Entries Tagged "surveillance"
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The Doghouse: Onboard Threat Detection System
It’s almost too absurd to even write about seriously—this plan to spot terrorists in airplane seats:
Cameras fitted to seat-backs will record every twitch, blink, facial expression or suspicious movement before sending the data to onboard software which will check it against individual passenger profiles.
[…]
They say that rapid eye movements, blinking excessively, licking lips or ways of stroking hair or ears are classic symptoms of somebody trying to conceal something.
A separate microphone will hear and record even whispered remarks. Islamic suicide bombers are known to whisper texts from the Koran in the moments before they explode bombs.
The software being developed by the scientists will be so sophisticated that it will be able to take account of nervous flyers or people with a natural twitch, helping to ensure there are no false alarms.
The only thing I can think of is that some company press release got turned into real news without a whole lot of thinking.
Cameras Protecting Other Cameras
There is a proposal in Scotland to protect automatic speed-trap cameras from vandals by monitoring them with other cameras.
Then, I suppose we need still other cameras to protect the camera-watching cameras.
I am reminded of a certain building corner in York. Centuries ago it was getting banged up by carts and whatnot, so the owners stuck a post in the ground a couple of feet away from the corner to protect it. Time passed, and the post itself became historically significant. So now there is another post a couple of feet away from the first one to protect it.
When will it end?
Ubiquitous Surveillance
Nothing new in this article, but it’s nice to see it on the front page of The Washington Post.
Wholesale Surveillance
I had an op-ed published in the Arizona Star today:
Technology is fundamentally changing the nature of surveillance. Years ago, surveillance meant trench-coated detectives following people down streets. It was laborious and expensive and was used only when there was reasonable suspicion of a crime. Modern surveillance is the policeman with a license-plate scanner, or even a remote license-plate scanner mounted on a traffic light and a policeman sitting at a computer in the station.
It’s the same, but it’s completely different. It’s wholesale surveillance. And it disrupts the balance between the powers of the police and the rights of the people.
The news hook I used was this article, about the police testing a vehicle-mounted automatic license plate scanner. Unfortunately, I got the police department wrong. It’s the Arizona State Police, not the Tucson Police.
Radio Transmitters Found in Canadian Coins
Radio transmitters have been found in Canadian coins:
Canadian coins containing tiny transmitters have mysteriously turned up in the pockets of at least three American contractors who visited Canada, says a branch of the U.S. Defense Department.
Security experts believe the miniature devices could be used to track the movements of defence industry personnel dealing in sensitive military technology.
Sounds implausible, really. There are far easier ways to track someone than to give him something he’s going to give away the next time he buys a cup of coffee. Like, maybe, by his cell phone.
And then we have this:
A report that some Canadian coins have been compromised by secretly embedded spy transmitters is overblown, according to a U.S. official familiar with the case.
“There is no story there,” the official, who asked not to be named, told The Globe and Mail.
He said that while some odd-looking Canadian coins briefly triggered suspicions in the United States, he said that the fears proved groundless: “We have no evidence to indicate anything connected with these coins poses a risk or danger.”
Take your pick. Either the original story was overblown, or those involved are trying to spin the news to cover their tracks. We definitely don’t have very many facts here.
EDITED TO ADD (1/18): The U.S. retracts the story.
Surveillance Cameras Catch a Cold-Blooded Killer
I’m in the middle of writing a long essay on the psychology of security. One of the things I’m writing about is the “availability heuristic,” which basically says that the human brain tends to assess the frequency of a class of events based on how easy it is to bring an instance of that class to mind. It explains why people tend to be afraid of the risks that are discussed in the media, or why people are afraid to fly but not afraid to drive.
One of the effects of this heuristic is that people are more persuaded by a vivid example than they are by statistics. The latter might be more useful, but the former is easier to remember.
That’s the context in which I want you to think about this very gripping story about a cold-blooded killer caught by city-wide surveillance cameras.
Federal agents showed Peterman the recordings from that morning. One camera captured McDermott, 48, getting off the bus. A man wearing a light jacket and dark pants got off the same bus, and followed a few steps behind her.
Another camera caught them as they rounded the corner. McDermott didn’t seem to notice the man following her. Halfway down the block, the man suddenly raised his arm and shot her once in the back of the head.
“I’ve seen shootings incidents on video before,” Peterman said, “but the suddenness, and that he did it for no reason at all, was really scary.”
I can write essay after essay about the inefficacy of security cameras. I can talk about trade-offs, and the better ways to spend the money. I can cite statistics and experts and whatever I want. But—used correctly—stories like this one will do more to move public opinion than anything I can do.
Secure Flight Privacy Report
The Department of Homeland Security’s own Privacy Office released a report on privacy issues with Secure Flight, the new airline passenger matching program. It’s not good, which is why the government tried to bury it by releasing it to the public the Friday before Christmas. And that’s why I’m waiting until after New Year’s Day before posting this.
