Entries Tagged "laws"

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European Terrorism Law and Music Downloaders

The European music industry is lobbying the European Parliament, demanding things that the RIAA can only dream about:

The music and film industries are demanding that the European parliament extends the scope of proposed anti-terror laws to help them prosecute illegal downloaders. In an open letter to MEPs, companies including Sony BMG, Disney and EMI have asked to be given access to communications data – records of phone calls, emails and internet surfing – in order to take legal action against pirates and filesharers. Current proposals restrict use of such information to cases of terrorism and organised crime.

Our society definitely needs a serious conversation about the fundamental freedoms we are sacrificing in a misguided attempt to keep us safe from terrorism. It feels both surreal and sickening to have to defend our fundamental freedoms against those who want to stop people from sharing music. How is it possible that we can contemplate so much damage to our society simply to protect the business model of a handful of companies?

Posted on November 27, 2005 at 12:20 PMView Comments

Identity Theft Over-Reported

I’m glad to see that someone wrote this article. For a long time now, I’ve been saying that the rate of identity theft has been grossly overestimated: too many things are counted as identity theft that are just traditional fraud. Here’s some interesting data to back that claim up:

Multiple surveys have found that around 20 percent of Americans say they have been beset by identity theft. But what exactly is identity theft?

The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 defines it as the illegal use of someone’s “means of identification”—including a credit card. So if you lose your card and someone else uses it to buy a candy bar, technically you have been the victim of identity theft.

Of course misuse of lost, stolen or surreptitiously copied credit cards is a serious matter. But it shouldn’t force anyone to hide in a cave.

Federal law caps our personal liability at $50, and even that amount is often waived. That’s why surveys have found that about two-thirds of people classified as identity theft victims end up paying nothing out of their own pockets.

The more pernicious versions of identity theft, in which fraudsters use someone else’s name to open lines of credit or obtain government documents, are much rarer.

Consider a February survey for insurer Chubb Corp. of 1,866 people nationwide. Nearly 21 percent said they had been an identity theft victim in the previous year.

But when the questioners asked about specific circumstances—and broadened the time frame beyond just the previous year—the percentages diminished. About 12 percent said a collection agency had demanded payment for purchases they hadn’t made. Some 8 percent said fraudulent checks had been drawn against their accounts.

In both cases, the survey didn’t ask whether a faulty memory or a family member—rather than a shadowy criminal—turned out to be to be the culprit.

It wouldn’t be uncommon. In a 2005 study by Synovate, a research firm, half of self-described victims blamed relatives, friends, neighbors or in-home employees.

When Chubb’s report asked whether people had suffered the huge headache of finding that someone else had taken out loans in their name, 2.4 percent—one in 41 people—said yes.

So what about the claim that 10 million Americans are hit every year, a number often used to pitch credit monitoring services? That statistic, which would amount to about one in 22 adults, also might not be what it seems.

The figure arose in a 2003 report by Synovate commissioned by the Federal Trade Commission. A 2005 update by Synovate put the figure closer to 9 million.

Both totals include misuse of existing credit cards.

Subtracting that, the identity theft numbers were still high but not as frightful: The FTC report determined that fraudsters had opened new accounts or committed similar misdeeds in the names of 3.2 million Americans in the previous year.

The average victim lost $1,180 and wasted 60 hours trying to resolve the problem. Clearly, it’s no picnic.

But there was one intriguing nugget deep in the report.

Some 38 percent of identity theft victims said they hadn’t bothered to notify anyone—not the police, not their credit card company, not a credit bureau. Even when fraud losses purportedly exceeded $5,000, the kept-it-to-myself rate was 19 percent.

Perhaps some people decide that raising a stink over a wrongful charge isn’t worth the trouble. Even so, the finding made the overall validity of the data seem questionable to Fred Cate, an Indiana University law professor who specializes in privacy and security issues.

“That’s not identity theft,” he said. “I’m just confident if you saw a charge that wasn’t yours, you’d contact somebody.”

Identity theft is a serious crime, and it’s a major growth industry in the criminal world. But we do everyone a disservice when we count things as identity theft that really aren’t.

Posted on November 16, 2005 at 1:21 PMView Comments

The FBI is Spying on Us

From TalkLeft:

The Washington Post reports that the FBI has been obtaining and reviewing records of ordinary Americans in the name of the war on terror through the use of national security letters that gag the recipients.

Merritt’s entire post is worth reading.

