Entries Tagged "identity theft"

Page 12 of 13

More on Two-Factor Authentication

Recently I published an essay arguing that two-factor authentication is an ineffective defense against identity theft. For example, issuing tokens to online banking customers won’t reduce fraud, because new attack techniques simply ignore the countermeasure. Unfortunately, some took my essay as a condemnation of two-factor authentication in general. This is not true. It’s simply a matter of understanding the threats and the attacks.

Passwords just don’t work anymore. As computers have gotten faster, password guessing has gotten easier. Ever-more-complicated passwords are required to evade password-guessing software. At the same time, there’s an upper limit to how complex a password users can be expected to remember. About five years ago, these two lines crossed: It is no longer reasonable to expect users to have passwords that can’t be guessed. For anything that requires reasonable security, the era of passwords is over.

Two-factor authentication solves this problem. It works against passive attacks: eavesdropping and password guessing. It protects against users choosing weak passwords, telling their passwords to their colleagues or writing their passwords on pieces of paper taped to their monitors. For an organization trying to improve access control for its employees, two-factor authentication is a great idea. Microsoft is integrating two-factor authentication into its operating system, another great idea.

What two-factor authentication won’t do is prevent identity theft and fraud. It’ll prevent certain tactics of identity theft and fraud, but criminals simply will switch tactics. We’re already seeing fraud tactics that completely ignore two-factor authentication. As banks roll out two-factor authentication, criminals simply will switch to these new tactics.

Security is always an arms race, and you could argue that this situation is simply the cost of treading water. The problem with this reasoning is it ignores countermeasures that permanently reduce fraud. By concentrating on authenticating the individual rather than authenticating the transaction, banks are forced to defend against criminal tactics rather than the crime itself.

Credit cards are a perfect example. Notice how little attention is paid to cardholder authentication. Clerks barely check signatures. People use their cards over the phone and on the Internet, where the card’s existence isn’t even verified. The credit card companies spend their security dollar authenticating the transaction, not the cardholder.

Two-factor authentication is a long-overdue solution to the problem of passwords. I welcome its increasing popularity, but identity theft and bank fraud are not results of password problems; they stem from poorly authenticated transactions. The sooner people realize that, the sooner they’ll stop advocating stronger authentication measures and the sooner security will actually improve.

This essay previously appeared in Network World as a “Face Off.” Joe Uniejewski of RSA Security wrote an opposing position. Another article on the subject was published at SearchSecurity.com.

One way to think about this—a phrasing I didn’t think about until after writing the above essay—is that two-factor authentication solves security problems involving authentication. The current wave of attacks against financial systems are not exploiting vulnerabilities in the authentication system, so two-factor authentication doesn’t help.

Posted on April 12, 2005 at 11:02 AM • View Comments

ChoicePoint Feeling the Heat

AP says:

An executive of embattled data broker ChoicePoint Inc. says the company is developing a system that would allow people
to review their personal information that is sold to law enforcement agencies, employers, landlords and businesses. ChoicePoint’s announcement comes a month after it disclosed
that thieves used previously stolen identities to create what appeared to be legitimate businesses seeking personal
records.

Posted on April 2, 2005 at 9:09 AM • View Comments

Student Hacks System to Alter Grades

This is an interesting story:

A UCSB student is being charged with four felonies after she allegedly stole the identity of two professors and used the information to change her own and several other students’ grades, police said.

The Universty of California Santa Barbara has a custom program, eGrades, where faculty can submit and alter grades. It’s password protected, of course. But there’s a backup system, so that faculty who forget their password can reset it using their Social Security number and date of birth.

A student worked for an insurance company, and she was able to obtain SSN and DOB for two faculty members. She used that information to reset their passwords and change grades.

Police, university officials and campus computer specialists said Ramirez’s alleged illegal access to the computer grading system was not the result of a deficiency or flaw in the program.

Sounds like a flaw in the program to me. It’s even one I’ve written about: a primary security mechanism that fails to a less-secure secondary mechanism.

Posted on April 1, 2005 at 2:36 PM • View Comments

ID Theft is Inescapable

The Register says what I’ve been saying all along:

While this is nothing new, there is an important observation here that’s worth emphasizing: none of these cases involved online transactions.

