This is good news:
Whenever you visit a website — even if it’s HTTPS enabled — the DNS query that converts the web address into an IP address that computers can read is usually unencrypted. DNS-over-HTTPS, or DoH, encrypts the request so that it can’t be intercepted or hijacked in order to send a user to a malicious site.
But the move is not without controversy. Last year, an internet industry group branded Mozilla an “internet villain” for pressing ahead the security feature. The trade group claimed it would make it harder to spot terrorist materials and child abuse imagery. But even some in the security community are split, amid warnings that it could make incident response and malware detection more difficult.
The move to enable DoH by default will no doubt face resistance, but browser makers have argued it’s not a technology that browser makers have shied away from. Firefox became the first browser to implement DoH — with others, like Chrome, Edge, and Opera — quickly following suit.
I think DoH is a great idea, and long overdue.
Slashdot thread. Tech details here. And here’s a good summary of the criticisms.
Posted on February 25, 2020 at 9:15 AM •
Firefox is removing the battery status API, citing privacy concerns. Here’s the paper that described those concerns:
Abstract. We highlight privacy risks associated with the HTML5 Battery Status API. We put special focus on its implementation in the Firefox browser. Our study shows that websites can discover the capacity of users’ batteries by exploiting the high precision readouts provided by Firefox on Linux. The capacity of the battery, as well as its level, expose a fingerprintable surface that can be used to track web users in short time intervals. Our analysis shows that the risk is much higher for old or used batteries with reduced capacities, as the battery capacity may potentially serve as a tracking identifier. The fingerprintable surface of the API could be drastically reduced without any loss in the API’s functionality by reducing the precision of the readings. We propose minor modifications to Battery Status API and its implementation in the Firefox browser to address the privacy issues presented in the study. Our bug report for Firefox was accepted and a fix is deployed.
W3C is updating the spec. Here’s a battery tracker found in the wild.
Posted on November 7, 2016 at 12:59 PM •
The Stagefright vulnerability for Android phones is a bad one. It’s exploitable via a text message (details depend on auto downloading of the particular phone), it runs at an elevated privilege (again, the severity depends on the particular phone — on some phones it’s full privilege), and it’s trivial to weaponize. Imagine a worm that infects a phone and then immediately sends a copy of itself to everyone on that phone’s contact list.
The worst part of this is that it’s an Android exploit, so most phones won’t be patched anytime soon — if ever. (The people who discovered the bug alerted Google in April. Google has sent patches to its phone manufacturer partners, but most of them have not sent the patch to Android phone users.)
Posted on July 28, 2015 at 6:37 AM •
Good information on how Internet Explorer, Chrome, and Firefox store user passwords.
Posted on January 3, 2015 at 7:08 AM •
There’s speculation that the FBI is responsible for an exploit that compromised the Tor anonymity service. Note that Tor
nodes Browser Bundles installed or updated after June 26 are secure.
Posted on August 6, 2013 at 1:42 PM •
Ghostery is a Firefox plug-in that tracks who is tracking your browsing habits in cyberspace. Here’s a TED talk by Gary Kovacs, the CEO of Mozilla Corp., on it.
I use AdBlock Plus, and dump my cookies whenever I close Firefox. Should I switch to Ghostery? What do other people do for web privacy?
Posted on June 6, 2012 at 9:36 AM •
Firesheep is a new Firefox plugin that makes it easy for you to hijack other people’s social network connections. Basically, Facebook authenticates clients with cookies. If someone is using a public WiFi connection, the cookies are sniffable. Firesheep uses wincap to capture and display the authentication information for accounts it sees, allowing you to hijack the connection.
Slides from the Toorcon talk.
Protect yourself by forcing the authentication to happen over TLS. Or stop logging in to Facebook from public networks.
EDITED TO ADD (10/27): To protect against this attack, you have to encrypt the entire session — not just the initial authentication.
EDITED TO ADD (11/4): Foiling Firesheep.
EDITED TO ADD (11/10): More info.
EDITED TO ADD (11/17): Blacksheep detects Firesheep.
Posted on October 27, 2010 at 7:53 AM •
Who are these certificate authorities? At the beginning of Web history, there were only a handful of companies, like Verisign, Equifax, and Thawte, that made near-monopoly profits from being the only providers trusted by Internet Explorer or Netscape Navigator. But over time, browsers have trusted more and more organizations to verify Web sites. Safari and Firefox now trust more than 60 separate certificate authorities by default. Microsoft’s software trusts more than 100 private and government institutions.
Disturbingly, some of these trusted certificate authorities have decided to delegate their powers to yet more organizations, which aren’t tracked or audited by browser companies. By scouring the Net for certificates, security researchers have uncovered more than 600 groups who, through such delegation, are now also automatically trusted by most browsers, including the Department of Homeland Security, Google, and Ford Motorsand a UAE mobile phone company called Etisalat.
In 2005, a company called CyberTrust—which has since been purchased by Verizon—gave Etisalat, the government-connected mobile company in the UAE, the right to verify that a site is valid. Here’s why this is trouble: Since browsers now automatically trust Etisalat to confirm a site’s identity, the company has the potential ability to fake a secure connection to any site Etisalat subscribers might visit using a man-in-the-middle scheme.
EDITED TO ADD (9/14): EFF has gotten involved.
Posted on September 3, 2010 at 6:27 AM •
- We analyzed the results from over a quarter of a million people who ran our tests in the last few months, and found that we can detect browsing histories for over 76% of them. All major browsers allow their users’ history to be detected, but it seems that users of the more modern browsers such as Safari and Chrome are more affected; we detected visited sites for 82% of Safari users and 94% of Chrome users.
- While our tests were quite limited, for our test of 5000 most popular websites, we detected an average of 63 visited locations (13 sites and 50 subpages on those sites); the medians were 8 and 17 respectively.
- Almost 10% of our visitors had over 30 visited sites and 120 subpages detected — heavy Internet users who don’t protect themselves are more affected than others.
- The ability to detect visitors’ browsing history requires just a few lines of code. Armed with a list of websites to check for, a malicious webmaster can scan over 25 thousand links per second (1.5 million links per minute) in almost every recent browser.
- Most websites and pages you view in your browser can be detected as long as they are kept in your history. Almost every address that was in your browser’s address bar can be detected (this includes most pages, including those retrieved using https and some forms with potentialy private information such as your zipcode or search query). Pages won’t be detected when they expire from your history (usually after a month or two), or if you manually clear it.
For now, the only way to fix the issue is to constantly clear browsing history or use private browsing modes. The first browser to prevent this trick in a default installation (Firefox 4.0) is supposed to come out in October.
Here’s a link to the paper.
Posted on May 20, 2010 at 1:28 PM •
Although there is an increasing trend for attacks against popular Web browsers, only little is known about the actual patch level of daily used Web browsers on a global scale. We conjecture that users in large part do not actually patch their Web browsers based on recommendations, perceived threats, or any security warnings. Based on HTTP useragent header information stored in anonymized logs from Google’s web servers, we measured the patch dynamics of about 75% of the world’s Internet users for over a year. Our focus was on the Web browsers Firefox and Opera. We found that the patch level achieved is mainly determined by the ergonomics and default settings of built-in auto-update mechanisms. Firefox’ auto-update is very effective: most users installed a new version within three days. However, the maximum share of the latest, most secure version never exceeded 80% for Firefox users and 46% for Opera users at any day in 2007. This makes about 50 million Firefox users with outdated browsers an easy target for attacks. Our study is the result of the first global scale measurement of the patch dynamics of a popular browser.
Posted on February 13, 2009 at 6:27 AM •
Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.