Entries Tagged "laws"

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Passwords Alone Don't Protect Trade Secrets

A court ruled that simply password-protecting a file isn’t enough to make it a trade secret.

To establish that information is a trade secret under the ITSA, two requirements must be met: (1) the plaintiff must show the information was sufficiently secret to give the plaintiff a competitive advantage, and (2) the plaintiff must show that it took affirmative measures to prevent others from acquiring or using the information. Although the court determined in this case that the customer lists met the first requirement, it denied trade secret protection based on the second requirement.

The court held that “[r]estricting access to sensitive information by assigning employees passwords on a need-to-know basis is a step in the right direction.” This precaution in and of itself, however was not enough. The court was “troubled by the failure to either require employees to sign confidentiality agreements, advise employees that its records were confidential, or label the information as confidential.” There was insufficient evidence in the record to show the employees understood the information to be confidential, thus the trial court’s finding that the customer lists were not trade secrets was not against the manifest weight of the evidence.

Posted on April 14, 2005 at 1:05 PMView Comments

ID Theft is Inescapable

The Register says what I’ve been saying all along:

While this is nothing new, there is an important observation here that’s worth emphasizing: none of these cases involved online transactions.

Many people innocently believe that they’re safe from credit card fraud and identity theft in the brick and mortar world. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The vast majority of incidents can be traced to skimming, dumpster diving, and just plain stupidity among those who “own” our personal data.

Only a small fraction of such incidents result from online transactions. Every time you pay by check, use a debit or credit card, or fill out an application for insurance, housing, credit, employment, or education, you lose control of sensitive data.

In the US, a merchant is at liberty to do anything he pleases with the information, and this includes selling it to a third party without your knowledge or permission, or entering it into a computerized database, possibly with lax access controls, and possibly connected to the Internet.

Sadly, Congress’s response has been to increase the penalties for identity theft, rather than to regulate access to, and use of, personal data by merchants, marketers, and data miners. Incredibly, the only person with absolutely no control over the collection, storage, security, and use of such sensitive information is its actual owner.

For this reason, it’s literally impossible for an individual to prevent identity theft and credit card fraud, and it will remain impossible until Congress sees fit to regulate the privacy invasion industry.

Posted on March 30, 2005 at 7:35 AMView Comments

ChoicePoint Says "Please Regulate Me"

According to ChoicePoint’s most recent 8-K filing:

Based on information currently available, we estimate that approximately 145,000 consumers from 50 states and other territories may have had their personal information improperly accessed as a result of the recent Los Angeles incident and certain other instances of unauthorized access to our information products. Approximately 35,000 of these consumers are California residents, and approximately 110,000 are residents of other states. These numbers were determined by conducting searches of our databases that matched searches conducted by customers who we believe may have had unauthorized access to our information products on or after July 1, 2003, the effective date of the California notification law. Because our databases are constantly updated, our search results will never be identical to the search results of these customers.

Catch that? ChoicePoint actually has no idea if only 145,000 customers were affected by its recent security debacle. But it’s not doing any work to determine if more than 145,000 customers were affected—or if any customers before July 1, 2003 were affected—because there’s no law compelling it to do so.

I have no idea why ChoicePoint has decided to tape a huge “Please Regulate My Industry” sign to its back, but it’s increasingly obvious that it has. There’s a class-action shareholders’ lawsuit, but I don’t think that will be enough.

And, by the way, Choicepoint’s database is riddled with errors.

Posted on March 9, 2005 at 2:54 PMView Comments

Banning Matches and Lighters on Airplanes

According to the Washington Post:

When Congress voted last year to prohibit passengers from bringing lighters and matches aboard commercial airplanes, it sounded like a reasonable idea for improving airline security.

But as airports and government leaders began discussing how to create flame-free airport terminals, the task became more complicated. Would newsstands and other small airport stores located beyond the security checkpoint have to stop selling lighters? Would airports have to ban smoking and close smoking lounges? How would security screeners detect matches in passengers’ pockets or carry-on bags when they don’t contain metal to set off the magnetometers? And what about arriving international travelers, who might have matches and lighters with them as they walk through the terminal?

It’s the silly security season out there. Given all of the things to spend money on to improve security, how this got to the top of anyone’s list is beyond me.

Posted on March 4, 2005 at 3:00 PMView Comments

Regulation, Liability, and Computer Security

For a couple of years I have been arguing that liability is a way to solve the economic problems underlying our computer security problems. At the RSA conference this year, I was on a panel on that very topic.

This essay argues that regulation, not liability, is the correct way to solve the underlying economic problems, using the analogy of high-pressure steam engines in the 1800s.

Definitely worth thinking about some more.

Posted on February 25, 2005 at 8:00 AMView Comments

ChoicePoint

The ChoicePoint fiasco has been news for over a week now, and there are only a few things I can add. For those who haven’t been following along, ChoicePoint mistakenly sold personal credit reports for about 145,000 Americans to criminals.

This story would have never been made public if it were not for SB 1386, a California law requiring companies to notify California residents if any of a specific set of personal information is leaked.

ChoicePoint’s behavior is a textbook example of how to be a bad corporate citizen. The information leakage occurred in October, and it didn’t tell any victims until February. First, ChoicePoint notified 30,000 Californians and said that it would not notify anyone who lived outside California (since the law didn’t require it). Finally, after public outcry, it announced that it would notify everyone affected.

The clear moral here is that first, SB 1386 needs to be a national law, since without it ChoicePoint would have covered up their mistakes forever. And second, the national law needs to force companies to disclose these sorts of privacy breaches immediately, and not allow them to hide for four months behind the “ongoing FBI investigation” shield.

More is required. Compare the difference in ChoicePoint’s public marketing slogans with its private reality.

From “Identity Theft Puts Pressure on Data Sellers,” by Evan Perez, in the 18 Feb 2005 Wall Street Journal:

The current investigation involving ChoicePoint began in October when the company found the 50 accounts it said were fraudulent. According to the company and police, criminals opened the accounts, posing as businesses seeking information on potential employees and customers. They paid fees of $100 to $200, and provided fake documentation, gaining access to a trove of
personal data including addresses, phone numbers, and social security numbers.

From ChoicePoint Chairman and CEO Derek V. Smith:

ChoicePoint’s core competency is verifying and authenticating individuals
and their credentials.

The reason there is a difference is purely economic. Identity theft is the fastest-growing crime in the U.S., and an enormous problem elsewhere in the world. It’s expensive—both in money and time—to the victims. And there’s not much people can do to stop it, as much of their personal identifying information is not under their control: it’s in the computers of companies like ChoicePoint.

ChoicePoint protects its data, but only to the extent that it values it. The hundreds of millions of people in ChoicePoint’s databases are not ChoicePoint’s customers. They have no power to switch credit agencies. They have no economic pressure that they can bring to bear on the problem. Maybe they should rename the company “NoChoicePoint.”

The upshot of this is that ChoicePoint doesn’t bear the costs of identity theft, so ChoicePoint doesn’t take those costs into account when figuring out how much money to spend on data security. In economic terms, it’s an “externality.”

The point of regulation is to make externalities internal. SB 1386 did that to some extent, since ChoicePoint now must figure the cost of public humiliation when they decide how much money to spend on security. But the actual cost of ChoicePoint’s security failure is much, much greater.

Until ChoicePoint feels those costs—whether through regulation or liability—it has no economic incentive to reduce them. Capitalism works, not through corporate charity, but through the free market. I see no other way of solving the problem.

Posted on February 23, 2005 at 3:19 PMView Comments

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.