Summary:
The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Privacy Office conducted a review of the Transportation Security Administration’s (TSA) collection and use of commercial data during initial testing for the Secure Flight program that occurred in the fall 2004 through spring 2005. The Privacy Office review was undertaken following notice by the TSA Privacy Officer of preliminary concerns raised by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) that, contrary to published privacy notices and public statements, TSA may have accessed and stored personally identifying data from commercial sources as part of its efforts to fashion a passenger prescreening program.
These new concerns followed much earlier public complaints that TSA collected passenger name record data from airlines to test the developmental passenger prescreening program without giving adequate notice to the public. Thus, the Privacy Office’s review of the Secure Flight commercial data testing also sought to determine whether the data collection from air carriers and commercial data brokers about U.S. persons was consistent with published privacy documents.
The Privacy Office appreciates the cooperation in this review by TSA management, staff, and contractors involved in the commercial data testing. The Privacy Office wishes to recognize that, with the best intentions, TSA undertook considerable efforts to address information privacy and security in the development of the Secure Flight Program. Notwithstanding these efforts, we are concerned that shortcomings identified in this report reflect what appear to be largely unintentional, yet significant privacy missteps that merit the careful attention and privacy leadership that TSA Administrator Kip Hawley is giving to the development of the Secure Flight program and, in support of which, the DHS Acting Chief Privacy Officer has committed to provide Privacy Office staff resources and privacy guidance.
I’ve written about Secure Flight many times. I suppose this is a good summary post. This is a post about the Secure Flight Privacy/IT Working Group, which I was a member of, and its final report. That link also includes links to my other posts on the program.
Auditory Eavesdropping
In the information age, surveillance isn’t just for the police. Marketers want to watch you, too: what you do, where you go, what you buy. Integrated Media Measurement, Inc. wants to know what you watch and what you listen to—wherever you are.
They do this by turning traditional ratings collection on its head. Instead of a Nielsen-like system, which monitors individual televisions in an effort to figure out who’s watching, IMMI measures individual people and tries to figure out what they’re watching (or listening to). They do this through specially designed cell phones that automatically eavesdrop on what’s going on in the room they’re in:
The IMMI phone randomly samples 10 seconds of room audio every 30 seconds. These samples are reduced to digital signatures, which are uploaded continuously to the IMMI servers.
IMMI also tracks all local media outlets actively broadcasting in any given designated media area (DMA). To identify media, IMMI compares the uploaded audio signatures computed by the phones with audio signatures computed on the IMMI servers monitoring TV and radio broadcasts. IMMI also maintains client-provided content files, such as commercials, promos, movies, and songs.
By matching the signatures, IMMI couples media broadcasts with the individuals who are exposed to them. The process takes just a few seconds.
Panel Members may sometimes delay watching or listening to a program by using satellite radio, DVRs, VCRs, or TiVo. IMMI captures these viewings with a “look-back” feature that recognizes when a Panel Member is exposed to a program outside of its normal broadcast hour, and then goes back in time (roughly two weeks) to identify it.
These cell phones are given away to test subjects, who get free service in exchange for giving up all their privacy.
I’m sure the company will claim not to actually eavesdrop on in-room conversations, or cell phone conversations. And just how different are these special phones, anyway? Can the software be installed on off-the-shelf phones? Can it be done without the owner’s knowledge or consent? The potential for abuse here is enormous.
Remember, the threats to privacy in the information age are not solely from government; they’re from private industry as well. And the real threat is the alliance between the two.
Tracking People by their Sneakers
Researchers at the University of Washington have demonstrated a surveillance system that automatically tracks people through the Nike+iPod Sport Kit. Basically, the kit contains a transmitter that you stick in your sneakers and a receiver you attach to your iPod. This allows you to track things like time, distance, pace, and calories burned. Pretty clever.
However, it turns out that the transmitter in your sneaker can be read up to 60 feet away. And because it broadcasts a unique ID, you can be tracked by it. In the demonstration, the researchers built a surveillance device (at a cost of about $250) and interfaced their surveillance system with Google Maps. Details are in the paper. Very scary.
This is a great demonstration for anyone who is skeptical that RFID chips can be used to track people. It’s a good example because the chips have no personal identifying information, yet can still be used to track people. As long as the chips have unique IDs, those IDs can be used for surveillance.
To me, the real significance of this work is how easy it was. The people who designed the Nike/iPod system put zero thought into security and privacy issues. Unless we enact some sort of broad law requiring companies to add security into these sorts of systems, companies will continue to produce devices that erode our privacy through new technologies. Not on purpose, not because they’re evil—just because it’s easier to ignore the externality than to worry about it.
Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.