Entries Tagged "gaming consoles"
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These are what I get for giving interviews when I’m in a bad mood. For the record, I think Sony did a terrible job with its customers’ security. I also think that most companies do a terrible job with customers’ security, simply because there isn’t a financial incentive to do better. And that most of us are pretty secure, despite that.
One of my biggest complaints with these stories is how little actual information we have. We often don’t know if any data was actually stolen, only that hackers had access to it. We rarely know how the data was accessed: what sort of vulnerability was used by the hackers. We rarely know the motivations of the hackers: were they criminals, spies, kids, or someone else? We rarely know if the data is actually used for any nefarious purposes; it’s generally impossible to connect a data breach with a corresponding fraud incident. Given all of that, it’s impossible to say anything useful or definitive about the attack. But the press always wants definitive statements.
The whitelist/blacklist debate is far older than computers, and it’s instructive to recall what works where. Physical security works generally on a whitelist model: if you have a key, you can open the door; if you know the combination, you can open the lock. We do it this way not because it’s easier — although it is generally much easier to make a list of people who should be allowed through your office door than a list of people who shouldn’t–but because it’s a security system that can be implemented automatically, without people.
To find blacklists in the real world, you have to start looking at environments where almost everyone is allowed. Casinos are a good example: everyone can come in and gamble except those few specifically listed in the casino’s black book or the more general Griffin book. Some retail stores have the same model — a Google search on “banned from Wal-Mart” results in 1.5 million hits, including Megan Fox — although you have to wonder about enforcement. Does Wal-Mart have the same sort of security manpower as casinos?
National borders certainly have that kind of manpower, and Marcus is correct to point to passport control as a system with both a whitelist and a blacklist. There are people who are allowed in with minimal fuss, people who are summarily arrested with as minimal a fuss as possible, and people in the middle who receive some amount of fussing. Airport security works the same way: the no-fly list is a blacklist, and people with redress numbers are on the whitelist.
Computer networks share characteristics with your office and Wal-Mart: sometimes you only want a few people to have access, and sometimes you want almost everybody to have access. And you see whitelists and blacklists at work in computer networks. Access control is whitelisting: if you know the password, or have the token or biometric, you get access. Antivirus is blacklisting: everything coming into your computer from the Internet is assumed to be safe unless it appears on a list of bad stuff. On computers, unlike the real world, it takes no extra manpower to implement a blacklist — the software can do it largely for free.
Traditionally, execution control has been based on a blacklist. Computers are so complicated and applications so varied that it just doesn’t make sense to limit users to a specific set of applications. The exception is constrained environments, such as computers in hotel lobbies and airline club lounges. On those, you’re often limited to an Internet browser and a few common business applications.
Lately, we’re seeing more whitelisting on closed computing platforms. The iPhone works on a whitelist: if you want a program to run on the phone, you need to get it approved by Apple and put in the iPhone store. Your Wii game machine works the same way. This is done primarily because the manufacturers want to control the economic environment, but it’s being sold partly as a security measure. But in this case, more security equals less liberty; do you really want your computing options limited by Apple, Microsoft, Google, Facebook, or whoever controls the particular system you’re using?
Turns out that many people do. Apple’s control over its apps hasn’t seemed to hurt iPhone sales, and Facebook’s control over its apps hasn’t seemed to affect Facebook’s user numbers. And honestly, quite a few of us would have had an easier time over the Christmas holidays if we could have implemented a whitelist on the computers of our less-technical relatives.
For these two reasons, I think the whitelist model will continue to make inroads into our general purpose computers. And those of us who want control over our own environments will fight back — perhaps with a whitelist we maintain personally, but more probably with a blacklist.
This essay previously appeared in Information Security as the first half of a point-counterpoint with Marcus Ranum. You can read Marcus’s half there as well.
Speaking to the BBC, HMRC spokesperson Clare Merrills warned that faulty counterfeit consoles could be unsafe.
“You might find you plug it in and the adaptor sets on fire or the wires start to melt and stick out,” she warned.
“When you buy these goods, you’re not funding our economy, you’re actually funding criminals in these far off places and it could be linked to terrorism,” she added.
Why be rational, when you can stoke fear instead?
EDITED TO ADD (1/13): How to spot a fake Nintendo console.
According to the specs of the new Nintendo Wii (their new game machine), “Wii can communicate with the Internet even when the power is turned off.” Nintendo accentuates the positive: “This WiiConnect24 service delivers a new surprise or game update, even if users do not play with Wii,” while ignoring the possibility that Nintendo can deactivate a game if they choose to do so, or that someone else can deliver a different — not so wanted — surprise.
We all know that, but what’s interesting here is that Nintendo is changing the meaning of the word “off.” We are all conditioned to believe that “off” means off, and therefore safe. But in Nintendo’s case, “off” really means something like “on standby.” If users expect the Nintendo Wii to be truly off, they need to pull the power plug — assuming there isn’t a battery foiling that tactic. Maybe they need to pull both the power plug and the Ethernet cable. Unless they have a wireless network at home.
Maybe there is no way to turn the Nintendo Wii off.
There’s a serious security problem here, made worse by a bad user interface. “Off” should mean off.
Interesting article: “The Hidden Boot Code of the Xbox, or How to fit three bugs in 512 bytes of security code.”
Microsoft wanted to lock out both pirated games and unofficial games, so they built a chain of trust on the Xbox from the hardware to the execution of the game code. Only code authorized by Microsoft could run on the Xbox. The link between hardware and software in this chain of trust is the hidden “MCPX” boot ROM. The article discusses that ROM.
Lots of kindergarten security mistakes.
Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.