Entries Tagged "national security policy"

Page 49 of 59

Melissa Hathaway Interview

President Obama has tasked Melissa Hathaway with conducting a 60-day review of the nation’s cybersecurity policies.

Who is she?

Hathaway has been working as a cybercoordination executive for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence. She chaired a multiagency group called the National Cyber Study Group that was instrumental in developing the Comprehensive National Cyber Security Initiative, which was approved by former President George W. Bush early last year. Since then, she has been in charge of coordinating and monitoring the CNCI’s implementation.

Although, honestly, the best thing to read to get an idea of how she thinks is this interview from IEEE Security & Privacy:

In the technology field, concern to be first to market often does trump the need for security to be built in up front. Most of the nation’s infrastructure is owned, operated, and developed by the commercial sector. We depend on this sector to address the nation’s broader needs, so we’ll need a new information-sharing environment. Private-sector risk models aren’t congruent with the needs for national security. We need to think about a way to do business that meets both sets of needs. The proposed revisions to Federal Information Security Management Act [FISMA] legislation will raise awareness of vulnerabilities within broader-based commercial systems.

Increasingly, we see industry jointly addressing these vulnerabilities, such as with the Industry Consortium for Advancement of Security on the Internet to share common vulnerabilities and response mechanisms. In addition, there’s the Software Assurance Forum for Excellence in Code, an alliance of vendors who seek to improve software security. Industry is beginning to understand that [it has a] shared risk and shared responsibilities and sees the advantage of coordinating and collaborating up front during the development stage, so that we can start to address vulnerabilities from day one. We also need to look for niche partnerships to enhance product development and build trust into components. We need to understand when and how we introduce risk into the system and ask ourselves whether that risk is something we can live with.

The government is using its purchasing power to influence the market toward better security. We’re already seeing results with the Federal Desktop Core Configuration [FDCC] initiative, a mandated security configuration for federal computers set by the OMB. The Department of Commerce is working with several IT vendors on standardizing security settings for a wide variety of IT products and environments. Because a broad population of the government is using Windows XP and Vista, the FDCC imitative worked with Microsoft and others to determine security needs up front.

Posted on February 24, 2009 at 12:36 PM • View Comments

Cost of the U.S. No-Fly List

Someone did the analysis:

As will be analyzed below, it is estimated that the costs of the no-fly list, since 2002, range from approximately $300 million (a conservative estimate) to $966 million (an estimate on the high end). Using those figures as low and high potentials, a reasonable estimate is that the U.S. government has spent over $500 million on the project since the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. Using annual data, this article suggests that the list costs taxpayers somewhere between $50 million and $161 million a year, with a reasonable compromise of those figures at approximately $100 million.

Posted on February 3, 2009 at 1:01 PM • View Comments

Shaping the Obama Administration's Counterterrorism Strategy

I’m at a two-day conference: Shaping the Obama Adminstration’s Counterterrorism Strategy, sponsored by the Cato Institute in Washington, DC. It’s sold out, but you can watch or listen to the event live on the Internet. I’ll be on a panel tomorrow at 9:00 AM.

I’ve been told that there’s a lively conversation about the conference on Twitter, but—as I have previously said—I don’t Twitter.

Posted on January 12, 2009 at 12:44 PM • View Comments

James Bamford Interview on the NSA

Worth reading. One excerpt:

The problem is that NSA was never designed for what it’s doing. It was designed after World War II to prevent another surprise attack from another nation-state, particularly the Soviet Union. And from 1945 or ’46 until 1990 or ’91, that’s what its mission was. That’s what every piece of equipment, that’s what every person recruited to the agency, was supposed to do, practically—find out when and where and if the Russians were about to launch a nuclear attack. That’s what it spent 50 years being built for. And then all of a sudden the Soviet Union is not around anymore, and NSA’s got a new mission, and part of that is going after terrorists. And it’s just not a good fit. They missed the first World Trade Center bombing, they missed the attack on the U.S.S. Cole, they missed the attack on the U.S. embassies in Africa, they missed 9/11. There’s this string of failures because this agency was not really designed to do this. In the movies, they’d be catching terrorists all the time. But this isn’t the movies, this is reality.

