A mafia fugitive hiding out in the Dominican Republic was arrested when investigators found his YouTube cooking channel and identified him by his distinctive arm tattoos.
Entries Tagged "Italy"
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Kaspersky Labs is reporting on a new piece of sophisticated malware:
We observed many web landing pages that mimic the sites of mobile operators and which are used to spread the Android implants. These domains have been registered by the attackers since 2015. According to our telemetry, that was the year the distribution campaign was at its most active. The activities continue: the most recently observed domain was registered on October 31, 2017. Based on our KSN statistics, there are several infected individuals, exclusively in Italy.
Moreover, as we dived deeper into the investigation, we discovered several spyware tools for Windows that form an implant for exfiltrating sensitive data on a targeted machine. The version we found was built at the beginning of 2017, and at the moment we are not sure whether this implant has been used in the wild.
It seems to be Italian. Ars Technica speculates that it is related to Hacking Team:
That’s not to say the malware is perfect. The various versions examined by Kaspersky Lab contained several artifacts that provide valuable clues about the people who may have developed and maintained the code. Traces include the domain name h3g.co, which was registered by Italian IT firm Negg International. Negg officials didn’t respond to an email requesting comment for this post. The malware may be filling a void left after the epic hack in 2015 of Hacking Team, another Italy-based developer of spyware.
I don’t think this is really a case about ISP liability at all. It is a case about the use of a person’s image, without their consent, that generates commercial value for someone else. That is the essence of the Italian law at issue in this case. It is also how the right of privacy was first established in the United States.
The video at the center of this case was very popular in Italy and drove lots of users to the Google Video site. This boosted advertising and support for other Google services. As a consequence, Google actually had an incentive not to respond to the many requests it received before it actually took down the video.
Back in the U.S., here is the relevant history: after Brandeis and Warren published their famous article on the right to privacy in 1890, state courts struggled with its application. In a New York state case in 1902, a court rejected the newly proposed right. In a second case, a Georgia state court in 1905 endorsed it.
What is striking is that both cases involved the use of a person’s image without their consent. In New York, it was a young girl, whose image was drawn and placed on an oatmeal box for advertising purposes. In Georgia, a man’s image was placed in a newspaper, without his consent, to sell insurance.
Also important is the fact that the New York judge who rejected the privacy claim, suggested that the state assembly could simple pass a law to create the right. The New York legislature did exactly that and in 1903 New York enacted the first privacy law in the United States to protect a person’s “name or likeness” for commercial use.
The whole thing is worth reading.
EDITED TO ADD (3/18): A rebuttal.
We’re losing the “War on the Unexpected.”
A blind calypso musician and his band removed from an airplane:
The passenger told the pilot of the Sardinia-Stansted flight that he was concerned about the behaviour of Michael Toussaint and four other members of the Caribbean Steel International Orchestra, a court heard. He claimed to be a psychology lecturer from London University and said he had noticed the group in “high spirits” in the terminal building, but that they had sat separately and quietly on board. He also believed Toussaint, who was wearing dark glasses, could have been feigning blindness, the court was told.
A Jewish man removed from a train:
The incident took place on a train that left Chicago early in the morning – when Jewish men are obligated to put on tefillin (phylacteries). The passenger began strapping the head-tefillin to his forehead and passengers unfamiliar with the custom rushed to the conductor and told him there was a man on board who was fastening a box to his head with wires dangling from it.”
The conductor approached the passenger but the latter refused to answer him as he was in the middle of the prayer, heightening the conductor’s suspicions.
Meanwhile, the passengers grew even more frantic when they noticed that the passenger sitting next to the Jewish man had a Middle-Eastern appearance and wore a turban.
EDITED TO ADD (12/6): Bomb squad in Sarasota, Florida called in to detonate a typewriter.
EDITED TO ADD (2/8/08): The calypso band won damages in court:
A judge ruled that the airline had not acted reasonably and had failed in its duty of care to the passengers, particularly Toussaint, who was entitled to special care because of his disability.
He also found the company had issued a “false and misleading” statement to the BBC, which blamed the incident on the Italian security authorities.
I love stuff like this: “Electing the Doge of Venice: Analysis of a 13th Century Protocol,” by Miranda Mowbray and Dieter Gollmann.
This paper discusses the protocol used for electing the Doge of Venice between 1268 and the end of the Republic in 1797. We will show that it has some useful properties that in addition to being interesting in themselves, also suggest that its fundamental design principle is worth investigating for application to leader election protocols in computer science. For example it gives some opportunities to minorities while ensuring that more popular candidates are more likely to win, and offers some resistance to corruption of voters. The most obvious feature of this protocol is that it is complicated and would have taken a long time to carry out. We will advance a hypothesis as to why it is so complicated, and describe a simplified protocol with very similar features.
Venice was very clever about working to avoid the factionalism that tore apart a lot of its Italian rivals, while making the various factions feel represented.