The closing:

The ACLU has been actively litigating the legality of the National Security Letters. Their latest press release is here.

Also, the ACLU is less critical than I am of activity taking place in Congress now where conferees of the Senate and House are working out a compromise version of Patriot Act extension legislation that will resolve differences in versions passed by each in the last Congress. The ACLU reports that the Senate version contains some modest improvements respecting your privacy rights while the House version contains further intrusions. There is still time to contact the conferees. The ACLU provides more information and a sample letter here.

History shows that once new power is granted to the government, it rarely gives it back. Even if you wouldn’t recognize a terrorist if he were standing in front of you, let alone consort with one, now is the time to raise your voice.

EDITED TO ADD: Here’s a good personal story of someone’s FBI file.

EDITED TO ADD: Several people have written to tell me that the CapitolHillBlue website, above, is not reliable. I don’t know one way or the other, but consider yourself warned.

Posted on November 7, 2005 at 3:13 PMView Comments

Microsoft Calls for National Privacy Law

Here’s some good news from Microsoft:

In an eight-page document released on Capitol Hill today, Microsoft outlined a series of steps it would like to see Congress take to preempt a growing number of state laws that impose varying requirements on the collection, use, storage and disclosure of personal information.

According to the press release:

[Microsoft’s senior vice president and general counsel Brad] Smith described four core principles that Microsoft believes should be the foundation of any federal legislation on data privacy:

  • Create a baseline standard across all organizations and industries for offline and online data collection and storage. This federal standard should pre-empt state laws and, as much as possible, be consistent with privacy laws around the world.
  • Increase transparency regarding the collection, use and disclosure of personal information. This would include a range of notification and access functions, such as simplified, consumer-friendly privacy notices and features that permit individuals to access and manage their personal information collected online.
  • Provide meaningful levels of control over the use and disclosure of personal information. This approach should balance a requirement for organizations to obtain individuals’ consent before using and disclosing information with the need to make the requirements flexible for businesses, while avoiding bombarding consumers with excessive and unnecessary levels of choice.

  • Ensure a minimum level of security for personal information in storage and transit. A federal standard should require organizations to take reasonable steps to secure and protect critical data against unauthorized access, use, disclosure modification and loss of personal information.

Here’s Microsoft’s document, with a bunch more details.

With this kind of thing, the devil is in the details. But it’s definitely a good start. Certainly Microsoft has become more pro-privacy in recent years.

Posted on November 7, 2005 at 12:06 PMView Comments

Sony Secretly Installs Rootkit on Computers

Mark Russinovich discovered a rootkit on his system. After much analysis, he discovered that the rootkit was installed as a part of the DRM software linked with a CD he bought. The package cannot be uninstalled. Even worse, the package actively cloaks itself from process listings and the file system.

At that point I knew conclusively that the rootkit and its associated files were related to the First 4 Internet DRM software Sony ships on its CDs. Not happy having underhanded and sloppily written software on my system I looked for a way to uninstall it. However, I didn’t find any reference to it in the Control Panel’s Add or Remove Programs list, nor did I find any uninstall utility or directions on the CD or on First 4 Internet’s site. I checked the EULA and saw no mention of the fact that I was agreeing to have software put on my system that I couldn’t uninstall. Now I was mad.

Removing the rootkit kills Windows.

Could Sony have violated the the Computer Misuse Act in the UK? If this isn’t clearly in the EULA, they have exceeded their privilege on the customer’s system by installing a rootkit to hide their software.

Certainly Mark has a reasonable lawsuit against Sony in the U.S.

EDITED TO ADD: The Washington Post is covering this story.

Sony lies about their rootkit:

November 2, 2005 – This Service Pack removes the cloaking technology component that has been recently discussed in a number of articles published regarding the XCP Technology used on SONY BMG content protected CDs. This component is not malicious and does not compromise security. However to alleviate any concerns that users may have about the program posing potential security vulnerabilities, this update has been released to enable users to remove this component from their computers.

Their update does not remove the rootkit, it just gets rid of the $sys$ cloaking.

Ed Felton has a great post on the issue:

The update is more than 3.5 megabytes in size, and it appears to contain new versions of almost all the files included in the initial installation of the entire DRM system, as well as creating some new files. In short, they’re not just taking away the rootkit-like function—they’re almost certainly adding things to the system as well. And once again, they’re not disclosing what they’re doing.