The big difference here is that when they were focused on the Soviet Union, the Soviets communicated over dedicated lines. The army communicated over army channels, the navy communicated over navy channels, the diplomats communicated over foreign-office channels. These were all particular channels, particular frequencies, you knew where they were; the main problem was breaking encrypted communications. [The NSA] had listening posts ringing the Soviet Union, they had Russian linguists that were being pumped out from all these schools around the U.S.

Then the Cold War ends and everything changes. Now instead of a huge country that communicated all the time, you have individuals who hop from Kuala Lampur to Nairobi or whatever, from continent to continent, from day to day. They don’t communicate [electronically] all the time—they communicate by meetings. [The NSA was] tapping Bin Laden’s phone for three years and never picked up on any of these terrorist incidents. And the [electronic] communications you do have are not on dedicated channels, they’re mixed in with the world communication network. First you’ve got to find out how to extract that from it, then you’ve got to find people who can understand the language, and then you’ve got to figure out the word code. You can’t use a Cray supercomputer to figure out if somebody’s saying they’re going to have a wedding next week whether it’s really going to be a wedding or a bombing.

So that’s the challenge facing the people there. So even though I’m critical about them for missing these things, I also try in the book to give an explanation as to why this is. It’s certainly not because the people are incompetent. It’s because the world has changed.

I think the problem is more serious than people realize. I talked to the people at Fort Gordon [in Georgia], which is the main listening post for the Middle East and North Africa. What was shocking to me was the people who were there were saying they didn’t have anybody [at the time] who spoke Pashtun. We’re at war in Afghanistan and the main language of the Taliban is Pashtun.

The answer here is to change our foreign policy so that we don’t have to depend on agencies like NSA to try to protect the country. You try to protect the country by having reasonable policies so that we won’t have to worry about terrorism so much. It’s just getting harder and harder to find them.

Also worth reading is his new book.

Posted on December 18, 2008 at 6:42 AM • View Comments

Friday Squid Blogging: Preserving Giant Squid

At the Smithsonian:

At the centerof the Smithsonian Institution’s National Museum of Natural History’s gleaming new Sant Ocean Hall lies a preserved giant female squid—the arresting, spineless star among the vibrant exhibition’s animal specimens. Tentacles menacingly outstretched and seemingly frozen in time, the 24-foot squid embodies humans’ fascination with the briny deep. But this squid also symbolizes something else: an ongoing experiment in the chemistry of preservation, without which the Smithsonian’s new exhibition would not have been possible.

Also note the terrorism tie-in:

To create the exhibit, the Smithsonian had to work around post-9/11 rules restricting flammable materials, while maximizing the lifelike appearance of the squid for public display. They turned not to formalin or ethanol, but to a new fluorinated chemical called Novec, developed by 3M.

If we give up our preserved giant squids, then surely the terrorists have won.

Posted on November 21, 2008 at 4:20 PM • View Comments

Schneier for TSA Administrator

It’s been suggested. For the record, I don’t want the job.

Since the election, the newspapers and Internet have been flooded with unsolicited advice for President-elect Barack Obama. I’ll go ahead and add mine.

[…]

And by “revamp,” I mean “start over.” Most security experts agree that the rigmarole we go through at the airport is mere security theater, designed not to make us safer, but to make us feel safer by making it increasingly inconvenient to fly. TSA’s approach to security is too reactionary—too set on preventing attacks and attempted attacks that have already happened. And please, whatever you do, resist the temptation to let TSA workers unionize. Security from terror attacks should not be a federal jobs program. You need the authority to fire underperforming screeners quickly and effortlessly. Three game-changing possibilities to head up TSA: security guru Bruce Schneier, Cato Institute security and technology scholar Jim Harper, or Ohio State University’s John Mueller.

Although I’d be happy to see either Jim or John with it.

I don’t want it because it’s too narrow. I think the right thing for the government to do is to give the TSA a lot less money. I’d rather they defend against the broad threat of terrorism than focus on the narrow threat of airplane terrorism, and I’d rather they defend against the myriad of threats that face our society than focus on the singular threat of terrorism. But the head of the TSA can’t have those opinions; he has to take the money he’s given and perform the specific function he’s assigned to perform. Not very much fun, really.