CIA agents exposed due to their use of frequent-flier miles and other mistakes:
The man and woman were pretending to be American business executives on international assignments, so they did what globe-trotting executives do. While traveling abroad they used their frequent-flier cards as often as possible to gain credits toward free flights.
In fact, the pair were covert operatives working for the CIA. Thanks to their diligent use of frequent-flier programs, Italian prosecutors have been able to reconstruct much of their itinerary during 2003, including trips to Brussels, Venice, London, Vienna and Oslo.
Aides to former CIA Director Porter Goss have used the word “horrified” to describe Goss’ reaction to the sloppiness of the Milan operation, which Italian police were able to reconstruct through the CIA operatives’ imprudent use of cell phones and other violations of basic CIA “tradecraft.”
I’m not sure how collecting frequent-flier miles is a problem, though. Assuming they’re traveling under the cover of being business executives, it makes sense for them to act just like other business executives.
It’s not like there’s no other way to reconstruct their travel.
Have you ever been to a retail store and seen this sign on the register: “Your purchase free if you don’t get a receipt”? You almost certainly didn’t see it in an expensive or high-end store. You saw it in a convenience store, or a fast-food restaurant. Or maybe a liquor store. That sign is a security device, and a clever one at that. And it illustrates a very important rule about security: it works best when you align interests with capability.
If you’re a store owner, one of your security worries is employee theft. Your employees handle cash all day, and dishonest ones will pocket some of it for themselves. The history of the cash register is mostly a history of preventing this kind of theft. Early cash registers were just boxes with a bell attached. The bell rang when an employee opened the box, alerting the store owner—who was presumably elsewhere in the store—that an employee was handling money.
The register tape was an important development in security against employee theft. Every transaction is recorded in write-only media, in such a way that it’s impossible to insert or delete transactions. It’s an audit trail. Using that audit trail, the store owner can count the cash in the drawer, and compare the amount with what the register. Any discrepancies can be docked from the employee’s paycheck.
If you’re a dishonest employee, you have to keep transactions off the register. If someone hands you money for an item and walks out, you can pocket that money without anyone being the wiser. And, in fact, that’s how employees steal cash in retail stores.
What can the store owner do? He can stand there and watch the employee, of course. But that’s not very efficient; the whole point of having employees is so that the store owner can do other things. The customer is standing there anyway, but the customer doesn’t care one way or another about a receipt.
So here’s what the employer does: he hires the customer. By putting up a sign saying “Your purchase free if you don’t get a receipt,” the employer is getting the customer to guard the employee. The customer makes sure the employee gives him a receipt, and employee theft is reduced accordingly.
There is a general rule in security to align interest with capability. The customer has the capability of watching the employee; the sign gives him the interest.
In Beyond Fear I wrote about ATM fraud; you can see the same mechanism at work:
“When ATM cardholders in the US complained about phantom withdrawals from their accounts, the courts generally held that the banks had to prove fraud. Hence, the banks’ agenda was to improve security and keep fraud low, because they paid the costs of any fraud. In the UK, the reverse was true: The courts generally sided with the banks and assumed that any attempts to repudiate withdrawals were cardholder fraud, and the cardholder had to prove otherwise. This caused the banks to have the opposite agenda; they didn’t care about improving security, because they were content to blame the problems on the customers and send them to jail for complaining. The result was that in the US, the banks improved ATM security to forestall additional losses—most of the fraud actually was not the cardholder’s fault—while in the UK, the banks did nothing.”
The banks had the capability to improve security. In the US, they also had the interest. But in the UK, only the customer had the interest. It wasn’t until the UK courts reversed themselves and aligned interest with capability that ATM security improved.
Computer security is no different. For years I have argued in favor of software liabilities. Software vendors are in the best position to improve software security; they have the capability. But, unfortunately, they don’t have much interest. Features, schedule, and profitability are far more important. Software liabilities will change that. They’ll align interest with capability, and they’ll improve software security.
One last story… In Italy, tax fraud used to be a national hobby. (It may still be; I don’t know.) The government was tired of retail stores not reporting sales and paying taxes, so they passed a law regulating the customers. Any customer having just purchased an item and stopped within a certain distance of a retail store, has to produce a receipt or they would be fined. Just as in the “Your purchase free if you don’t get a receipt” story, the law turned the customers into tax inspectors. They demanded receipts from merchants, which in turn forced the merchants to create a paper audit trail for the purchase and pay the required tax.
This was a great idea, but it didn’t work very well. Customers, especially tourists, didn’t like to be stopped by police. People started demanding that the police prove they just purchased the item. Threatening people with fines if they didn’t guard merchants wasn’t as effective an enticement as offering people a reward if they didn’t get a receipt.
Interest must be aligned with capability, but you need to be careful how you generate interest.
This essay originally appeared on Wired.com.
After Italy passed a new antiterrorism package in July, authorities ordered managers offering public communications services, like Mr. Savoni,to make passport photocopies of every customer seeking to use the Internet, phone, or fax.
Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.