Entries Tagged "SSL"

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UAE Man-in-the-Middle Attack Against SSL

Interesting:

Who are these certificate authorities? At the beginning of Web history, there were only a handful of companies, like Verisign, Equifax, and Thawte, that made near-monopoly profits from being the only providers trusted by Internet Explorer or Netscape Navigator. But over time, browsers have trusted more and more organizations to verify Web sites. Safari and Firefox now trust more than 60 separate certificate authorities by default. Microsoft’s software trusts more than 100 private and government institutions.

Disturbingly, some of these trusted certificate authorities have decided to delegate their powers to yet more organizations, which aren’t tracked or audited by browser companies. By scouring the Net for certificates, security researchers have uncovered more than 600 groups who, through such delegation, are now also automatically trusted by most browsers, including the Department of Homeland Security, Google, and Ford Motors­and a UAE mobile phone company called Etisalat.

In 2005, a company called CyberTrust­—which has since been purchased by Verizon­—gave Etisalat, the government-connected mobile company in the UAE, the right to verify that a site is valid. Here’s why this is trouble: Since browsers now automatically trust Etisalat to confirm a site’s identity, the company has the potential ability to fake a secure connection to any site Etisalat subscribers might visit using a man-in-the-middle scheme.

EDITED TO ADD (9/14): EFF has gotten involved.

Posted on September 3, 2010 at 6:27 AMView Comments

UAE to Ban BlackBerrys

The United Arab Emirates — Dubai, etc. — is threatening to ban BlackBerrys because they can’t eavesdrop on them.

At the heart of the battle is access to the data transmitted by BlackBerrys. RIM processes the information through a handful of secure Network Operations Centers around the world, meaning that most governments can’t access the data easily on their own. The U.A.E. worries that because of jurisdictional issues, its courts couldn’t compel RIM to turn over secure data from its servers, which are outside the U.A.E. even in a national-security situation, a person familiar with the situation said.

This is a weird story for several reasons:

1. The UAE can’t eavesdrop on BlackBerry traffic because it is encrypted between RIM’s servers and the phones. That makes sense, but conventional e-mail services are no different. Gmail, for example, is encrypted between Google’s servers and the users’ computers. So are most other webmail services. Is the mobile nature of BlackBerrys really that different? Is it really not a problem that any smart phone can access webmail through an encrypted SSL tunnel?

2. This an isolated move in a complicated negotiation between the UAE and RIM.

The U.A.E. ban, due to start Oct. 11, was the result of the “failure of ongoing attempts, dating back to 2007, to bring BlackBerry services in the U.A.E. in line with U.A.E. telecommunications regulations,” the country’s Telecommunications Regulatory Authority said Sunday. The ban doesn’t affect telephone and text-messaging services.

And:

The U.A.E. wanted RIM to locate servers in the country, where it had legal jurisdiction over them; RIM had offered access to the data of 3,000 clients instead, the person said.

There’s no reason to announce the ban over a month before it goes into effect, other than to prod RIM to respond in some way.

3. It’s not obvious who will blink first. RIM has about 500,000 users in the UAE. RIM doesn’t want to lose those subscribers, but the UAE doesn’t want to piss those people off, either. The UAE needs them to work and do business in their country, especially as real estate prices continue to collapse.

4. India, China, and Russia threatened to kick BlackBerrys out for this reason, but relented when RIM agreed to “address concerns,” which is code for “allowed them to eavesdrop.”

Most countries have negotiated agreements with RIM that enable their security agencies to monitor and decipher this traffic. For example, Russia’s two main mobile phone providers, MTS and Vimpelcom, began selling BlackBerrys after they agreed to provide access to the federal security service. “We resolved this question,” Vimpelcom says. “We provided access.”

The launch of BlackBerry service by China Mobile was delayed until RIM negotiated an agreement that enables China to monitor traffic.

Similarly, last week India lifted a threat to ban BlackBerry services after RIM agreed to address concerns.

[…]

Nevertheless, while RIM has declined to comment on the details of its arrangements with any government, it issued an opaque statement on Monday: “RIM respects both the regulatory requirements of government and the security and privacy needs of corporations and consumers.”

How did they do that? Did they put RIM servers in those countries, and allow the government access to the traffic? Did they pipe the raw traffic back to those countries from their servers elsewhere? Did they just promise to turn over any data when asked?

