Entries Tagged "keys"
Page 9 of 13
This idea, by Stuart Schechter at Microsoft Research, is — I think — clever:
Abstract: Implantable medical devices, such as implantable cardiac defibrillators and pacemakers, now use wireless communication protocols vulnerable to attacks that can physically harm patients. Security measures that impede emergency access by physicians could be equally devastating. We propose that access keys be written into patients’ skin using ultraviolet-ink micropigmentation (invisible tattoos).
It certainly is a new way to look at the security threat model.
Here’s a promotional security product designed by someone who knows nothing about security. The USB drive is “protected” by a combination lock. There are only two dials, so there are only 100 possible combinations. And when the drive is “locked” and the connector is retracted, the contact are still accessible.
Maybe it should be given away by companies that sell security theater.
Look at this new AES-encrypted USB memory stick. You enter the key directly into the stick via the keypad, thereby bypassing any eavesdropping software on the computer.
The problem is that in order to get full 256-bit entropy in the key, you need to enter 77 decimal digits using the keypad. I can’t imagine anyone doing that; they’ll enter an eight- or ten-digit key and call it done. (Likely, the password encrypts a random key that encrypts the actual data: not that it matters.) And even if you wanted to, is it reasonable to expect someone to enter 77 digits without making an error?
Nice idea, complete implementation failure.
EDITED TO ADD (3/4): According to the manual, the drive locks for two minutes after five unsuccessful attempts. This delay is enough to make brute-force attacks infeasible, even with only ten-digit keys.
So, not nearly as bad as I thought it was. Better would be a much longer delay after 100 or so unsuccessful attempts. Yes, there’s a denial-of-service attack against the thing, but stealing it is an even more effective denial-of-service attack.
Interesting blog post, with video demonstration, about an improved tool to open high security locks with a key that will just “form itself” if you insert it into the lock and wiggle it a little. The basic technique is a few years old, but the improvements discussed here allow the tool to open a wider variety of locks than before.
This is neat:
The Impressioner consists of a sensor that goes into the lock and sends information back to a computer via USB about the location of the lock’s tumblers—a corresponding computer program comes up with the code, depending on the make of car you’ve entered beforehand. Once you know the code, a key-cutting machine can use it to carve up a key.
Right now, it’s a prototype that only works on Ford car locks. The article points out that both locksmiths and thieves can use this device.
EDITED TO ADD (2/16): How it likely works.
Reproducing keys from distant and angled photographs:
The access control provided by a physical lock is based on the assumption that the information content of the corresponding key is private — that duplication should require either possession of the key or a priori knowledge of how it was cut. However, the ever-increasing capabilities and prevalence of digital imaging technologies present a fundamental challenge to this privacy assumption. Using modest imaging equipment and standard computer vision algorithms, we demonstrate the effectiveness of physical key teleduplication — extracting a key’s complete and precise bitting code at a distance via optical decoding and then cutting precise duplicates. We describe our prototype system, Sneakey, and evaluate its effectiveness, in both laboratory and real-world settings, using the most popular residential key types in the U.S.
Those of you who carry your keys on a ring dangling from a belt loop, take note.
Texas Instruments’ calculators use RSA digital signatures to authenticate any updates to their operating system. Unfortunately, their signing keys are too short: 512-bits. Earlier this month, a collaborative effort factored the moduli and published the private keys. Texas Instruments responded by threatening websites that published the keys with the DMCA, but it’s too late.
So far, we have the operating-system signing keys for the TI-92+, TI-73, TI-89, TI-83+/TI-83+ Silver Edition, Voyage 200, TI-89 Titanium, and the TI-84+/TI-84 Silver Edition, and the date-stamp signing key for the TI-73, Explorer, TI-83 Plus, TI-83 Silver Edition, TI-84 Plus, TI-84 Silver Edition, TI-89, TI-89 Titanium, TI-92 Plus, and the Voyage 200.
Moral: Don’t assume that if your application is obscure, or if there’s no obvious financial incentive for doing so, that your cryptography won’t be broken if you use too-short keys.
Using a 3D printer. Impressive.
At the end of the day he talked the officers into trying the key on their handcuffs and … it did work! At least the Dutch Police now knows there is a plastic key on the market that will open their handcuffs. A plastic key undetectable by metal detectors….
Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.