Entries Tagged "hacking"

Page 62 of 79

RSA Security, Inc Hacked

The company, not the algorithm. Here’s the corporate spin.

Our investigation has led us to believe that the attack is in the category of an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT). Our investigation also revealed that the attack resulted in certain information being extracted from RSA’s systems. Some of that information is specifically related to RSA’s SecurID two-factor authentication products. While at this time we are confident that the information extracted does not enable a successful direct attack on any of our RSA SecurID customers, this information could potentially be used to reduce the effectiveness of a current two-factor authentication implementation as part of a broader attack. We are very actively communicating this situation to RSA customers and providing immediate steps for them to take to strengthen their SecurID implementations.

Here are news articles. The worry is that source code to the company’s SecurID two-factor authentication product was stolen, which would possibly allow hackers to reverse-engineer or otherwise break the system. It’s hard to make any assessments about whether this is possible or likely without knowing 1) how SecurID’s cryptography works, and 2) exactly what was stolen from the company’s servers. We do not know either, and the corporate spin is as short on details as it is long on reassurances.

RSA Data Security, Inc. is probably pretty screwed if SecurID is compromised. Those hardware tokens have no upgrade path, and would have to be replaced. How many of the company’s customers will replace them with competitors’ tokens. Probably a bunch. Hence, it’s in RSA’s best interest for their customers to forget this incident as quickly as possible.

There seems to be two likely scenarios if the attackers have compromised SecurID. One, they are a sophisticated organization who wants the information for a specific purpose. The attackers actually are on RSA’s side in the public-relations spin, and we’re unlikely to see widespread use of this information. Or two, they stole the stuff for conventional criminal purposes and will sell it. In that case, we’re likely to know pretty quickly.

Again, without detailed information—or at least an impartial assessment—it’s impossible to make any recommendations. Security is all about trust, and when trust is lost there is no security. User’s of SecurID trusted RSA Data Security, Inc. to protect the secrets necessary to secure that system. To the extent they did not, the company has lost its customers’ trust.

Posted on March 21, 2011 at 6:52 AM • View Comments

Anonymous vs HBGary

One of the effects of writing a book is that I don’t have the time to devote to other writing. So while I’ve been wanting to write about Anonymous vs HBGary, I don’t think I will have time. Here’s an excellent series of posts on the topic from ArsTechnica.

In cyberspace, the balance of power is on the side of the attacker. Attacking a network is much easier than defending a network. That may change eventually—there might someday be the cyberspace equivalent of trench warfare, where the defender has the natural advantage—but not anytime soon.

EDITED TO ADD (3/14): Stephen Colbert on HGary. Another article.

Posted on February 28, 2011 at 5:58 AM • View Comments

HBGary and the Future of the IT Security Industry

This is a really good piece by Paul Roberts on Anonymous vs. HBGary: not the tactics or the politics, but what HBGary demonstrates about the IT security industry.

But I think the real lesson of the hack – and of the revelations that followed it – is that the IT security industry, having finally gotten the attention of law makers, Pentagon generals and public policy establishment wonks in the Beltway, is now in mortal danger of losing its soul. We’ve convinced the world that the threat is real – omnipresent and omnipotent. But in our desire to combat it, we are becoming indistinguishable from the folks with the black hats.

[…]

…While “scare ’em and snare ’em” may be business as usual in the IT security industry, other HBGary Federal skunk works projects clearly crossed a line: a proposal for a major U.S. bank, allegedly Bank of America, to launch offensive cyber attacks on the servers that host the whistle blower site Wikileaks. HBGary was part of a triumvirate of firms that also included Palantir Inc and Berico Technologies, that was working with the law firm of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to develop plans to target progressive groups, labor unions and other left-leaning non profits who the Chamber opposed with a campaign of false information and entrapment. Other leaked e-mail messages reveal work with General Dynamics and a host of other firms to develop custom, stealth malware and collaborations with other firms selling offensive cyber capabilities including knowledge of previously undiscovered (“zero day”) vulnerabilities.

[…]

What’s more disturbing is the way that the folks at HBGary – mostly Aaron Barr, but others as well – came to view the infowar tactics they were pitching to the military and its contractors as applicable in the civilian context, as well. How effortlessly and seamlessly the focus on “advanced persistent threats” shifted from government backed hackers in China and Russia to encompass political foes like ThinkProgress or the columnist Glenn Greenwald. Anonymous may have committed crimes that demand punishment – but its up to the FBI to handle that, not “a large U.S. bank” or its attorneys.

Read the whole thing.

Posted on February 25, 2011 at 6:14 AM • View Comments

Hacking Tamper-Evident Devices

At the Black Hat conference lasts week, Jamie Schwettmann and Eric Michaud presented some great research on hacking tamper-evident seals.

Jamie Schwettmann and Eric Michaud of i11 Industries went through a long list of tamper evident devices at the conference here and explained, step-by-step, how each seal can be circumvented with common items, such as various solvents, hypodermic needles, razors, blow driers, and in more difficult cases with the help of tools such as drills.

Tamper-evident devices may be as old as civilization, and today are used in everyday products such as aspirin containers’ paper seals. The more difficult devices may be bolt locks designed to secure shipping containers, or polycarbonate locks designed to shatter if cut.

But they all share something in common: They can be removed and the anti-tampering device reassembled.

Here’s their paper, and here are the slides from their presentation. (These two direct download links from GoogleDocs also work.) There was more information in the presentation than in either the paper or the PowerPoint slides. If the video ever gets online, I’ll link to it in this post.

Posted on January 24, 2011 at 1:20 PM • View Comments

Attacking High-Frequency Trading Networks

Turns out you can make money by manipulating the network latency.

cPacket has developed a proof of concept showing that these side-channel attacks can be used to create tiny delays in the transmission of market data and trades. By manipulating specific trading activities by several microseconds, an attacker could gain unfair trading advantage. And because the operation occurs outside the range of monitoring technology, it would remain invisible. “We believe that such techniques pose a substantial risk of creating unfair trading, if used by the wrong people,” Kay says.

It’s hard to know how real this threat is. Certainly micro-traders pay attention to latency, and sometimes even place their computers physically close to exchanges so they can reduce latency. And while it would be illegal to deliberately manipulate someone else’s trades, it is probably okay to place a gazillion trades at the same time which—as a side effect—increases latency for everyone else. My guess is that this isn’t a movie-plot threat, and that traders are trying lots of things along this line to give them a small advantage over everyone else.

On the same subject, can anyone explain this?

Posted on January 12, 2011 at 6:59 AM • View Comments

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Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.