Entries Tagged "security conferences"

Page 11 of 11

Chinese Cryptographers Denied U.S. Visas

Chinese cryptographer Xiaoyun Wang, the woman who broke SHA-1 last year, was unable to attend the Crypto conference to present her paper on Monday. The U.S. government didn’t give her a visa in time:

On Monday, she was scheduled to explain her discovery in a keynote address to an international group of researchers meeting in California.

But a stand-in had to take her place, because she was not able to enter the country. Indeed, only one of nine Chinese researchers who sought to enter the country for the conference received a visa in time to attend.

Sadly, this is now common:

Although none of the scientists were officially denied visas by the United States Consulate, officials at the State Department and National Academy of Sciences said this week that the situation was not uncommon.

Lengthy delays in issuing visas are now routine, they said, particularly for those involved in sensitive scientific and technical fields.

These delays can make it impossible for some foreign researchers to attend U.S. conferences. There are researchers who need to have their paper accepted before they can apply for a visa. But the paper review and selection process, done by the program committee in the months before the conference, doesn’t finish early enough. Conferences can move the submission and selection deadlines earlier, but that just makes the conference less current.

In Wang’s case, she applied for her visa in early July. So did her student. Dingyi Pei, another Chinese researcher who is organizing Asiacrypt this year, applied for his in early June. (I don’t know about the others.) Wang has not received her visa, and Pei got his just yesterday.

This kind of thing hurts cryptography, and hurts national security. The visa restrictions were designed to protect American advanced technologies from foreigners, but in this case they’re having the opposite effect. We are all more secure because there is a vibrant cryptography research community in the U.S. and the world. By prohibiting Chinese cryptographers from attending U.S. conferences, we’re only hurting ourselves.

NIST is sponsoring a workshop on hash functions (sadly, it’s being referred to as a “hash bash”) in October. I hope Wang gets a visa for that.

Posted on August 17, 2005 at 11:53 AMView Comments

Wireless Interception Distance Records

Don’t believe wireless distance limitations. Again and again they’re proven wrong.

At DefCon earlier this month, a group was able to set up an unamplified 802.11 network at a distance of 124.9 miles.

The record holders relied on more than just a pair of wireless laptops. The equipment required for the feat, according to the event website, included a “collection of homemade antennas, surplus 12 foot satellite dishes, home-welded support structures, scaffolds, ropes and computers”.

Bad news for those of us who rely on physical distance to secure our wireless networks.

Even more important, the world record for communicating with a passive RFID device was set at 69 feet. (Pictures here.) Remember that the next time someone tells you that it’s impossible to read RFID identity cards at a distance.

Whenever you hear a manufacturer talk about a distance limitation for any wireless technology—wireless LANs, RFID, Bluetooth, anything—assume he’s wrong. If he’s not wrong today, he will be in a couple of years. Assume that someone who spends some money and effort building more sensitive technology can do much better, and that it will take less money and effort over the years. Technology always gets better; it never gets worse. If something is difficult and expensive now, it will get easier and cheaper in the future.

Posted on August 8, 2005 at 1:37 PMView Comments

More Lynn/Cisco Information

There’s some new information on last week’s Lynn/Cisco/ISS story: Mike Lynn gave an interesting interview to Wired. Here’s some news about the FBI’s investigation. And here’s a video of Cisco/ISS ripping pages out of the BlackHat conference proceedings.

Someone is setting up a legal defense fund for Lynn. Send donations via PayPal to Abaddon@IO.com. (Does anyone know the URL?) According to BoingBoing, donations not used to defend Lynn will be donated to the EFF.

Copies of Lynn’s talk have popped up on the Internet, but some have been removed due to legal cease-and-desist letters from ISS attorneys, like this one. Currently, Lynn’s slides are here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, here, and here. (The list is from BoingBoing.) Note that the presentation above is not the same as the one Lynn gave at BlackHat. The presentation at BlackHat didn’t have the ISS logo at the bottom, as the one on the Internet does. Also, the critical code components were blacked out. (Photographs of Lynn’s actual presentation slides were available here, but have been removed due to legal threats from ISS.)

