Entries Tagged "TSA"
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Airlines Profiting from TSA Rules
From CNN:
Before 9/11, airlines and security personnel—and I use the term “security personnel” loosely—might have let a nickname or even a maiden name on a ticket slide. No longer. If you have the wrong name on your ticket, you’re probably grounded. And there are two reasons for this: security and greed.
The Transportation Security Administration wants to be sure the same person who bought the ticket, and who was screened, is boarding the plane. But when there’s an inexact match, the airline can either charge a $100 “change” fee or force you to buy a new ticket. In an industry where every dollar counts, the exact-name rule is the government’s gift to cash-starved air carriers.
That’s the situation Gordon was confronted with, even when it was obvious that “Jan” and “Janet” were one and the same. There were suggestions that a new ticket might need to be purchased. “We didn’t let it get to that,” he recalls. Instead, he asked to speak with a supervisor who could finally fix the codes so that the ticket and passport matched up. How did all of this happen in the first place? Turns out Jan Gordon had signed up for a frequent flier account under her informal name, so when she booked an award ticket, it also used her informal—and inaccurate—name.
There are two things to get pissed off about here. One, the airlines profiting off a TSA rule. And two, a TSA rule that requires them to ignore what is obvious.
EDITED TO ADD (5/28): To add some more detail here, the rule makes absolutely no sense. If this were sensible, the TSA employee who checks the ticket against the ID would make the determination if the names were the same. Instead, the passenger is forced to go back to the airline who, for a fee, changes the name on the ticket to match the ID. This latter system is no more secure. If anything, it’s less secure. But rules are rules, so it’s what has to happen.
Sky Marshals on the No-Fly List
If this weren’t so sad, it would be funny:
The problem with federal air marshals (FAM) names matching those of suspected terrorists on the no-fly list has persisted for years, say air marshals familiar with the situation.
One air marshal said it has been “a major problem, where guys are denied boarding by the airline.”
“In some cases, planes have departed without any coverage because the airline employees were adamant they would not fly,” the air marshal said. “I’ve seen guys actually being denied boarding.”
A second air marshal says one agent “has been getting harassed for six years because his exact name is on the no-fly list.”
Seriously—if these people can’t get their names off the list, what hope do the rest of us have? Not that the no-fly list has any real value, anyway.
Boring Jobs Dull the Mind
We already knew this, but it’s good to reinforce the lesson:
In the study, Dr Eichele and his colleagues asked participants to repeatedly perform a “flanker task”—an experiment in which individuals must quickly respond to visual clues.
As they did so, brain scans were performed using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI).
They found the participants’ mistakes were “foreshadowed” by a particular pattern of brain activity.
“To our surprise, up to 30 seconds before the mistake we could detect a distinct shift in activity,” said Dr Stefan Debener, of Southampton University, UK.
“The brain begins to economise, by investing less effort to complete the same task.
“We see a reduction in activity in the prefrontal cortex. At the same time, we see an increase in activity in an area which is more active in states of rest, known as the Default Mode Network (DMN).”
This has security implications whenever you have people watching the same thing over and over again, looking for anomalies: airport screeners looking at X-ray scans, casino dealers looking for cheaters, building guards looking for bad guys. It’s hard to do it correctly, because the brain doesn’t work that way.
EDITED TO ADD (4/28): This video demonstrates the point nicely.
Software that Assesses Security Risks to Transportation Networks
The TSA wants a tool that will assess risks against transportation networks:
“The tool will assist in prioritization of security measures based on their risk reduction potential,” said the statement of work accompanying TSA’s formal solicitation, which was posted April 18.
The software tool would help TSA gather and organize information about specific transport modes and assist agency officials to make risk management decisions.
The contract, which will be issued by TSA’s office of operational process and technology, envisions a one-year base period plus four one-year options. The chosen vendor will be expected to install the software, troubleshoot any hardware or software problems, consult on building risk assessment modules, attend classified intelligence meetings at TSA headquarters and maintain the software.
I don’t think you have to be very good to qualify here. This automated system put Boise, ID, on the top of its list of most vulnerable cities. The bar isn’t very high here; I’m just saying.
The Liquid Bomb
We finally have some actual information about the “liquid bomb” that was planned by that London group arrested in 2006:
The court heard the bombers intended to use hydrogen peroxide and mix it with a product called Tang, used in soft drinks, to turn it into an explosive.
