The Security Risks of Not Teaching Malware
Essay by George Ledin on the security risks of not teaching students malware.
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Essay by George Ledin on the security risks of not teaching students malware.
You can now get a Master of Science in Strategic Studies in Weapons of Mass Destruction. Well, maybe you can’t:
“It’s not going to be open enrollment (or) traditional students,” Giever said. “You worry about whether you might be teaching the wrong person this stuff.”
At first, the FBI will select students from within its ranks, though Giever wants to open it to other law enforcement agencies. Rather than traditional tuition, agencies will contract with the school, paying about $300,000 a year for groups of 15 to 20 full-time students, according to documents submitted to the board of governors of the State System of Higher Education.
In Applied Cryptography, I wrote about the “Chess Grandmaster Problem,” a man-in-the-middle attack. Basically, Alice plays chess remotely with two grandmasters. She plays Grandmaster 1 as white and Grandmaster 2 as black. After the standard opening of 1. e4, she just replays the moves from one game to the other, and convinces both of them that she’s a grandmaster in the process.
Detecting these sorts of man-in-the-middle attacks is difficult, and involves things like synchronous clocks, complex cryptographic protocols, or—more practically—proctors. Proctors, of course, can be fooled. Here’s a real-world attempt of this type of attack on the MCAT medical-school admissions test.
Police allege he used a pinhole camera and wireless technology to transmit images of the questions on a computer screen back to his co-conspirator, Ruben, at the University of British Columbia.
Investigators believe Ruben then tricked three other students, who thought they were taking a multiple choice test for a job to be an MCAT tutor, into answering the questions.
The answers were then transmitted back by phone to Rezazadeh-Azar, as he continued on with the test in Victoria, police allege.
And as long as we’re on the topic, we can think about all the ways to hack this system of remote exam proctoring via webcam.
One of the things I am writing about in my new book is how security equilibriums change. They often change because of technology, but they sometimes change because of incentives.
An interesting example of this is the recent scandal in the Washington, DC, public school system over teachers changing their students’ test answers.
In the U.S., under the No Child Left Behind Act, students have to pass certain tests; otherwise, schools are penalized. In the District of Columbia, things went further. Michelle Rhee, chancellor of the public school system from 2007 to 2010, offered teachers $8,000 bonuses—and threatened them with termination—for improving test scores. Scores did increase significantly during the period, and the schools were held up as examples of how incentives affect teaching behavior.
It turns out that a lot of those score increases were faked. In addition to teaching students, teachers cheated on their students’ tests by changing wrong answers to correct ones. That’s how the cheating was discovered; researchers looked at the actual test papers and found more erasures than usual, and many more erasures from wrong answers to correct ones than could be explained by anything other than deliberate manipulation.
Teachers were always able to manipulate their students’ test answers, but before, there wasn’t much incentive to do so. With Rhee’s changes, there was a much greater incentive to cheat.
The point is that whatever security measures were in place to prevent teacher cheating before the financial incentives and threats of firing wasn’t sufficient to prevent teacher cheating afterwards. Because Rhee significantly increased the costs of cooperation (by threatening to fire teachers of poorly performing students) and increased the benefits of defection ($8,000), she created a security risk. And she should have increased security measures to restore balance to those incentives.
This is not isolated to DC. It has happened elsewhere as well.
This recent essay (commentary here) reminded me of this older essay, both by people who write student term papers for hire.
There are several services that do automatic plagiarism detection—basically, comparing phrases from the paper with general writings on the Internet and even caches of previously written papers—but detecting this kind of custom plagiarism work is much harder.
I can think of three ways to deal with this:
The real issue is proof. Most colleges and universities are unwilling to pursue this without solid proof—the lawsuit risk is just too great—and in these cases the only real proof is self-incrimination.
Fundamentally, this is a problem of misplaced economic incentives. As long as the academic credential is worth more to a student than the knowledge gained in getting that credential, there will be an incentive to cheat.
