Entries Tagged "exploit of the day"

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GINSU: NSA Exploit of the Day

Today’s item from the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations (TAO) group implant catalog:

GINSU

(TS//SI//REL) GINSU provides software application persistence for the CNE implant, KONGUR, on target systems with the PCI bus hardware implant, BULLDOZER.

(TS//SI//REL) This technique supports any desktop PC system that contains at least one PCI connector (for BULLDOZER installation) and Microsoft Windows 9x, 2000, 20003, XP, or Vista.

(TS//SI//REL) Through interdiction, BULLDOZER is installed in the target system as a PCI bus hardware implant. After fielding, if KONGUR is removed from the system as a result of an operation system upgrade or reinstall, GINSU can be set to trigger on the next reboot of the system to restore the software implant.

Unit Cost: $0

Status: Released / Deployed. Ready for Immediate Delivery

Page, with graphics, is here. General information about TAO and the catalog is here.

In the comments, feel free to discuss how the exploit works, how we might detect it, how it has probably been improved since the catalog entry in 2008, and so on.

Posted on January 29, 2014 at 2:28 PMView Comments

TAWDRYYARD: NSA Exploit of the Day

Back in December, Der Spiegel published a lot of information about the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations (TAO) group, including a 2008 catalog of hardware and software “implants.” Because there were so many items in the catalog, the individual items didn’t get a lot of discussion. By highlighting an individual implant every day, my goal is to fix that.

Today’s item:

TAWDRYYARD

(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) Beacon RF retro-reflector. Provides return when illuminated with radar to provide rough positional location.

(U) Capabilities
(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) TAWDRYYARD is used as a beacon, typically to assist in locating and identifying deployed RAGEMASTER units. Current design allos it to be detected and located quite easily within a 50′ radius of the radar system being used to illuminate it. TAWDRYYARD draws as 8 mu;A at 2.5V (20mu;W) allowing a standard lithium coin cell to power it for months or years. The simplicity of the dsign allows the form factor to be tailored for specific operational requirements. Future capabilities being considered are return of GPS coordinates and a unique target identifier and automatic processing to scan a target area for presence of TWDRYYARDs. All components are COTS and so are non-attributable to NSA.

Concept of Operation
(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) The board generates a square wave operating at a preset frequency. This square wave is used to turn a FET (field effect transistor) on and off. When the unit is illuminated with a CW signal, the illuminating signal is amplitude-modulated (AM) with the square wave. This signal is re-radiated, where it is picked up by the radar, then processed to recover the clock signal. Typically, the fundamental is used to indicate the unit’s presence, and is simply displayed on a low frequency spectrum analyzer. TAWDRYYARD is part of the ANGRYNEIGHBOR family of radar retro-reflectors.

Unit Cost: $30

Status: End processing still in development.

Page, with graphics, is here. General information about TAO and the catalog is here.

In the comments, feel free to discuss how the exploit works, how we might detect it, how it has probably been improved since the catalog entry in 2008, and so on.

Posted on January 28, 2014 at 2:13 PMView Comments

SPARROW II: NSA Exploit of the Day

Today’s item from the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations (TAO) group implant catalog:

SPARROW II

(TS//SI//REL) An embedded computer system running BLINDDATE tools. Sparrow II is a fully functional WLAN collection system with integrated Mini PCI slots for added functionality such as GPS and multiple Wireless Network Interface Cards.

(U//FOUO) System Specs

Processor: IBM Power PC 405GPR

Memory: 64MB (SDRAM), 16MB (FLASH)

Expansion: Mini PCI (Up to 4 devices) supports USB, Compact Flash, and 802.11 B/G

OS: Linux (2.4 Kernel)

Application SW: BLINDDATE

Battery Time: At least two hours

(TS//SI//REL) The Sparrow II is a capable option for deployment where small size, minimal weight and reduced power consumption are required. PCI devices can be connected to the Sparrow II to provide additional functionality, such as wireless command and control or a second or third 802.11 card. The Sparrow is shipped with Linux and runs the BLINDDATE software suite.

Unit Cost: $6K

Status: (S//SI//REL) Operational Restrictions exist for equipment deployment.

Page, with graphics, is here. General information about TAO and the catalog is here.

In the comments, feel free to discuss how the exploit works, how we might detect it, how it has probably been improved since the catalog entry in 2008, and so on.

Posted on January 27, 2014 at 8:06 PMView Comments

PHOTOANGLO: NSA Exploit of the Day

Today’s item from the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations (TAO) group implant catalog:

PHOTOANGLO

(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) PHOTOANGLO is a joint NSA/GCHQ project to develop a new radar system to take the place of the CTX4000.