RIM makes a big deal about how secure its users’ data is, but I don’t know how much of that to believe:

RIM said the BlackBerry network was set up so that “no one, including RIM, could access” customer data, which is encrypted from the time it leaves the device. It added that RIM would “simply be unable to accommodate any request” for a key to decrypt the data, since the company doesn’t have the key.

The BlackBerry network is designed “to exclude the capability for RIM or any third party to read encrypted information under any circumstances,” RIM’s statement said. Moreover, the location of BlackBerry’s servers doesn’t matter, the company said, because the data on them can’t be deciphered without a decryption key.

Am I missing something here? RIM isn’t providing a file storage service, where user-encrypted data is stored on its servers. RIM is providing a communications service. While the data is encrypted between RIM’s servers and the BlackBerrys, it has to be encrypted by RIM — so RIM has access to the plaintext.

In any case, RIM has already demonstrated that it has the technical ability to address the UAE’s concerns. Like the apocryphal story about Churchill and Lady Astor, all that’s left is to agree on a price.

5. For the record, I have absolutely no idea what this quote of mine from the Reuters story really means:

“If you want to eavesdrop on your people, then you ban whatever they’re using,” said Bruce Schneier, chief security technology officer at BT. “The basic problem is there’s encryption between the BlackBerries and the servers. We find this issue all around about encryption.”

I hope I wasn’t that incoherent during the phone interview.

EDITED TO ADD (8/5): I might have gotten a do-over with Reuters. On a phone interview yesterday, I said: “RIM’s carefully worded statements about BlackBerry security are designed to make their customers feel better, while giving the company ample room to screw them.” Jonathan Zittrain picks apart one of those statements.

Posted on August 3, 2010 at 11:08 AMView Comments

Man-in-the-Middle Attacks Against SSL

Says Matt Blaze:

A decade ago, I observed that commercial certificate authorities protect you from anyone from whom they are unwilling to take money. That turns out to be wrong; they don’t even do that much.

Scary research by Christopher Soghoian and Sid Stamm:

Abstract: This paper introduces a new attack, the compelled certificate creation attack, in which government agencies compel a certificate authority to issue false SSL certificates that are then used by intelligence agencies to covertly intercept and hijack individuals’ secure Web-based communications. We reveal alarming evidence that suggests that this attack is in active use. Finally, we introduce a lightweight browser add-on that detects and thwarts such attacks.

Even more scary, Soghoian and Stamm found that hardware to perform this attack is being produced and sold:

At a recent wiretapping convention, however, security researcher Chris Soghoian discovered that a small company was marketing internet spying boxes to the feds. The boxes were designed to intercept those communications — without breaking the encryption — by using forged security certificates, instead of the real ones that websites use to verify secure connections. To use the appliance, the government would need to acquire a forged certificate from any one of more than 100 trusted Certificate Authorities.

[…]

The company in question is known as Packet Forensics…. According to the flyer: “Users have the ability to import a copy of any legitimate key they obtain (potentially by court order) or they can generate ‘look-alike’ keys designed to give the subject a false sense of confidence in its authenticity.” The product is recommended to government investigators, saying “IP communication dictates the need to examine encrypted traffic at will.” And, “Your investigative staff will collect its best evidence while users are lulled into a false sense of security afforded by web, e-mail or VOIP encryption.”

Matt Blaze has the best analysis. Read his whole commentary; this is just the ending:

It’s worth pointing out that, from the perspective of a law enforcement or intelligence agency, this sort of surveillance is far from ideal. A central requirement for most government wiretapping (mandated, for example, in the CALEA standards for telephone interception) is that surveillance be undetectable. But issuing a bogus web certificate carries with it the risk of detection by the target, either in real-time or after the fact, especially if it’s for a web site already visited. Although current browsers don’t ordinarily detect unusual or suspiciously changed certificates, there’s no fundamental reason they couldn’t (and the Soghoian/Stamm paper proposes a Firefox plugin to do just that). In any case, there’s no reliable way for the wiretapper to know in advance whether the target will be alerted by a browser that scrutinizes new certificates.

Also, it’s not clear how web interception would be particularly useful for many of the most common law enforcement investigative scenarios. If a suspect is buying books or making hotel reservations online, it’s usually a simple (and legally relatively uncomplicated) matter to just ask the vendor about the transaction, no wiretapping required. This suggests that these products may be aimed less at law enforcement than at national intelligence agencies, who might be reluctant (or unable) to obtain overt cooperation from web site operators (who may be located abroad).