There have been a bunch of commentary and analyses on the whole story. Business Week completely missed the point. Larry Seltzer at eWeek is more balanced.

Hackers are working overtime to reconstruct Lynn’s attack and write an exploit. This, of course, means that we’re in much more danger of there being a worm that makes use of this vulnerability.

The sad thing is that we could have avoided this. If Cisco and ISS had simply let Lynn present his work, it would have been just another obscure presentation amongst the sea of obscure presentations that is BlackHat. By attempting to muzzle Lynn, the two companies ensured that 1) the vulnerability was the biggest story of the conference, and 2) some group of hackers would turn the vulnerability into exploit code just to get back at them.

EDITED TO ADD: Jennifer Granick is Lynn’s attorney, and she has blogged about what happened at BlackHat and DefCon. And photographs of the slides Lynn actually used for his talk are here (for now, at least). Is it just me, or does it seem like ISS is pursuing this out of malice? With Cisco I think it was simple stupidity, but I think it’s malice with ISS.

EDITED TO ADD: I don’t agree with Irs Winkler’s comments, either.

EDITED TO ADD: ISS defends itself.

EDITED TO ADD: More commentary.

EDITED TO ADD: Nice rebuttal to Winkler’s essay.

Posted on August 3, 2005 at 1:31 PMView Comments

Cisco Harasses Security Researcher

I’ve written about full disclosure, and how disclosing security vulnerabilities is our best mechanism for improving security—especially in a free-market system. (That essay is also worth reading for a general discussion of the security trade-offs.) I’ve also written about how security companies treat vulnerabilities as public-relations problems first and technical problems second. This week at BlackHat, security researcher Michael Lynn and Cisco demonstrated both points.

Lynn was going to present security flaws in Cisco’s IOS, and Cisco went to inordinate lengths to make sure that information never got into the hands of the their consumers, the press, or the public.

Cisco threatened legal action to stop the conference’s organizers from allowing a 24-year-old researcher for a rival tech firm to discuss how he says hackers could seize control of Cisco’s Internet routers, which dominate the market. Cisco also instructed workers to tear 20 pages outlining the presentation from the conference program and ordered 2,000 CDs containing the presentation destroyed.

In the end, the researcher, Michael Lynn, went ahead with a presentation, describing flaws in Cisco’s software that he said could allow hackers to take over corporate and government networks and the Internet, intercepting and misdirecting data communications. Mr. Lynn, wearing a white hat emblazoned with the word “Good,” spoke after quitting his job at Internet Security Systems Inc. Wednesday. Mr. Lynn said he resigned because ISS executives had insisted he strike key portions of his presentation.

Not being able to censor the information, Cisco decided to act as if it were no big deal:

In a release shortly after the presentation, Cisco stated, “It is important to note that the information Lynn presented was not a disclosure of a new vulnerability or a flaw with Cisco IOS software. Lynn’s research explores possible ways to expand exploitations of known security vulnerabilities impacting routers.” And went on to state “Cisco believes that the information Lynn presented at the Blackhat conference today contained proprietary information and was illegally obtained.” The statement also refers to the fact that Lynn stated in his presentation that he used a popular file decompressor to ‘unzip’ the Cisco image before reverse engineering it and finding the flaw, which is against Cisco’s use agreement.

The Cisco propaganda machine is certainly working overtime this week.

The security implications of this are enormous. If companies have the power to censor information about their products they don’t like, then we as consumers have less information with which to make intelligent buying decisions. If companies have the power to squelch vulnerability information about their products, then there’s no incentive for them to improve security. (I’ve written about this in connection to physical keys and locks.) If free speech is subordinate to corporate demands, then we are all much less safe.

Full disclosure is good for society. But because it helps the bad guys as well as the good guys (see my essay on secrecy and security for more discussion of the balance), many of us have championed “responsible disclosure” guidelines that give vendors a head start in fixing vulnerabilities before they’re announced.

