Entries Tagged "terrorism"

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Scott Atran on Why People Become Terrorists

Scott Atran has done some really interesting research on why ordinary people become terrorists.

Academics who study warfare and terrorism typically don’t conduct research just kilometers from the front lines of battle. But taking the laboratory to the fight is crucial for figuring out what impels people to make the ultimate sacrifice to, for example, impose Islamic law on others, says Atran, who is affiliated with the National Center for Scientific Research in Paris.

Atran’s war zone research over the last few years, and interviews during the last decade with members of various groups engaged in militant jihad (or holy war in the name of Islamic law), give him a gritty perspective on this issue. He rejects popular assumptions that people frequently join up, fight and die for terrorist groups due to mental problems, poverty, brainwashing or savvy recruitment efforts by jihadist organizations.

Instead, he argues, young people adrift in a globalized world find their own way to ISIS, looking to don a social identity that gives their lives significance. Groups of dissatisfied young adult friends around the world ­ often with little knowledge of Islam but yearning for lives of profound meaning and glory ­ typically choose to become volunteers in the Islamic State army in Syria and Iraq, Atran contends. Many of these individuals connect via the internet and social media to form a global community of alienated youth seeking heroic sacrifice, he proposes.

Preliminary experimental evidence suggests that not only global terrorism, but also festering state and ethnic conflicts, revolutions and even human rights movements—think of the U.S. civil rights movement in the 1960s—depend on what Atran refers to as devoted actors. These individuals, he argues, will sacrifice themselves, their families and anyone or anything else when a volatile mix of conditions are in play. First, devoted actors adopt values they regard as sacred and nonnegotiable, to be defended at all costs. Then, when they join a like-minded group of nonkin that feels like a family ­ a band of brothers ­ a collective sense of invincibility and special destiny overwhelms feelings of individuality. As members of a tightly bound group that perceives its sacred values under attack, devoted actors will kill and die for each other.

Paper.

EDITED TO ADD (8/13): Related paper, also by Atran.

Posted on August 10, 2016 at 12:20 PM • View Comments

Security Effectiveness of the Israeli West Bank Barrier

Interesting analysis:

Abstract: Objectives—Informed by situational crime prevention (SCP) this study evaluates the effectiveness of the “West Bank Barrier” that the Israeli government began to construct in 2002 in order to prevent suicide bombing attacks.

Methods—Drawing on crime wave models of past SCP research, the study uses a time series of terrorist attacks and fatalities and their location in respect to the Barrier, which was constructed in different sections over different periods of time, between 1999 and 2011.

Results—The Barrier together with associated security activities was effective in preventing suicide bombings and other attacks and fatalities with little if any apparent displacement. Changes in terrorist behavior likely resulted from the construction of the Barrier, not from other external factors or events.

Conclusions—In some locations, terrorists adapted to changed circumstances by committing more opportunistic attacks that require less planning. Fatalities and attacks were also reduced on the Palestinian side of the Barrier, producing an expected “diffusion of benefits” though the amount of reduction was considerably more than in past SCP studies. The defensive roles of the Barrier and offensive opportunities it presents, are identified as possible explanations. The study highlights the importance of SCP in crime and counter-terrorism policy.

Unfortunately, the whole paper is behind a paywall.

Note: This is not a political analysis of the net positive and negative effects of the wall, just a security analysis. Of course any full analysis needs to take the geopolitics into account. The comment section is not the place for this broader discussion.

Posted on July 14, 2016 at 5:58 AM • View Comments

Good Article on Airport Security

The New York Times wrote a good piece comparing airport security around the world, and pointing out that moving the security perimeter doesn’t make any difference if the attack can occur just outside the perimeter. Mark Stewart has the good quote:

“Perhaps the most cost-effective measure is policing and intelligence—to stop them before they reach the target,” Mr. Stewart said.

Sounds like something I would say.

Posted on July 6, 2016 at 9:45 AM • View Comments

Security and Human Behavior (SHB 2016)

Earlier this week, I was at the ninth Workshop on Security and Human Behavior, hosted at Harvard University.