Many people innocently believe that they’re safe from credit card fraud and identity theft in the brick and mortar world. Nothing could be farther from the truth. The vast majority of incidents can be traced to skimming, dumpster diving, and just plain stupidity among those who “own” our personal data.

Only a small fraction of such incidents result from online transactions. Every time you pay by check, use a debit or credit card, or fill out an application for insurance, housing, credit, employment, or education, you lose control of sensitive data.

In the US, a merchant is at liberty to do anything he pleases with the information, and this includes selling it to a third party without your knowledge or permission, or entering it into a computerized database, possibly with lax access controls, and possibly connected to the Internet.

Sadly, Congress’s response has been to increase the penalties for identity theft, rather than to regulate access to, and use of, personal data by merchants, marketers, and data miners. Incredibly, the only person with absolutely no control over the collection, storage, security, and use of such sensitive information is its actual owner.

For this reason, it’s literally impossible for an individual to prevent identity theft and credit card fraud, and it will remain impossible until Congress sees fit to regulate the privacy invasion industry.

Posted on March 30, 2005 at 7:35 AM • View Comments

Personal Information and Identity Theft

From BBC:

The chance to win theatre tickets is enough to make people give away their identity, reveals a survey.

Of those taking part 92% revealed details such as mother’s maiden name, first school and birth date.

Fraud due to impersonation—commonly called “identity theft”—works for two reasons. One, identity information is easy to obtain. And two, identity information is easy to use to commit fraud.

Studies like this show why attacking the first reason is futile; there are just too many ways to get the information. If we want to reduce the risks associated with identity theft, we have to make identity information less valuable. Too much of our security is based on identity, and it’s not working.

Posted on March 25, 2005 at 8:09 AM • View Comments

The Failure of Two-Factor Authentication

Two-factor authentication isn’t our savior. It won’t defend against phishing. It’s not going to prevent identity theft. It’s not going to secure online accounts from fraudulent transactions. It solves the security problems we had ten years ago, not the security problems we have today.

The problem with passwords is that they’re too easy to lose control of. People give them to other people. People write them down, and other people read them. People send them in e-mail, and that e-mail is intercepted. People use them to log into remote servers, and their communications are eavesdropped on. They’re also easy to guess. And once any of that happens, the password no longer works as an authentication token because you can’t be sure who is typing that password in.

Two-factor authentication mitigates this problem. If your password includes a number that changes every minute, or a unique reply to a random challenge, then it’s harder for someone else to intercept. You can’t write down the ever-changing part. An intercepted password won’t be good the next time it’s needed. And a two-factor password is harder to guess. Sure, someone can always give his password and token to his secretary, but no solution is foolproof.

These tokens have been around for at least two decades, but it’s only recently that they have gotten mass-market attention. AOL is rolling them out. Some banks are issuing them to customers, and even more are talking about doing it. It seems that corporations are finally waking up to the fact that passwords don’t provide adequate security, and are hoping that two-factor authentication will fix their problems.

Unfortunately, the nature of attacks has changed over those two decades. Back then, the threats were all passive: eavesdropping and offline password guessing. Today, the threats are more active: phishing and Trojan horses.

Here are two new active attacks we’re starting to see:

  • Man-in-the-Middle attack. An attacker puts up a fake bank website and entices user to that website. User types in his password, and the attacker in turn uses it to access the bank’s real website. Done right, the user will never realize that he isn’t at the bank’s website. Then the attacker either disconnects the user and makes any fraudulent transactions he wants, or passes along the user’s banking transactions while making his own transactions at the same time.

  • Trojan attack. Attacker gets Trojan installed on user’s computer. When user logs into his bank’s website, the attacker piggybacks on that session via the Trojan to make any fraudulent transaction he wants.

See how two-factor authentication doesn’t solve anything? In the first case, the attacker can pass the ever-changing part of the password to the bank along with the never-changing part. And in the second case, the attacker is relying on the user to log in.

The real threat is fraud due to impersonation, and the tactics of impersonation will change in response to the defenses. Two-factor authentication will force criminals to modify their tactics, that’s all.

Recently I’ve seen examples of two-factor authentication using two different communications paths: call it “two-channel authentication.” One bank sends a challenge to the user’s cell phone via SMS and expects a reply via SMS. If you assume that all your customers have cell phones, then this results in a two-factor authentication process without extra hardware. And even better, the second authentication piece goes over a different communications channel than the first; eavesdropping is much, much harder.