The problem is that not all researchers follow these guidelines. And laws limiting free speech do more harm to society than good. (In any case, laws won’t completely fix the problem; we can’t get laws passed in every possible country security researchers live.) So the only reasonable course of action for a company is to work with researchers who alert them to vulnerabilities, but also assume that vulnerability information will sometimes be released without prior warning.

I can’t imagine the discussions inside Cisco that led them to act like thugs. I can’t figure out why they decided to attack Michael Lynn, BlackHat, and ISS rather than turn the situation into a public-relations success. I can’t believe that they thought they could have censored the information by their actions, or even that it was a good idea.

Cisco’s customers want information. They don’t expect perfection, but they want to know the extent of problems and what Cisco is doing about them. They don’t want to know that Cisco tries to stifle the truth:

Joseph Klein, senior security analyst at the aerospace electronic systems division for Honeywell Technology Solutions, said he helped arrange a meeting between government IT professionals and Lynn after the talk. Klein said he was furious that Cisco had been unwilling to disclose the buffer-overflow vulnerability in unpatched routers. “I can see a class-action lawsuit against Cisco coming out of this,” Klein said.

ISS didn’t come out of this looking very good, either:

“A few years ago it was rumored that ISS would hold back on certain things because (they’re in the business of) providing solutions,” [Ali-Reza] Anghaie, [a senior security engineer with an aerospace firm, who was in the audience,] said. “But now you’ve got full public confirmation that they’ll submit to the will of a Cisco or Microsoft, and that’s not fair to their customers…. If they’re willing to back down and leave an employee … out to hang, well what are they going to do for customers?”

Despite their thuggish behavior, this has been a public-relations disaster for Cisco. Now it doesn’t matter what they say—we won’t believe them. We know that the public-relations department handles their security vulnerabilities, and not the engineering department. We know that they think squelching information and muzzling researchers is more important than informing the public. They could have shown that they put their customers first, but instead they demonstrated that short-sighted corporate interests are more important than being a responsible corporate citizen.

And these are the people building the hardware that runs much of our infrastructure? Somehow, I don’t feel very secure right now.

EDITED TO ADD: I am impressed with Lynn’s personal integrity in this matter:

When Mr. Lynn took the stage yesterday, he was introduced as speaking on a different topic, eliciting boos. But those turned to cheers when he asked, “Who wants to hear about Cisco?” As he got started, Mr. Lynn said, “What I just did means I’m about to get sued by Cisco and ISS. Not to put too fine a point on it, but bring it on.”

And this:

Lynn closed his talk by directing the audience to his resume and asking if anyone could give him a job.

“In large part I had to quit to give this presentation because ISS and Cisco would rather the world be at risk, I guess,” Lynn said. “They had to do what’s right for their shareholders; I understand that. But I figured I needed to do what’s right for the country and for the national critical infrastructure.”

There’s a lawsuit against him. I’ll let you know if there’s a legal defense fund.

EDITED TO ADD: The lawsuit has been settled. Some details:

Michael Lynn, a former ISS researcher, and the Black Hat organisers agreed to a permanent injunction barring them from further discussing the presentation Lynn gave on Wednesday. The presentation showed how attackers could take over Cisco routers, a problem that Lynn said could bring the Internet to its knees.

The injunction also requires Lynn to return any materials and disassembled code related to Cisco, according to a copy of the injunction, which was filed in US District Court for the District of Northern California. The injunction was agreed on by attorneys for Lynn, Black Hat, ISS and Cisco.

Lynn is also forbidden to make any further presentations at the Black Hat event, which ended on Thursday, or the following Defcon event. Additionally, Lynn and Black Hat have agreed never to disseminate a video made of Lynn’s presentation and to deliver to Cisco any video recording made of Lynn.

My hope is that Cisco realized that continuing with this would be a public-relations disaster.

EDITED TO ADD: Lynn’s BlackHat presentation is on line.

EDITED TO ADD: The FBI is getting involved.