SHB is a small invitational gathering of people studying various aspects of the human side of security. The fifty or so people in the room include psychologists, economists, computer security researchers, sociologists, political scientists, philosophers, political scientists, neuroscientists, lawyers, anthropologists, business school professors, and a smattering of others. It’s not just an interdisciplinary event; most of the people here are individually interdisciplinary.

These are the most intellectually stimulating two days of my year; this year someone called it “Bruce’s brain in conference form.”

The goal is maximum interaction and discussion. We do that by putting everyone on panels. There are eight six-person panels over the course of the two days. Everyone gets to talk for ten minutes about their work, and then there’s half an hour of discussion in the room. Then there are lunches, dinners, and receptions—all designed so people meet each other and talk.

This page lists the participants and gives links to some of their work. As usual, Ross Anderson liveblogged the talks.

Here are my posts on the first, second, third, fourth, fifth, sixth, seventh, and eighth SHB workshops. Follow those links to find summaries, papers, and audio recordings of the workshops.

Posted on June 3, 2016 at 1:36 PM • View Comments

Detecting Explosives

Really interesting article on the difficulties involved with explosive detection at airport security checkpoints.

Abstract: The mid-air bombing of a Somali passenger jet in February was a wake-up call for security agencies and those working in the field of explosive detection. It was also a reminder that terrorist groups from Yemen to Syria to East Africa continue to explore innovative ways to get bombs onto passenger jets by trying to beat detection systems or recruit insiders. The layered state-of-the-art detection systems that are now in place at most airports in the developed world make it very hard for terrorists to sneak bombs onto planes, but the international aviation sector remains vulnerable because many airports in the developing world either have not deployed these technologies or have not provided rigorous training for operators. Technologies and security measures will need to improve to stay one step ahead of innovative terrorists. Given the pattern of recent Islamic State attacks, there is a strong argument for extending state-of-the-art explosive detection systems beyond the aviation sector to locations such as sports arenas and music venues.

I disagree with his conclusions—the last sentence above—but the technical information on explosives detection technology is really interesting.

Posted on May 20, 2016 at 2:06 PM • View Comments

Bypassing Phone Security through Social Engineering

This works:

Khan was arrested in mid-July 2015. Undercover police officers posing as company managers arrived at his workplace and asked to check his driver and work records, according to the source. When they disputed where he was on a particular day, he got out his iPhone and showed them the record of his work.

The undercover officers asked to see his iPhone and Khan handed it over. After that, he was arrested. British police had 30 seconds to change the password settings to keep the phone open.

Reminds me about how the FBI arrested Ross William Ulbricht:

The agents had tailed him, waiting for the 29-year-old to open his computer and enter his passwords before swooping in.

That also works.

And, yes, I understand that none of this would have worked with the already dead Syed Farook and his iPhone.

Posted on April 7, 2016 at 6:39 AM • View Comments

Smart Essay on the Limitations of Anti-Terrorism Security

This is good:

Threats constantly change, yet our political discourse suggests that our vulnerabilities are simply for lack of resources, commitment or competence. Sometimes, that is true. But mostly we are vulnerable because we choose to be; because we’ve accepted, at least implicitly, that some risk is tolerable. A state that could stop every suicide bomber wouldn’t be a free or, let’s face it, fun one.

We will simply never get to maximum defensive posture. Regardless of political affiliation, Americans wouldn’t tolerate the delay or intrusion of an urban mass-transit system that required bag checks and pat-downs. After the 2013 Boston Marathon bombing, many wondered how to make the race safe the next year. A heavier police presence helps, but the only truly safe way to host a marathon is to not have one at all. The risks we tolerate, then, are not necessarily bad bargains simply because an enemy can exploit them.

No matter what promises are made on the campaign trail, terrorism will never be vanquished. There is no ideology, no surveillance, no wall that will definitely stop some 24-year-old from becoming radicalized on the Web, gaining access to guns and shooting a soft target. When we don’t admit this to ourselves, we often swing between the extremes of putting our heads in the sand or losing them entirely.

I am reminded of my own 2006 “Refuse to be Terrorized” essay.

Posted on April 3, 2016 at 7:42 PM • View Comments

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Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.