They intended to carry it on board disguised as 500ml bottles of Oasis or Lucozade by using food dye to recreate the drinks’ distinctive colour.
The detonator would have been disguised as AA 1.5 batteries. The contents of the batteries would have been removed and an electric element such as a lightbulb or wiring would have been inserted.
A disposable camera would have provided a power source.
Any chemists want to take a crack at this one?
Would-Be Bomber Caught at Orlando Airport
Oddly enough, I flew into Orlando Airport on Tuesday night, hours after TSA and police caught Kevin Brown—not the baseball player—with bomb-making equipment in his checked luggage. (Yes, checked luggage. He was bringing it to Jamaica, not planning on blowing up the plane he was on.) Seems like someone trained in behavioral profiling singled him out, probably for stuff like this:
“He was rocking left to right, bouncing up and down … he was there acting crazy,” passenger Jason Doyle said.
But that was a passenger remembering Brown after the fact, so I wouldn’t put too much credence in it.
There are a bunch of articles about Brown and potential motives. Note that he is not an Islamic terrorist; he’s a U.S. Army veteran who served in Iraq:
“This is not him,” she said in a phone interview. “It has to be a mental issue for him. I know if they looked through his medical records…I’m sure they will see…”He’s not a terrorist.”
Brown married Holt’s daughter, Kamishia, 25, about three years ago. They met while serving in the Army and separated a year later. Brown wasn’t the same after returning from Iraq, her daughter told her.
“When he doesn’t take it [medication], he’s off the chain,” Holt said. “When you don’t take it and drink alcohol, it makes it worse.”
Doesn’t sound like a terrorist, but this does:
According to the affidavit, Brown admitted he had the items because he wanted to make pipe bombs in Jamaica. It also indicated he wanted to show friends how to make pipe bombs like he made while in Iraq.
Federal agents said federal agents found two vodka bottles filled with nitro-methane, a highly explosive liquid, as well as galvanized pipes, end caps with holes, BBs, a model-rocket igniter, AA batteries, a lighter and lighter fluid, plus other items used to make pipe bombs and detailed instructions and diagrams. He indicated the items were purchased in Gainesville where he lived at one time.
Ignore the hyperbole; nitromethane is a liquid fuel, not a high explosive. Here’s the whole affidavit, if you want to read it.
Even with all this news, the truth is that we just don’t know what happened. It looks like a great win for behavioral profiling (which, when done well, I think is a good idea) and the TSA. The TSA is certainly pleased. But we’ve seen apparent TSA wins before that turn out to be bogus when the details finally come out. Right now I’m cautiously pleased with the TSA’s performance, and offer them a tentative congratulations, especially for not over-reacting. I read—but can’t find the link now—that only 11 flights were delayed because of the event. The TSA claims that no flights were delayed, and also says that no security checkpoints were closed. Either way, it’s certainly something to congratulate the TSA about.
Bottle Liquid Scanners
Got an idea for how to build one? The TSA wants to give you money.
TSA's Ideal Laptop Bag
This seems not to be a joke.
The Transportation Security Administration is interested in evaluating—and eventually approving –- the design of certain laptop bags, so travelers would be permitted to pass through security checkpoints without having to remove their laptops.
[…]
To accomplish this, the TSA RFI pointed out that the laptop bag would need to meet the following requirements:
- The carrying bag cannot exceed any one of the proposed dimensions – 16 inches in height, 24 inches wide and 36 inches long.
- The materials that make up the bag cannot degrade the quality of the X-ray image of the laptop.
- No straps, pockets, zippers, handles or closures of the bag can interfere with the image of the laptop.
- No electronics, chargers, batteries, wires, paper products, pens or other contents of the bag can shield the image of the laptop.
TSA is inviting bag designers and manufacturers to come up with creative ways to meet these design requirements, but it has also suggested three concepts of its own:
- A bag that would open completely, and lie horizontally on the X-ray belt, such that one side with hold only the laptop.
- A bag that would open completely, leaving the laptop standing vertically, supported by clips.
- A bag that would pull apart in separate compartments, with one compartment containing only the laptop.
Doesn’t sound like a particularly useful laptop bag.
Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.