But in this new world of active attacks, no one cares. An attacker using a man-in-the-middle attack is happy to have the user deal with the SMS portion of the log-in, since he can’t do it himself. And a Trojan attacker doesn’t care, because he’s relying on the user to log in anyway.

Two-factor authentication is not useless. It works for local login, and it works within some corporate networks. But it won’t work for remote authentication over the Internet. I predict that banks and other financial institutions will spend millions outfitting their users with two-factor authentication tokens. Early adopters of this technology may very well experience a significant drop in fraud for a while as attackers move to easier targets, but in the end there will be a negligible drop in the amount of fraud and identity theft.

This essay will appear in the April issue of Communications of the ACM.

Posted on March 15, 2005 at 7:54 AM • View Comments

ChoicePoint Says "Please Regulate Me"

According to ChoicePoint’s most recent 8-K filing:

Based on information currently available, we estimate that approximately 145,000 consumers from 50 states and other territories may have had their personal information improperly accessed as a result of the recent Los Angeles incident and certain other instances of unauthorized access to our information products. Approximately 35,000 of these consumers are California residents, and approximately 110,000 are residents of other states. These numbers were determined by conducting searches of our databases that matched searches conducted by customers who we believe may have had unauthorized access to our information products on or after July 1, 2003, the effective date of the California notification law. Because our databases are constantly updated, our search results will never be identical to the search results of these customers.

Catch that? ChoicePoint actually has no idea if only 145,000 customers were affected by its recent security debacle. But it’s not doing any work to determine if more than 145,000 customers were affected—or if any customers before July 1, 2003 were affected—because there’s no law compelling it to do so.

I have no idea why ChoicePoint has decided to tape a huge “Please Regulate My Industry” sign to its back, but it’s increasingly obvious that it has. There’s a class-action shareholders’ lawsuit, but I don’t think that will be enough.

And, by the way, Choicepoint’s database is riddled with errors.

Posted on March 9, 2005 at 2:54 PM • View Comments

Choicepoint's CISO Speaks

Richard Baich, Choicepoint’s CISO, is interviewed on SearchSecurity.com:

This is not an information security issue. My biggest concern is the impact this has on the industry from the standpoint that people are saying ChoicePoint was hacked. No we weren’t. This type of fraud happens every day.

Nice spin job, but it just doesn’t make sense. This isn’t a computer hack in the traditional sense, but it’s a social engineering hack of their system. Information security controls were compromised, and confidential information was leaked.

It’s created a media frenzy; this has been mislabeled a hack and a security breach. That’s such a negative impression that suggests we failed to provide adequate protection. Fraud happens every day. Hacks don’t.

So, Choicepoint believes that providing adequate protection doesn’t include preventing this kind of attack.

I’m sure he’s exaggerating when he says that “this type of fraud happens every day” and “frauds happens every day,” but if it’s true then Choicepoint has a huge information security problem.

Posted on March 1, 2005 at 10:45 AM • View Comments

Identity Theft out of Golf Lockers

When someone goes golfing in Japan, he’s given a locker in which to store his valuables. Generally, and at the golf course in question, these are electronic combination locks. The user selects a code himself and locks his valuables. Of course, there’s a back door—a literal one—to the lockers, in case someone forgets his unlock code. Furthermore, the back door allows the administrator of these lockers to read all the codes to all the lockers.

Here’s the scam: A group of thieves worked in conjunction with the locker administrator to open the lockers, copy the golfers’ debit cards, and replace them in their wallets and in their lockers before they were done golfing. In many cases, the golfers used the same code to lock their locker as their bank card PIN, so the thieves got those as well. Then the thieves stole a lot of money from multiple ATMs.

Several factors make this scam even worse. One, unlike the U.S., ATM cards in Japan have no limit. You can literally withdraw everything out of the account. Two, the victims don’t know anything until they find out they have no money when they use their card somewhere. Three, the victims, since they play golf at these expensive courses, are
usually very rich. And four, unlike the United States, Japanese banks do not guarantee loss due to theft.

Posted on March 1, 2005 at 9:20 AM • View Comments

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.