Entries Tagged "physical security"

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On US Capitol Security—By Someone Who Manages Arena-Rock-Concert Security

Smart commentary:

…I was floored on Wednesday when, glued to my television, I saw police in some areas of the U.S. Capitol using little more than those same mobile gates I had ­ the ones that look like bike racks that can hook together ­ to try to keep the crowds away from sensitive areas and, later, push back people intent on accessing the grounds. (A new fence that appears to be made of sturdier material was being erected on Thursday.) That’s the same equipment and approximately the same amount of force I was able to use when a group of fans got a little feisty and tried to get backstage at a Vanilla Ice show.

[…]

There’s not ever going to be enough police or security at any event to stop people if they all act in unison; if enough people want to get to Vanilla Ice at the same time, they’re going to get to Vanilla Ice. Social constructs and basic decency, not lightweight security gates, are what hold everyone except the outliers back in a typical crowd.

[…]

When there are enough outliers in a crowd, it throws the normal dynamics of crowd control off; everyone in my business knows this. Citizens tend to hold each other to certain standards ­ which is why my 40,000-person town does not have 40,000 police officers, and why the 8.3 million people of New York City aren’t policed by 8.3 million police officers.

Social norms are the fabric that make an event run smoothly—and, really, hold society together. There aren’t enough police in your town to handle it if everyone starts acting up at the same time.

I like that she uses the term “outliers,” and I make much the same points in Liars and Outliers.

Posted on January 13, 2021 at 6:06 AM • View Comments

Copying a Key by Listening to It in Action

Researchers are using recordings of keys being used in locks to create copies.

Once they have a key-insertion audio file, SpiKey’s inference software gets to work filtering the signal to reveal the strong, metallic clicks as key ridges hit the lock’s pins [and you can hear those filtered clicks online here]. These clicks are vital to the inference analysis: the time between them allows the SpiKey software to compute the key’s inter-ridge distances and what locksmiths call the “bitting depth” of those ridges: basically, how deeply they cut into the key shaft, or where they plateau out. If a key is inserted at a nonconstant speed, the analysis can be ruined, but the software can compensate for small speed variations.

The result of all this is that SpiKey software outputs the three most likely key designs that will fit the lock used in the audio file, reducing the potential search space from 330,000 keys to just three. “Given that the profile of the key is publicly available for commonly used [pin-tumbler lock] keys, we can 3D-print the keys for the inferred bitting codes, one of which will unlock the door,” says Ramesh.

Posted on August 20, 2020 at 6:22 AM • View Comments

Smart Lock Vulnerability

Yet another Internet-connected door lock is insecure:

Sold by retailers including Amazon, Walmart, and Home Depot, U-Tec’s $139.99 UltraLoq is marketed as a “secure and versatile smart deadbolt that offers keyless entry via your Bluetooth-enabled smartphone and code.”

Users can share temporary codes and ‘Ekeys’ to friends and guests for scheduled access, but according to Tripwire researcher Craig Young, a hacker able to sniff out the device’s MAC address can help themselves to an access key, too.

UltraLoq eventually fixed the vulnerabilities, but not in a way that should give you any confidence that they know what they’re doing.

EDITED TO ADD (8/12): More.

Posted on August 10, 2020 at 6:23 AM • View Comments

Attack Against PC Thunderbolt Port

The attack requires physical access to the computer, but it’s pretty devastating:

On Thunderbolt-enabled Windows or Linux PCs manufactured before 2019, his technique can bypass the login screen of a sleeping or locked computer—and even its hard disk encryption—to gain full access to the computer’s data. And while his attack in many cases requires opening a target laptop’s case with a screwdriver, it leaves no trace of intrusion and can be pulled off in just a few minutes. That opens a new avenue to what the security industry calls an “evil maid attack,” the threat of any hacker who can get alone time with a computer in, say, a hotel room. Ruytenberg says there’s no easy software fix, only disabling the Thunderbolt port altogether.

“All the evil maid needs to do is unscrew the backplate, attach a device momentarily, reprogram the firmware, reattach the backplate, and the evil maid gets full access to the laptop,” says Ruytenberg, who plans to present his Thunderspy research at the Black Hat security conference this summer­or the virtual conference that may replace it. “All of this can be done in under five minutes.”

Lots of details in the article above, and in the attack website. (We know it’s a modern hack, because it comes with its own website and logo.)

Intel responds.

EDITED TO ADD (5/14): More.

Posted on May 12, 2020 at 6:09 AM • View Comments

Gas Pump Hack

This is weird:

Police in Detroit are looking for two suspects who allegedly managed to hack a gas pump and steal over 600 gallons of gasoline, valued at about $1,800. The theft took place in the middle of the day and went on for about 90 minutes, with the gas station attendant unable to thwart the hackers.

The theft, reported by Fox 2 Detroit, took place at around 1pm local time on June 23 at a Marathon gas station located about 15 minutes from downtown Detroit. At least 10 cars are believed to have benefitted from the free-flowing gas pump, which still has police befuddled.

Here’s what is known about the supposed hack: Per Fox 2 Detroit, the thieves used some sort of remote device that allowed them to hijack the pump and take control away from the gas station employee. Police confirmed to the local publication that the device prevented the clerk from using the gas station’s system to shut off the individual pump.

Slashdot post.

Hard to know what’s true, but it seems like a good example of a hack against a cyber-physical system.

Posted on July 13, 2018 at 6:18 AM • View Comments

Ridiculously Insecure Smart Lock

Tapplock sells an “unbreakable” Internet-connected lock that you can open with your fingerprint. It turns out that:

  1. The lock broadcasts its Bluetooth MAC address in the clear, and you can calculate the unlock key from it.
  2. Any Tapplock account can unlock every lock.
  3. You can open the lock with a screwdriver.

Regarding the third flaw, the manufacturer has responded that “…the lock is invincible to the people who do not have a screwdriver.”

You can’t make this stuff up.

EDITED TO ADD: The quote at the end is from a different smart lock manufacturer. Apologies for that.

Posted on June 18, 2018 at 6:19 AM • View Comments

On the Security of Walls

Interesting history of the security of walls:

Dún Aonghasa presents early evidence of the same principles of redundant security measures at work in 13th century castles, 17th century star-shaped artillery fortifications, and even “defense in depth” security architecture promoted today by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and countless other security organizations world-wide.

Security advances throughout the centuries have been mostly technical adjustments in response to evolving weaponry. Fortification—the art and science of protecting a place by imposing a barrier between you and an enemy—is as ancient as humanity. From the standpoint of theory, however, there is very little about modern network or airport security that could not be learned from a 17th century artillery manual. That should trouble us more than it does.

Fortification depends on walls as a demarcation between attacker and defender. The very first priority action listed in the 2017 National Security Strategy states: “We will secure our borders through the construction of a border wall, the use of multilayered defenses and advanced technology, the employment of additional personnel, and other measures.” The National Security Strategy, as well as the executive order just preceding it, are just formal language to describe the recurrent and popular idea of a grand border wall as a central tool of strategic security. There’s been a lot said about the costs of the wall. But, as the American finger hovers over the Hadrian’s Wall 2.0 button, whether or not a wall will actually improve national security depends a lot on how walls work, but moreso, how they fail.

Lots more at the link.

Posted on February 19, 2018 at 4:24 PM • View Comments

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Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.