Entries Tagged "Microsoft"

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UAE Man-in-the-Middle Attack Against SSL

Interesting:

Who are these certificate authorities? At the beginning of Web history, there were only a handful of companies, like Verisign, Equifax, and Thawte, that made near-monopoly profits from being the only providers trusted by Internet Explorer or Netscape Navigator. But over time, browsers have trusted more and more organizations to verify Web sites. Safari and Firefox now trust more than 60 separate certificate authorities by default. Microsoft’s software trusts more than 100 private and government institutions.

Disturbingly, some of these trusted certificate authorities have decided to delegate their powers to yet more organizations, which aren’t tracked or audited by browser companies. By scouring the Net for certificates, security researchers have uncovered more than 600 groups who, through such delegation, are now also automatically trusted by most browsers, including the Department of Homeland Security, Google, and Ford Motors­and a UAE mobile phone company called Etisalat.

In 2005, a company called CyberTrust­—which has since been purchased by Verizon­—gave Etisalat, the government-connected mobile company in the UAE, the right to verify that a site is valid. Here’s why this is trouble: Since browsers now automatically trust Etisalat to confirm a site’s identity, the company has the potential ability to fake a secure connection to any site Etisalat subscribers might visit using a man-in-the-middle scheme.

EDITED TO ADD (9/14): EFF has gotten involved.

Posted on September 3, 2010 at 6:27 AMView Comments

Alerting Users that Applications are Using Cameras, Microphones, Etc.

Interesting research: “What You See is What They Get: Protecting users from unwanted use of microphones, cameras, and other sensors,” by Jon Howell and Stuart Schechter.

Abstract: Sensors such as cameras and microphones collect privacy-sensitive data streams without the user’s explicit action. Conventional sensor access policies either hassle users to grant applications access to sensors or grant with no approval at all. Once access is granted, an application may collect sensor data even after the application’s interface suggests that the sensor is no longer being accessed.

We introduce the sensor-access widget, a graphical user interface element that resides within an application’s display. The widget provides an animated representation of the personal data being collected by its corresponding sensor, calling attention to the application’s attempt to collect the data. The widget indicates whether the sensor data is currently allowed to flow to the application. The widget also acts as a control point through which the user can configure the sensor and grant or deny the application access. By building perpetual disclosure of sensor data collection into the platform, sensor-access widgets enable new access-control policies that relax the tension between the user’s privacy needs and applications’ ease of access.

Apple seems to be taking some steps in this direction with the location sensor disclosure in iPhone 4.0 OS.

Posted on May 24, 2010 at 7:32 AMView Comments

Applications Disclosing Required Authority

This is an interesting piece of research evaluating different user interface designs by which applications disclose to users what sort of authority they need to install themselves. Given all the recent concerns about third-party access to user data on social networking sites (particularly Facebook), this is particularly timely research.

We have provided evidence of a growing trend among application platforms to disclose, via application installation consent dialogs, the resources and actions that applications will be authorized to perform if installed. To improve the design of these disclosures, we have have taken an important first step of testing key design elements. We hope these findings will assist future researchers in creating experiences that leave users feeling better informed and more confident in their installation decisions.

Within the admittedly constrained context of our laboratory study, disclosure design had surprisingly little effect on participants’ ability to absorb and search information. However, the great majority of participants preferred designs that used images or icons to represent resources. This great majority of participants also disliked designs that used paragraphs, the central design element of Facebook’s disclosures, and outlines, the central design element of Android’s disclosures.

Posted on May 21, 2010 at 1:17 PMView Comments

New Windows Attack

It’s still only in the lab, but nothing detects it right now:

The attack is a clever “bait-and-switch” style move. Harmless code is passed to the security software for scanning, but as soon as it’s given the green light, it’s swapped for the malicious code. The attack works even more reliably on multi-core systems because one thread doesn’t keep an eye on other threads that are running simultaneously, making the switch easier.

The attack, called KHOBE (Kernel HOok Bypassing Engine), leverages a Windows module called the System Service Descriptor Table, or SSDT, which is hooked up to the Windows kernel. Unfortunately, SSDT is utilized by antivirus software.

Posted on May 14, 2010 at 11:50 AMView Comments

Storing Cryptographic Keys with Invisible Tattoos

This idea, by Stuart Schechter at Microsoft Research, is—I think—clever:

Abstract: Implantable medical devices, such as implantable cardiac defibrillators and pacemakers, now use wireless communication protocols vulnerable to attacks that can physically harm patients. Security measures that impede emergency access by physicians could be equally devastating. We propose that access keys be written into patients’ skin using ultraviolet-ink micropigmentation (invisible tattoos).

It certainly is a new way to look at the security threat model.

Posted on April 15, 2010 at 6:43 AMView Comments

Guide to Microsoft Police Forensic Services

The “Microsoft Online Services Global Criminal Compliance Handbook (U.S. Domestic Version)” (also can be found here, here, and here) outlines exactly what Microsoft will do upon police request. Here’s a good summary of what’s in it:

The Global Criminal Compliance Handbook is a quasi-comprehensive explanatory document meant for law enforcement officials seeking access to Microsoft’s stored user information. It also provides sample language for subpoenas and diagrams on how to understand server logs.