EDITED TO ADD: The link to the presentation, above, has been replaced with a cease-and-desist letter. A copy of the presentation is now here.

Posted on July 29, 2005 at 4:35 AMView Comments

SHA Cryptanalysis Paper Online

In February, I wrote about a group of Chinese researchers who broke the SHA-1 hash function. That posting was based on short notice from the researchers. Since then, many people have written me asking about the research and the actual paper, some questioning the validity of the research because of the lack of documentation.

The paper did exist; I saw a copy. They will present it at the Crypto conference in August. I believe they didn’t post it because Crypto requires that submitted papers not be previously published, and they misunderstood that to mean that it couldn’t be widely distributed in any way.

Now there’s a copy of the paper on the web. You can read “Finding Collisions in the Full SHA-1,” by Xiaoyun Wang, Yiqun Lisa Yin, and Hongbo Yu, here.

Posted on June 24, 2005 at 12:46 PMView Comments

Regulation, Liability, and Computer Security

For a couple of years I have been arguing that liability is a way to solve the economic problems underlying our computer security problems. At the RSA conference this year, I was on a panel on that very topic.

This essay argues that regulation, not liability, is the correct way to solve the underlying economic problems, using the analogy of high-pressure steam engines in the 1800s.

Definitely worth thinking about some more.

Posted on February 25, 2005 at 8:00 AMView Comments

GovCon

There’s a conference in Washington, DC, in March that explores technologies for intelligence and terrorism prevention.

The 4th Annual Government Convention on Emerging Technologies will focus on the impact of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act signed into law by President Bush in December 2004.

The departments and agencies of the National Security Community are currently engaged in the most comprehensive transformation of policy, structure, doctrine, and capabilities since the National Security Act of 1947.

Many of the legal, policy, organizational, and cultural challenges to manage the National Security Community as an enterprise and provide a framework for fielding new capabilities are being addressed. However, there are many emerging technologies and commercial best practices available to help the National Security Community achieve its critical mission of keeping America safe and secure.

There’s a lot of interesting stuff on the agenda, including some classified sessions. I’m especially interested in this track:

Track Two: Attaining Tailored Persistence

Explore the technologies required to attain persistent surveillance and tailored persistence.

What does “persistent surveillance” mean, anyway?

Posted on February 3, 2005 at 9:07 AMView Comments

Academic Freedom and Security

Cryptography is the science of secret codes, and it is a primary Internet security tool to fight hackers, cyber crime, and cyber terrorism. CRYPTO is the world’s premier cryptography conference. It’s held every August in Santa Barbara.

This year, 400 people from 30 countries came to listen to dozens of talks. Lu Yi was not one of them. Her paper was accepted at the conference. But because she is a Chinese Ph.D. student in Switzerland, she was not able to get a visa in time to attend the conference.

In the three years since 9/11, the U.S. government has instituted a series of security measures at our borders, all designed to keep terrorists out. One of those measures was to tighten up the rules for foreign visas. Certainly this has hurt the tourism industry in the U.S., but the damage done to academic research is more profound and longer-lasting.

According to a survey by the Association of American Universities, many universities reported a drop of more than 10 percent in foreign student applications from last year. During the 2003 academic year, student visas were down 9 percent. Foreign applications to graduate schools were down 32 percent, according to another study by the Council of Graduate Schools.

There is an increasing trend for academic conferences, meetings and seminars to move outside of the United States simply to avoid visa hassles.

This affects all of high-tech, but ironically it particularly affects the very technologies that are critical in our fight against terrorism.

Also in August, on the other side of the country, the University of Connecticut held the second International Conference on Advanced Technologies for Homeland Security. The attendees came from a variety of disciplines—chemical trace detection, communications compatibility, X-ray scanning, sensors of various types, data mining, HAZMAT clothing, network intrusion detection, bomb diffusion, remote-controlled drones—and illustrate the enormous breadth of scientific know-how that can usefully be applied to counterterrorism.