But I’d be happy to advise whoever Obama choses to head the TSA.

The job of the nation’s CTO would be more interesting, but I don’t think I want it, either. (Have you seen the screening process?)

Posted on November 18, 2008 at 1:46 PM • View Comments

Data Mining for Terrorists Doesn't Work

According to a massive report from the National Research Council, data mining for terrorists doesn’t work. Here’s a good summary:

The report was written by a committee whose members include William Perry, a professor at Stanford University; Charles Vest, the former president of MIT; W. Earl Boebert, a retired senior scientist at Sandia National Laboratories; Cynthia Dwork of Microsoft Research; R. Gil Kerlikowske, Seattle’s police chief; and Daryl Pregibon, a research scientist at Google.

They admit that far more Americans live their lives online, using everything from VoIP phones to Facebook to RFID tags in automobiles, than a decade ago, and the databases created by those activities are tempting targets for federal agencies. And they draw a distinction between subject-based data mining (starting with one individual and looking for connections) compared with pattern-based data mining (looking for anomalous activities that could show illegal activities).

But the authors conclude the type of data mining that government bureaucrats would like to do—perhaps inspired by watching too many episodes of the Fox series 24—can’t work. “If it were possible to automatically find the digital tracks of terrorists and automatically monitor only the communications of terrorists, public policy choices in this domain would be much simpler. But it is not possible to do so.”

A summary of the recommendations:

  • U.S. government agencies should be required to follow a systematic process to evaluate the effectiveness, lawfulness, and consistency with U.S. values of every information-based program, whether classified or unclassified, for detecting and countering terrorists before it can be deployed, and periodically thereafter.
  • Periodically after a program has been operationally deployed, and in particular before a program enters a new phase in its life cycle, policy makers should (carefully review) the program before allowing it to continue operations or to proceed to the next phase.
  • To protect the privacy of innocent people, the research and development of any information-based counterterrorism program should be conducted with synthetic population data… At all stages of a phased deployment, data about individuals should be rigorously subjected to the full safeguards of the framework.
  • Any information-based counterterrorism program of the U.S. government should be subjected to robust, independent oversight of the operations of that program, a part of which would entail a practice of using the same data mining technologies to “mine the miners and track the trackers.”
  • Counterterrorism programs should provide meaningful redress to any individuals inappropriately harmed by their operation.
  • The U.S. government should periodically review the nation’s laws, policies, and procedures that protect individuals’ private information for relevance and effectiveness in light of changing technologies and circumstances. In particular, Congress should re-examine existing law to consider how privacy should be protected in the context of information-based programs (e.g., data mining) for counterterrorism.

Here are more news articles on the report. I explained why data mining wouldn’t find terrorists back in 2005.

EDITED TO ADD (10/10): More commentary:

As the NRC report points out, not only is the training data lacking, but the input data that you’d actually be mining has been purposely corrupted by the terrorists themselves. Terrorist plotters actively disguise their activities using operational security measures (opsec) like code words, encryption, and other forms of covert communication. So, even if we had access to a copious and pristine body of training data that we could use to generalize about the “typical terrorist,” the new data that’s coming into the data mining system is suspect.

To return to the credit reporting analogy, credit scores would be worthless to lenders if everyone could manipulate their credit history (e.g., hide past delinquencies) the way that terrorists can manipulate the data trails that they leave as they buy gas, enter buildings, make phone calls, surf the Internet, etc.

So this application of data mining bumps up against the classic GIGO (garbage in, garbage out) problem in computing, with the terrorists deliberately feeding the system garbage. What this means in real-world terms is that the success of our counter-terrorism data mining efforts is completely dependent on the failure of terrorist cells to maintain operational security.

The combination of the GIGO problem and the lack of suitable training data combine to make big investments in automated terrorist identification a futile and wasteful effort. Furthermore, these two problems are structural, so they’re not going away. All legitimate concerns about false positives and corrosive effects on civil liberties aside, data mining will never give authorities the ability to identify terrorists or terrorist networks with any degree of confidence.

Posted on October 10, 2008 at 6:35 AM • View Comments

1 … 47 48 49 50 51 … 59

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.