Marx Brothers on Security
Count the security lessons: bad password management, protocol failures, poor authentication, check fraud, and—I suppose—an attack made possible by poor bounds checking. What else?
2007 EFF Pioneer Award
Last Tuesday I accepted my EFF Pioneer Award. Here’s an audio of my speech, and here’s a blog report from the event.
I am very pleased to receive the award, and am simply stunned by this quote from Cory Doctorow:
Technology could never achieve what the fundamental values of a democratic society can attain. We can change the world with the power of ideas. I defy you to read Bruce’s incredible essays and not have it change the way you think about the world.
EDITED (4/6): Here’s a video.
Schneier on Video: Security Theater Against Movie Plot Threats
On June 10, 2006, I gave a talk at the ACLU New Jersey Membership Conference: “Counterterrorism in America: Security Theater Against Movie-Plot Threats.” Here’s the video.
EDITED TO ADD (2/10): The video is a little over an hour long. You can download the .WMV version directly here. It will play in the cross-platform, GPL VLC media player, but you may need to upgrade to the most recent version (0.8.6).
EDITED TO ADD (2/11): Someone put the video up on Google Video.
"Family Guy" on Airport Security
Funny clip.
EDITED TO ADD (1/8): Amazingly enough, this was aired before 9/11. I think it makes better satire now.
Friday Squid Blogging: Giant Squid Captured on Video
Japanese researchers have captured a giant squid on video. Great pictures, too.
Not Paying Attention at the Virginia DMV
Two men have been issued Virginia drivers’ licenses even though they were wearing outlandish disguises when they had their pictures taken at the Department of Motor Vehicles:
Will Carsola and Dave Stewart posted Internet videos of their pranks, which included scenes of Carsola spray-painting his face and neck bright red and Stewart painting the top of his head black and sticking a row of fake buckteeth in his mouth in an Asian caricature. They each enter the DMV office and return with real licenses with photos of their new likenesses.
In another video, a shaved-headed Carsola comes out of the DMV with a photo of his eyes crossed, and another friend obtains a license after spray-painting on a thick, black beard and monobrow.
The Virginia DMV is now demanding that the two come back and get real pictures taken.
I never thought I would say this, but I agree with everything Michelle Malkin says on this issue:
These guys have done the Virginia DMV—and the nation—a big favor. Many of us have tried to argue how much of a joke these agencies and our homeland security remain after 9/11—particularly the issuance of driver’s licenses (it was the Virginia DMV that issued state photo ID to several 9/11 hijackers who were aided by illegal aliens).
But few dissertations and policy analyses drive the message home more effectively than these two damning videos.
Thanks, guys.
I honestly don’t know if she realizes that REAL ID won’t solve this kind of problem, though. Nor will it solve the problem of people getting legitimate IDs in the names of people whose identity they stole, or real IDs in fake names by bribing DMV employees. (Several of the 9/11 hijackers did this, in Virginia.)
New Diebold Vulnerability
Ed Felten and his team at Princeton have analyzed a Diebold machine:
This paper presents a fully independent security study of a Diebold AccuVote-TS voting machine, including its hardware and software. We obtained the machine from a private party. Analysis of the machine, in light of real election procedures, shows that it is vulnerable to extremely serious attacks. For example, an attacker who gets physical access to a machine or its removable memory card for as little as one minute could install malicious code; malicious code on a machine could steal votes undetectably, modifying all records, logs, and counters to be consistent with the fraudulent vote count it creates. An attacker could also create malicious code that spreads automatically and silently from machine to machine during normal election activities—a voting-machine virus. We have constructed working demonstrations of these attacks in our lab. Mitigating these threats will require changes to the voting machine’s hardware and software and the adoption of more rigorous election procedures.
(Executive summary. Full paper. FAQ. Video demonstration.)
Diebold has repeatedly disputed the findings then as speculation. But the Princeton study appears to demonstrate conclusively that a single malicious person could insert a virus into a machine and flip votes. The study also reveals a number of other vulnerabilities, including that voter access cards used on Diebold systems could be created inexpensively on a personal laptop computer, allowing people to vote as many times as they wish.
Bomb or Not?
Can you identify the bombs?
In related news, here’s a guy who makes it through security with a live vibrator in his pants.
There’s also a funny video on Dutch TV. A screener scans a passenger’s bag, putting aside several obvious bags of cocaine to warn him about a very tiny nail file.
Here’s where to buy stuff seized at Boston’s Logan Airport. I also read somewhere that some stuff ends up on eBay.
And finally,Quinn Norton said: “I think someone should try to blow up a plane with a piece of ID, just to watch the TSA’s mind implode.”
Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.