I call it “quasi-comprehensive” because, at a mere 22 pages, it doesn’t explore the nitty-gritty of Microsoft’s systems; it’s more like a data-hunting guide for dummies.

When it was first leaked, Microsoft tried to scrub it from the Internet. But they quickly realized that it was futile and relented.

Lots more information.

Posted on March 9, 2010 at 6:59 AMView Comments

Anonymity and the Internet

Universal identification is portrayed by some as the holy grail of Internet security. Anonymity is bad, the argument goes; and if we abolish it, we can ensure only the proper people have access to their own information. We’ll know who is sending us spam and who is trying to hack into corporate networks. And when there are massive denial-of-service attacks, such as those against Estonia or Georgia or South Korea, we’ll know who was responsible and take action accordingly.

The problem is that it won’t work. Any design of the Internet must allow for anonymity. Universal identification is impossible. Even attribution—knowing who is responsible for particular Internet packets—is impossible. Attempting to build such a system is futile, and will only give criminals and hackers new ways to hide.

Imagine a magic world in which every Internet packet could be traced to its origin. Even in this world, our Internet security problems wouldn’t be solved. There’s a huge gap between proving that a packet came from a particular computer and that a packet was directed by a particular person. This is the exact problem we have with botnets, or pedophiles storing child porn on innocents’ computers. In these cases, we know the origins of the DDoS packets and the spam; they’re from legitimate machines that have been hacked. Attribution isn’t as valuable as you might think.

Implementing an Internet without anonymity is very difficult, and causes its own problems. In order to have perfect attribution, we’d need agencies—real-world organizations—to provide Internet identity credentials based on other identification systems: passports, national identity cards, driver’s licenses, whatever. Sloppier identification systems, based on things such as credit cards, are simply too easy to subvert. We have nothing that comes close to this global identification infrastructure. Moreover, centralizing information like this actually hurts security because it makes identity theft that much more profitable a crime.

And realistically, any theoretical ideal Internet would need to allow people access even without their magic credentials. People would still use the Internet at public kiosks and at friends’ houses. People would lose their magic Internet tokens just like they lose their driver’s licenses and passports today. The legitimate bypass mechanisms would allow even more ways for criminals and hackers to subvert the system.

On top of all this, the magic attribution technology doesn’t exist. Bits are bits; they don’t come with identity information attached to them. Every software system we’ve ever invented has been successfully hacked, repeatedly. We simply don’t have anywhere near the expertise to build an airtight attribution system.

Not that it really matters. Even if everyone could trace all packets perfectly, to the person or origin and not just the computer, anonymity would still be possible. It would just take one person to set up an anonymity server. If I wanted to send a packet anonymously to someone else, I’d just route it through that server. For even greater anonymity, I could route it through multiple servers. This is called onion routing and, with appropriate cryptography and enough users, it adds anonymity back to any communications system that prohibits it.

Attempts to banish anonymity from the Internet won’t affect those savvy enough to bypass it, would cost billions, and would have only a negligible effect on security. What such attempts would do is affect the average user’s access to free speech, including those who use the Internet’s anonymity to survive: dissidents in Iran, China, and elsewhere.

Mandating universal identity and attribution is the wrong goal. Accept that there will always be anonymous speech on the Internet. Accept that you’ll never truly know where a packet came from. Work on the problems you can solve: software that’s secure in the face of whatever packet it receives, identification systems that are secure enough in the face of the risks. We can do far better at these things than we’re doing, and they’ll do more to improve security than trying to fix insoluble problems.

The whole attribution problem is very similar to the copy-protection/digital-rights-management problem. Just as it’s impossible to make specific bits not copyable, it’s impossible to know where specific bits came from. Bits are bits. They don’t naturally come with restrictions on their use attached to them, and they don’t naturally come with author information attached to them. Any attempts to circumvent this limitation will fail, and will increasingly need to be backed up by the sort of real-world police-state measures that the entertainment industry is demanding in order to make copy-protection work. That’s how China does it: police, informants, and fear.

Just as the music industry needs to learn that the world of bits requires a different business model, law enforcement and others need to understand that the old ideas of identification don’t work on the Internet. For good or for bad, whether you like it or not, there’s always going to be anonymity on the Internet.

This essay originally appeared in Information Security, as part of a point/counterpoint with Marcus Ranum. You can read Marcus’s response below my essay.

EDITED TO ADD (2/5): Microsoft’s Craig Mundie wants to abolish anonymity as well.

What Mundie is proposing is to impose authentication. He draws an analogy to automobile use. If you want to drive a car, you have to have a license (not to mention an inspection, insurance, etc). If you do something bad with that car, like break a law, there is the chance that you will lose your license and be prevented from driving in the future. In other words, there is a legal and social process for imposing discipline. Mundie imagines three tiers of Internet ID: one for people, one for machines and one for programs (which often act as proxies for the other two).

Posted on February 3, 2010 at 6:16 AMView Comments

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Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.