No doubt they’ll ask us to just trust them. I wouldn’t. The companies still assert—falsely—that the original rootkit-like software “does not compromise security” and “[t]here should be no concern” about it. So I wouldn’t put much faith in any claim that the new update is harmless. And the companies claim to have developed “new ways of cloaking files on a hard drive”. So I wouldn’t derive much comfort from carefully worded assertions that they have removed “the … component .. that has been discussed”.

And you can use the rootkit to avoid World of Warcraft spyware.

World of Warcraft hackers have confirmed that the hiding capabilities of Sony BMG’s content protection software can make tools made for cheating in the online world impossible to detect.

.

EDITED TO ADD: F-Secure makes a good point:

A member of our IT security team pointed out quite chilling thought about what might happen if record companies continue adding rootkit based copy protection into their CDs.

In order to hide from the system a rootkit must interface with the OS on very low level and in those areas theres no room for error.

It is hard enough to program something on that level, without having to worry about any other programs trying to do something with same parts of the OS.

Thus if there would be two DRM rootkits on the same system trying to hook same APIs, the results would be highly unpredictable. Or actually, a system crash is quite predictable result in such situation.

EDITED TO ADD: Declan McCullagh has a good essay on the topic. There will be lawsuits.

EDITED TO ADD: The Italian police are getting involved.

EDITED TO ADD: Here’s a Trojan that uses Sony’s rootkit to hide.

EDITED TO ADD: Sony temporarily halts production of CDs protected with this technology.

Posted on November 1, 2005 at 10:17 AMView Comments

NIST Hash Workshop Liveblogging (2)

In the morning we had a series of interesting papers: “Strengthening Digital Signatures via Randomized Hashing,” by Halevi and Krawczyk; “Herding Hash Functions and the Nostradamus Attack,” by Kelsey and Kohno; and “Collision-Resistant usage of MD5 and SHA-1 via Message Preprocessing,” by Szydlo and Yin. The first and third papers are suggestions for modifying SHA-1 to make it more secure. The second paper discusses some fascinating and cool, but still theoretical, attacks on hash functions.

The last session before lunch was a panel discussion: “SHA-1: Practical Security Implications of Continued Use.” The panel stressed that these are collision attacks and not pre-image attacks, and that many protocols simply don’t care. Collision attacks are important for digital signatures, but less so for other uses of hash functions. On the other hand, this difference is only understood by cryptographers; there are issues if the public believes that SHA-1 is “broken.”

Niels Ferguson pointed out that the big problem is MD5, which is still used everywhere. (Hell, DES is still everywhere.) It takes much longer to upgrade algorithms on the Internet than most people believe; Steve Bellovin says it takes about one year to get the change through the IETF, and another five to seven years to get it depoloyed. And that’s after we all figure out which algorithm they should use.

Georg Illies gave a perspective from Germany, where there is a digital-signature law in effect. In addition to the technology, there are legal considerations that make it harder to switch.

The panel seemed to agree that it’s still safe to use SHA-1 today, but that we need to start migrating to something better. It’s way easier to change algorithms when you’re not in the middle of a panic.

There was more talk about algorithm agility. This problem is larger than SHA. Our Internet protocols simply don’t have a secure methodology for migrating from one cryptographic algorithm to another.

Bottom line: Don’t use SHA-1 for anything new, and start moving away from it as soon as possible. To SHA-256, probably.

And now it’s lunchtime.

Posted on October 31, 2005 at 11:50 AMView Comments

Convicted Felons with Big Dogs

Here’s a security threat I’ll bet you never even considered before: convicted felons with large dogs:

The Contra Costa County board of supervisors [in California] unanimously supported on Tuesday prohibiting convicted felons from owning any dog that is aggressive or weighs more than 20 pounds, making it all but certain the proposal will become law when it formally comes before the board for approval Nov. 15.

These are not felons in jail. These are felons who have been released from jail after serving their time. They’re allowed to re-enter society, but letting them own a large dog would be just too much of a risk to the community?

Posted on October 28, 2005 at 12:17 PMView Comments

Australia's New Anti-Terrorism Legislation

There’s a new Australian anti-terrorism law in the works. It includes such things as:

  • 14-day secret detention without arrest by security services
  • Shoot-to-kill “on suspicion” powers for police
  • Imprisonment and fines for revealing an individual has been the subject of an investigation

News reports are pretty bad.

This draft legislation was not supposed to be public yet, but the Chief Minister of the ACT revealed it on his website last week in defiance of a federal government request not to do so.

Posted on October 27, 2005 at 1:10 PMView Comments

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Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.