Posted on April 12, 2010 at 1:32 PMView Comments

Reacting to Security Vulnerabilities

Last month, researchers found a security flaw in the SSL protocol, which is used to protect sensitive web data. The protocol is used for online commerce, webmail, and social networking sites. Basically, hackers could hijack an SSL session and execute commands without the knowledge of either the client or the server. The list of affected products is enormous.

If this sounds serious to you, you’re right. It is serious. Given that, what should you do now? Should you not use SSL until it’s fixed, and only pay for internet purchases over the phone? Should you download some kind of protection? Should you take some other remedial action? What?

If you read the IT press regularly, you’ll see this sort of question again and again. The answer for this particular vulnerability, as for pretty much any other vulnerability you read about, is the same: do nothing. That’s right, nothing. Don’t panic. Don’t change your behavior. Ignore the problem, and let the vendors figure it out.

There are several reasons for this. One, it’s hard to figure out which vulnerabilities are serious and which are not. Vulnerabilities such as this happen multiple times a month. They affect different software, different operating systems, and different web protocols. The press either mentions them or not, somewhat randomly; just because it’s in the news doesn’t mean it’s serious.

Two, it’s hard to figure out if there’s anything you can do. Many vulnerabilities affect operating systems or Internet protocols. The only sure fix would be to avoid using your computer. Some vulnerabilities have surprising consequences. The SSL vulnerability mentioned above could be used to hack Twitter. Did you expect that? I sure didn’t.

Three, the odds of a particular vulnerability affecting you are small. There are a lot of fish in the Internet, and you’re just one of billions.

Four, often you can’t do anything. These vulnerabilities affect clients and servers, individuals and corporations. A lot of your data isn’t under your direct control — it’s on your web-based email servers, in some corporate database, or in a cloud computing application. If a vulnerability affects the computers running Facebook, for example, your data is at risk, whether you log in to Facebook or not.

It’s much smarter to have a reasonable set of default security practices and continue doing them. This includes:

1. Install an antivirus program if you run Windows, and configure it to update daily. It doesn’t matter which one you use; they’re all about the same. For Windows, I like the free version of AVG Internet Security. Apple Mac and Linux users can ignore this, as virus writers target the operating system with the largest market share.

2. Configure your OS and network router properly. Microsoft’s operating systems come with a lot of security enabled by default; this is good. But have someone who knows what they’re doing check the configuration of your router, too.

3. Turn on automatic software updates. This is the mechanism by which your software patches itself in the background, without you having to do anything. Make sure it’s turned on for your computer, OS, security software, and any applications that have the option. Yes, you have to do it for everything, as they often have separate mechanisms.

4. Show common sense regarding the Internet. This might be the hardest thing, and the most important. Know when an email is real, and when you shouldn’t click on the link. Know when a website is suspicious. Know when something is amiss.

5. Perform regular backups. This is vital. If you’re infected with something, you may have to reinstall your operating system and applications. Good backups ensure you don’t lose your data — documents, photographs, music — if that becomes necessary.

That’s basically it. I could give a longer list of safe computing practices, but this short one is likely to keep you safe. After that, trust the vendors. They spent all last month scrambling to fix the SSL vulnerability, and they’ll spend all this month scrambling to fix whatever new vulnerabilities are discovered. Let that be their problem.

Posted on December 10, 2009 at 1:13 PMView Comments

Too Many Security Warnings Results in Complacency

Research that proves what we already knew:

Crying Wolf: An Empirical Study of SSL Warning Effectiveness

Abstract. Web users are shown an invalid certificate warning when their browser cannot validate the identity of the websites they are visiting. While these warnings often appear in benign situations, they can also signal a man-in-the-middle attack. We conducted a survey of over 400 Internet users to examine their reactions to and understanding of current SSL warnings. We then designed two new warnings using warnings science principles and lessons learned from the survey. We evaluated warnings used in three popular web browsers and our two warnings in a 100-participant, between-subjects laboratory study. Our warnings performed significantly better than existing warnings, but far too many participants exhibited dangerous behavior in all warning conditions. Our results suggest that, while warnings can be improved, a better approach may be to minimize the use of SSL warnings altogether by blocking users from making unsafe connections and eliminating warnings in benign
situations.