It’s wrong to believe that the U.S. can conduct the research we need alone. At the Connecticut conference, the researchers presenting results included many foreigners studying at U.S. universities. Only 30 percent of the papers at CRYPTO had only U.S. authors. The most important discovery of the conference, a weakness in a mathematical function that protects the integrity of much of the critical information on the Internet, was made by four researchers from China.

Every time a foreign scientist can’t attend a U.S. technology conference, our security suffers. Every time we turn away a qualified technology graduate student, our security suffers. Technology is one of our most potent weapons in the war on terrorism, and we’re not fostering the international cooperation and development that is crucial for U.S. security.

Security is always a trade-off, and specific security countermeasures affect everyone, both the bad guys and the good guys. The new U.S. immigration rules may affect the few terrorists trying to enter the United States on visas, but they also affect honest people trying to do the same.

All scientific disciplines are international, and free and open information exchange—both in conferences and in academic programs at universities—will result in the maximum advance in the technologies vital to homeland security. The Soviet Union tried to restrict academic freedom along national lines, and it didn’t do the country any good. We should try not to follow in those footsteps.

This essay was originally published in the San Jose Mercury News

Posted on October 1, 2004 at 9:44 PMView Comments

Academic Freedom and Security

Cryptography is the science of secret codes, and it is a primary Internet security tool to fight hackers, cyber crime, and cyber terrorism. CRYPTO is the world’s premier cryptography conference. It’s held every August in Santa Barbara.

This year, 400 people from 30 countries came to listen to dozens of talks. Lu Yi was not one of them. Her paper was accepted at the conference. But because she is a Chinese Ph.D. student in Switzerland, she was not able to get a visa in time to attend the conference.

In the three years since 9/11, the U.S. government has instituted a series of security measures at our borders, all designed to keep terrorists out. One of those measures was to tighten up the rules for foreign visas. Certainly this has hurt the tourism industry in the U.S., but the damage done to academic research is more profound and longer-lasting.

According to a survey by the Association of American Universities, many universities reported a drop of more than 10 percent in foreign student applications from last year. During the 2003 academic year, student visas were down 9 percent. Foreign applications to graduate schools were down 32 percent, according to another study by the Council of Graduate Schools.

There is an increasing trend for academic conferences, meetings and seminars to move outside of the United States simply to avoid visa hassles.

This affects all of high-tech, but ironically it particularly affects the very technologies that are critical in our fight against terrorism.

Also in August, on the other side of the country, the University of Connecticut held the second International Conference on Advanced Technologies for Homeland Security. The attendees came from a variety of disciplines—chemical trace detection, communications compatibility, X-ray scanning, sensors of various types, data mining, HAZMAT clothing, network intrusion detection, bomb diffusion, remote-controlled drones—and illustrate the enormous breadth of scientific know-how that can usefully be applied to counterterrorism.

It’s wrong to believe that the U.S. can conduct the research we need alone. At the Connecticut conference, the researchers presenting results included many foreigners studying at U.S. universities. Only 30 percent of the papers at CRYPTO had only U.S. authors. The most important discovery of the conference, a weakness in a mathematical function that protects the integrity of much of the critical information on the Internet, was made by four researchers from China.

Every time a foreign scientist can’t attend a U.S. technology conference, our security suffers. Every time we turn away a qualified technology graduate student, our security suffers. Technology is one of our most potent weapons in the war on terrorism, and we’re not fostering the international cooperation and development that is crucial for U.S. security.

Security is always a trade-off, and specific security countermeasures affect everyone, both the bad guys and the good guys. The new U.S. immigration rules may affect the few terrorists trying to enter the United States on visas, but they also affect honest people trying to do the same.

All scientific disciplines are international, and free and open information exchange—both in conferences and in academic programs at universities—will result in the maximum advance in the technologies vital to homeland security. The Soviet Union tried to restrict academic freedom along national lines, and it didn’t do the country any good. We should try not to follow in those footsteps.

This essay was originally published in the San Jose Mercury News

Posted on October 1, 2004 at 9:44 PMView Comments

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Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.