Entries Tagged "PINs"

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More on the ATM-Card Class Break

A few days ago, I wrote about the class break of Citibank ATM cards in Canada, the UK, and Russia. This is new news:

With consumers around the country reporting mysterious fraudulent account withdrawals, and multiple banks announcing problems with stolen account information, it appears thieves have unleashed a powerful new way to steal money from cash machines.

Criminals have stolen bank account data from a third-party company, several banks have said, and then used the data to steal money from related accounts using counterfeit cards at ATM machines.

The central question surrounding the new wave of crime is this: How did the thieves managed to foil the PIN code system designed to fend off such crimes? Investigators are considering the possibility that criminals have stolen PIN codes from a retailer, MSNBC has learned.

Read the whole article. Details are emerging slowly, but there’s still a lot we don’t know.

EDITED TO ADD (3/11): More info in these four articles.

Posted on March 9, 2006 at 3:51 PMView Comments

ATM Fraud and British Banks

An absolutely great story about phantom ATM withdrawals and British banking from the early 90s. (The story is from the early 90s; it has just become public now.) Read how a very brittle security system, coupled with banks using the legal system to avoid fixing the problem, resulted in lots of innocent people losing money to phantom withdrawals. Read how lucky everyone was that the catastrophic security problem was never discovered by criminals. It’s an amazing story.

See also Ross Anderson’s page on phantom withdrawals.

Oh, and Alistair Kelman assures me that he did not charge 1,750 pounds per hour, only 450 pounds per hour.

Posted on October 24, 2005 at 7:16 AMView Comments

Identity Cards Don't Help

Emily Finch, of the University of East Anglia, has researched criminals and how they adapt their fraud techniques to identity cards, especially the “chip and PIN” system that is currently being adapted in the UK. Her analysis: the security measures don’t help:

“There are various strategies that fraudsters use to get around the pin problem,” she said. “One of the things that is very clear is that it is a difficult matter for a fraudster to get hold of somebody’s card and then find out the pin.

“So the focus has been changed to finding the pin first, which is very, very easy if you are prepared to break social convention and look when people type the number in at the point of sale.”

Reliance in the technology actually reduces security, because people stop paying attention:

“One of the things we found quite alarming was how much the human element has been taken out of point-of-sale transactions,” Dr Finch said. “Point-of-sale staff are told to look away when people put their pin number in; so they don’t check at all.”

[…]

Some strategies relied on trust. Another fraudster trick was to produce a stolen card and pretend to misremember the number and search for it on a piece of paper.

Imagine, she said, someone searching for a piece of paper and saying, “Oh yes, that’s my signature”; there would be instant suspicion.

But there was utter trust in the new technology to pick up a fraudulent transaction, and criminals exploited this trust to get around the problem of having to enter a pin number.

“You go in, you put the card in, you type any number because you don’t know what it is. It won’t go through. The fraudster — because fraudsters are so good with people — says, ‘Oh, it’s no good, I haven’t got the hang of this yet. I could have sworn that was my number… I’ve probably got it confused with my other card.’

“They chat for a bit. The sales assistant, who is either disinterested or sympathetic, falls back on the old system, and swipes the card through.

“Because a relationship of empathy has already been established, and because they have already become accustomed to averting their gaze when people put pin numbers in, they don’t check the signature at all.

“So fraud is actually easier. There is very little vigilance at the point of sale any more. Fraudsters know this and they are taking advantage of it.”

I’ve been saying this kind of thing for a while, and it’s nice to read about some research that backs it up.

Other articles on the research are here, here, and here.

Posted on September 6, 2005 at 4:07 PMView Comments

Tamper-Evident Paper Mailings

We’ve all received them in the mail: envelopes from banks with PINs, access codes, or other secret information. The letters are somewhat tamper-proof, but mostly they’re designed to be tamper-evident: if someone opens the letter and reads the information, you’re going to know. The security devices include fully sealed packaging, and black inks that obscure the secret information if you hold the envelope up to the light.

Researchers from Cambridge University have been looking at the security inherent in these systems, and they’ve written a paper that outlines how to break them:

Abstract. Tamper-evident laser-printed PIN mailers are used by many institutions to issue PINs and other secrets to individuals in a secure manner. Such mailers are created by printing the PIN using a normal laser, but on to special stationery and using a special font. The background of the stationery disguises the PIN so that it cannot be read with the naked eye without tampering. We show that currently deployed PIN mailer technology (used by the major UK banks) is vulnerable to trivial attacks that reveal the PIN without tampering. We describe image processing attacks, where a colour difference between the toner and the stationary “masking pattern” is exploited. We also describe angled light attacks, where the reflective properties of the toner and stationery are exploited to allow the naked eye to separate the PIN from the backing pattern. All laser-printed mailers examined so far have been shown insecure.

According to a researcher website:

It should be noted that we sat on this report for about 9 months, and the various manufacturers all have new products which address to varying degrees the issues raised in the report.

BBC covered the story.

Posted on August 30, 2005 at 7:59 AMView Comments

Attack on the Bluetooth Pairing Process

There’s a new cryptographic result against Bluetooth. Yaniv Shaked and Avishai Wool of Tel Aviv University in Israel have figured out how to recover the PIN by eavesdropping on the pairing process.

Pairing is an important part of Bluetooth. It’s how two devices — a phone and a headset, for example — associate themselves with one another. They generate a shared secret that they use for all future communication. Pairing is why, when on a crowded subway, your Bluetooth devices don’t link up with all the other Bluetooth devices carried by everyone else.

According to the Bluetooth specification, PINs can be 8-128 bits long. Unfortunately, most manufacturers have standardized on a four decimal-digit PIN. This attack can crack that 4-digit PIN in less than 0.3 sec on an old Pentium III 450MHz computer, and in 0.06 sec on a Pentium IV 3Ghz HT computer.

At first glance, this attack isn’t a big deal. It only works if you can eavesdrop on the pairing process. Pairing is something that occurs rarely, and generally in the safety of your home or office. But the authors have figured out how to force a pair of Bluetooth devices to repeat the pairing process, allowing them to eavesdrop on it. They pretend to be one of the two devices, and send a message to the other claiming to have forgotten the link key. This prompts the other device to discard the key, and the two then begin a new pairing session.

Taken together, this is an impressive result. I can’t be sure, but I believe it would allow an attacker to take control of someone’s Bluetooth devices. Certainly it allows an attacker to eavesdrop on someone’s Bluetooth network.

News story here.

Posted on June 3, 2005 at 10:19 AMView Comments

Easy-to-Remember PINs

The UK is switching to a “chip and pin” system for credit card transactions. It’s been happening slowly, but by January (I’m not sure if it is the beginning of January or the end), every UK credit card will be a smart card.

This kind of system already exists in France and elsewhere. The cards have embedded chips. When you want to make a purchase, you stick your card in a slot and type your four-digit PIN on a keypad. (Presumably they will never turn off the magnetic stripe and signature system required for U.S. cards.)

One consumer fear over this process is about what happens if you forget your PIN. To allay fears, credit card companies have been placing newspaper advertisements suggesting that people change their PINs to an easy-to-remember number:

Keep forgetting your PIN?
It’s easy to change with chip and PIN.
To something more memorable like a birthday or your lucky numbers.

Don’t the credit card companies have anyone working on security?

The ad also goes on to say that you can change your PIN by phone, which has its own set of problems.

(I know that the cite I give doesn’t quote a primary source, but I also received the information from at least two readers, and one of them said that the advertisement was printed in the London Times.)

Posted on January 3, 2005 at 10:36 AMView Comments

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.