Posted on August 4, 2009 at 10:01 AMView Comments

Forging SSL Certificates

We already knew that MD5 is a broken hash function. Now researchers have successfully forged MD5-signed certificates:

Molnar, Appelbaum, and Sotirov joined forces with the European MD5 research team in mid-2008, along with Swiss cryptographer Dag Arne Osvik. They realized that the co-construction technique could be used to simultaneously generate one normal SSL certificate and one forged certificate, which could be used to sign and vouch for any other. They purchased a signature for the legitimate certificate from an established company that was still using MD5 for signing, and then applied the legitimate signature to the forged certificate. Because the legitimate and forged certificates had the same MD5 value, the legitimate signature also marked the forged one as acceptable.

Lots and lots more articles, and the research.

This isn’t a big deal. The research is great; it’s good work, and I always like to see cryptanalytic attacks used to break real-world security systems. Making that jump is often much harder than cryptographers think.

But SSL doesn’t provide much in the way of security, so breaking it doesn’t harm security very much. Pretty much no one ever verifies SSL certificates, so there’s not much attack value in being able to forge them. And even more generally, the major risks to data on the Internet are at the endpoints — Trojans and rootkits on users’ computers, attacks against databases and servers, etc — and not in the network.

I’m not losing a whole lot of sleep because of these attacks. But — come on, people — no one should be using MD5 anymore.

EDITED TO ADD (12/31): While it is true that browsers do some SSL certificate verification, when they find an invalid certificate they display a warning dialog box which everyone — me included — ignores. There are simply too many valid sites out there with bad certificates for that warning to mean anything. This is far too true:

If you’re like me and every other user on the planet, you don’t give a shit when an SSL certificate doesn’t validate. Unfortunately, commons-httpclient was written by some pedantic fucknozzles who have never tried to fetch real-world webpages.

Posted on December 31, 2008 at 1:39 PMView Comments

Man-in-the-Middle Attacks

Last week’s dramatic rescue of 15 hostages held by the guerrilla organization FARC was the result of months of intricate deception on the part of the Colombian government. At the center was a classic man-in-the-middle attack.

In a man-in-the-middle attack, the attacker inserts himself between two communicating parties. Both believe they’re talking to each other, and the attacker can delete or modify the communications at will.

The Wall Street Journal reported how this gambit played out in Colombia:

“The plan had a chance of working because, for months, in an operation one army officer likened to a ‘broken telephone,’ military intelligence had been able to convince Ms. Betancourt’s captor, Gerardo Aguilar, a guerrilla known as ‘Cesar,’ that he was communicating with his top bosses in the guerrillas’ seven-man secretariat. Army intelligence convinced top guerrilla leaders that they were talking to Cesar. In reality, both were talking to army intelligence.”

This ploy worked because Cesar and his guerrilla bosses didn’t know one another well. They didn’t recognize one anothers’ voices, and didn’t have a friendship or shared history that could have tipped them off about the ruse. Man-in-the-middle is defeated by context, and the FARC guerrillas didn’t have any.

And that’s why man-in-the-middle, abbreviated MITM in the computer-security community, is such a problem online: Internet communication is often stripped of any context. There’s no way to recognize someone’s face. There’s no way to recognize someone’s voice. When you receive an e-mail purporting to come from a person or organization, you have no idea who actually sent it. When you visit a website, you have no idea if you’re really visiting that website. We all like to pretend that we know who we’re communicating with — and for the most part, of course, there isn’t any attacker inserting himself into our communications — but in reality, we don’t. And there are lots of hacker tools that exploit this unjustified trust, and implement MITM attacks.

Even with context, it’s still possible for MITM to fool both sides — because electronic communications are often intermittent. Imagine that one of the FARC guerrillas became suspicious about who he was talking to. So he asks a question about their shared history as a test: “What did we have for dinner that time last year?” or something like that. On the telephone, the attacker wouldn’t be able to answer quickly, so his ruse would be discovered. But e-mail conversation isn’t synchronous. The attacker could simply pass that question through to the other end of the communications, and when he got the answer back, he would be able to reply.

This is the way MITM attacks work against web-based financial systems. A bank demands authentication from the user: a password, a one-time code from a token or whatever. The attacker sitting in the middle receives the request from the bank and passes it to the user. The user responds to the attacker, who passes that response to the bank. Now the bank assumes it is talking to the legitimate user, and the attacker is free to send transactions directly to the bank. This kind of attack completely bypasses any two-factor authentication mechanisms, and is becoming a more popular identity-theft tactic.