Related note: anyone remember my personal experience with plagiarism from 2005?
In Australia:
A high school teacher who assigned her class to plan a terrorist attack that would kill as many innocent people as possible had no intent to promote terrorism, the school principal said yesterday.
The Year-10 students at Kalgoorlie-Boulder Community High School were asked to pretend they were terrorists making a political statement by releasing a chemical or biological agent on “an unsuspecting Australian community”.
The task included choosing the best time to attack and explaining their choice of victims and what effects the attack would have on a human body.
“Your goal is to kill the MOST innocent civilians,” the assignment read.
Principal Terry Martino said he withdrew the assignment for the class on contemporary conflict and terrorism as soon as he heard of it. He said the teacher was “relatively inexperienced” and it was a “well-intentioned but misguided attempt to engage the students”.
Sounds like me:
It is in this spirit I announce the (possibly First) Movie-Plot Threat Contest. Entrants are invited to submit the most unlikely, yet still plausible, terrorist attack scenarios they can come up with.
Your goal: cause terror. Make the American people notice. Inflict lasting damage on the U.S. economy. Change the political landscape, or the culture. The more grandiose the goal, the better.
Assume an attacker profile on the order of 9/11: 20 to 30 unskilled people, and about $500,000 with which to buy skills, equipment, etc.
For the record, 1) I have no interest in promoting terrorism—I’m not even sure how I could promote terrorism without actually engaging in terrorism, 2) I’m pretty experienced, and 3) my movie-plot threat contests are not misguided. You can’t understand security defense without also understanding attack.
Australian police are claiming the assignment was illegal, so Australians who enter my movie-plot threat contests should think twice. Also anyone writing a thriller novel about terrorism, perhaps.
An AFP spokeswoman said it was an offence to collect or make documents preparing for or assisting a terrorist attack.
It was also illegal to be “reckless as to whether these documents may assist or prepare for a terrorist attack”.
The measures used to prevent cheating during tests remind me of casino security measures:
No gum is allowed during an exam: chewing could disguise a student’s speaking into a hands-free cellphone to an accomplice outside.
The 228 computers that students use are recessed into desk tops so that anyone trying to photograph the screen—using, say, a pen with a hidden camera, in order to help a friend who will take the test later—is easy to spot.
Scratch paper is allowed—but it is stamped with the date and must be turned in later.
When a proctor sees something suspicious, he records the student’s real-time work at the computer and directs an overhead camera to zoom in, and both sets of images are burned onto a CD for evidence.
Lots of information on detecting cheating in homework and written papers.
If you give people enough incentive to cheat, people will cheat:
Of all the forms of academic cheating, none may be as startling as educators tampering with children’s standardized tests. But investigations in Georgia, Indiana, Massachusetts, Nevada, Virginia and elsewhere this year have pointed to cheating by educators. Experts say the phenomenon is increasing as the stakes over standardized testing ratchet higher—including, most recently, taking student progress on tests into consideration in teachers’ performance reviews.
It’s a really creepy story. A school issues laptops to students, and then remotely and surreptitiously turns on the camera. (Here’s the lawsuit.)
This is an excellent technical investigation of what actually happened.
This investigation into the remote spying allegedly being conducted against students at Lower Merion represents an attempt to find proof of spying and a look into the toolchain used to accomplish spying. Taking a look at the LMSD Staff List, Mike Perbix is listed as a Network Tech at LMSD. Mr. Perbix has a large online web forum footprint as well as a personal blog, and a lot of his posts, attributed to his role at Lower Merion, provide insight into the tools, methods, and capabilities deployed against students at LMSD. Of the three network techs employed at LMSD, Mr. Perbix appears to have been the mastermind behind a massive, highly effective digital panopticon.
I had no idea this was being done, but erased answers are now analyzed on standardized tests. Schools with a high number of wrong-to-right changes across multiple tests are presumed to have cheated: teachers changing the answers after the students are done.
Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.