There are cryptographic solutions to MITM attacks, and there are secure web protocols that implement them. Many of them require shared secrets, though, making them useful only in situations where people already know and trust one another.

The NSA-designed STU-III and STE secure telephones solve the MITM problem by embedding the identity of each phone together with its key. (The NSA creates all keys and is trusted by everyone, so this works.) When two phones talk to each other securely, they exchange keys and display the other phone’s identity on a screen. Because the phone is in a secure location, the user now knows who he is talking to, and if the phone displays another organization — as it would if there were a MITM attack in progress — he should hang up.

Zfone, a secure VoIP system, protects against MITM attacks with a short authentication string. After two Zfone terminals exchange keys, both computers display a four-character string. The users are supposed to manually verify that both strings are the same — “my screen says 5C19; what does yours say?” — to ensure that the phones are communicating directly with each other and not with an MITM. The AT&T TSD-3600 worked similarly.

This sort of protection is embedded in SSL, although no one uses it. As it is normally used, SSL provides an encrypted communications link to whoever is at the other end: bank and phishing site alike. And the better phishing sites create valid SSL connections, so as to more effectively fool users. But if the user wanted to, he could manually check the SSL certificate to see if it was issued to “National Bank of Trustworthiness” or “Two Guys With a Computer in Nigeria.”

No one does, though, because you have to both remember and be willing to do the work. (The browsers could make this easier if they wanted to, but they don’t seem to want to.) In the real world, you can easily tell a branch of your bank from a money changer on a street corner. But on the internet, a phishing site can be easily made to look like your bank’s legitimate website. Any method of telling the two apart takes work. And that’s the first step to fooling you with a MITM attack.

Man-in-the-middle isn’t new, and it doesn’t have to be technological. But the internet makes the attacks easier and more powerful, and that’s not going to change anytime soon.

This essay originally appeared on Wired.com.

Posted on July 15, 2008 at 6:47 AMView Comments

Florida E-Voting Study

Florida just recently released another study of the Diebold voting
machines. They — and it was real security researchers like the California study, and not posers — studied v4.6.5 of the Diebold TSx and v1.96.8 of the Diebold Optical Scan. (California studied older versions (v4.6.4 of the TSx and v1.96.6 of the Optical Scan).

The most interesting issues are (1) Diebold’s apparent “find- then-patch” approach to computer security, and (2) Diebold’s lousy use of cryptography.

Among the findings:

  • Section 3.5. They use RSA signatures, apparently to address previously documented flaws in the literature. But their signature verification step has a problem. It computes H = signature**3 mod N, and then compares _only 160 bits of H_ with the SHA1 hash of a message. This is a natural way to implement RSA signatures if you just read a security textbook. But this approach is also insecure — the report demonstrates how to create a 250-line Java program to forge RSA signatures over (basically) arbitrary messages of their choosing.
  • Section 3.10.3. The original Hopkins report talked about the lack of crypto for network (or dialup) communications between a TSX voting machine and the back-end GEMs server. Apparently, Diebold tried to use SSL to fix the problem. The RABA report analyzed Diebold’s SSL usage and found a security problem. Diebold then tried to patch their SSL implementation. This new report looks at the patched version, and finds that it is still vulnerable to a man-in-the-middle attack.
  • Section 3.7.1.1. Key management. Avi Rubin has already summarized some of the highlights.

    This is arguably worse than having a fixed static key in all of the machines. Because with knowledge of the machine’s serial number, anyone can calculate all of the secret keys. Whereas before, someone would have needed access to the source code or the binary in the machine.

    Other attacks mentioned in the report include swapping two candidate vote counters and many other vote switching attacks. The supervisor PIN is protected with weak cryptography, and once again Diebold has shown that they do not have even a basic understanding of how to apply cryptographic mechanisms.

Avi Rubin has a nice overall summary, too:

So, Diebold is doing some things better than they did before when they had absolutely no security, but they have yet to do them right. Anyone taking any of our cryptography classes at Johns Hopkins, for example, would do a better job applying cryptography. If you read the SAIT report, this theme repeats throughout.

Right. These are classic examples of problems that can arise if (1) you “roll your own” crypto and/or (2) employ “find and patch” rather than a principled approach to security.

It all makes me wonder what new problems will arise from future security patches.

The good news is that Florida has decided not to certify the TSX at this time. They may try to certify a revised version of the OS (optical scan) system.

Posted on August 6, 2007 at 6:34 AMView Comments

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.