(U) Capabilities
(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) The planned capabilities for this system are:

  • Frequency range: 1 – 2 GHz, which will be later extended to 1 – 4 GHz
  • Maximum bandwidth: 450 MHz.
  • Size: Small enough to fit into a slim briefcase.
  • Weight: Less than 10 lbs.
  • Maximum Output Power: 2W
  • Output:
  • Video
  • Transmit antenna
  • Inputs:
  • External oscillator
  • Receive antenna

(U) Concept of Operation
(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) The radar unit generates an un-modulated, continuous wave (CW) signal. The oscillator is either generated internally, or externally through a signal generator or cavity oscillator. The unit amplifies the signal and sends it out to an RF connector, where it is directed to some form of transmission antenna (horn, parabolic dish, LPA, spiral). The signal illuminates the target system and is re-radiated. The receive antenna picks up the re-radiated signal and directs the signal to the receive input. The signal is amplified, filtered, and mixed with the transmit antenna. The result is a homodyne receiver in which the RF signal is mixed directly to baseband. The baseband video signal is ported to an external BNC connector. This connects to a processing system, such as NIGHTWATCH, an LFS-2, or VIEWPLATE, to process the signal and provide the intelligence.

Unit Cost: $40k (planned)

Status: Development. Planned IOC is 1st QTR FY09.

Page, with graphics, is here. General information about TAO and the catalog is here.

In the comments, feel free to discuss how the exploit works, how we might detect it, how it has probably been improved since the catalog entry in 2008, and so on.

Posted on January 24, 2014 at 2:09 PMView Comments

NIGHTWATCH: NSA Exploit of the Day

Today’s item from the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations (TAO) group implant catalog:

NIGHTWATCH

(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) NIGHTWATCH is a portable computer with specialized, internal hardware designed to process progressive-scan (non-interlaced VAGRANT signals).

(U) Capability Summary
(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) The current implementation of NIGHTWATCH consists of a general-purpose PC inside of a shielded case. The PC has PCI digitizing and clock cards to provide the needed interface and accurate clocking required for video reconstruction. It also has:

  • horizontal sync, vertical sync and video outputs to drive an external, multi-sync monitor.
  • video output
  • spectral analysis up to 150 kHz to provide for indications of horizontal and vertical sync frequencies.
  • frame capture and forwarding
  • PCMCIA cards for program and data storage
  • horizontal sync locking to keep the display set on the NIGHTWATCH display.
  • frame averaging up to 2^16 (65536) frames.

(U) Concept of Operation
(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) The video output from an appropriate collection system, such as a CTX4000, PHOTOANGLO, or general-purpose receiver, is connected to the video output on the NIGHTWATCH system. The user, using the appropriate tools either within NIGHTWATCH or externally, determines the horizontal and vertical sync frequencies of the targeted monitor. Once the user matches the proper frequencies, he activates “Sync Lock” and frame averaging to reduce noise and improve readability of the targeted monitor. If warranted, the user then forwards the displayed frames over a network to NSAW, where analysts can look at them for intelligence purposes.

Unit Cost: N/A

Status: This system has reached the end of its service life. All work concerning the NIGHTWATCH system is strictly for maintenance purposes. This system is slated to be replaced by the VIEWPLATE system.

Page, with graphics, is here. General information about TAO and the catalog is here.

In the comments, feel free to discuss how the exploit works, how we might detect it, how it has probably been improved since the catalog entry in 2008, and so on.

Posted on January 23, 2014 at 2:39 PMView Comments

NIGHTSTAND: NSA Exploit of the Day

Today’s device from the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations (TAO) group implant catalog:

NIGHTSTAND

(TS//SI//REL) An active 802.11 wireless exploitation and injection tool for payload /exploit delivery into otherwise denied target space. NIGHTSTAND is typically used in operations where wired access to the target is not possible.

(TS//SI//REL) NIGHTSTAND – Close Access Operations • Battlefield Tested • Windows Exploitation • Standalone System

System Details

  • (U//FOUO) Standalone tool currently running on an x86 laptop loaded with Linux Fedora Core 3.
  • (TS//SI//REL) Exploitable Targets include Win2k, WinXP, WinXPSP1, WINXPSP2 running Internet Explorer versions 5.0-6.0.
  • (TS//SI//REL) NS packet injection can target one client or multiple targets on a wireless network.
  • (TS//SI//REL) Attack is undetectable by the user.

(TS//SI//REL) Use of external amplifiers and antennas in both experimental and operational scenarios have resulted in successful NIGHTSTAND attacks from as far away as eight miles under ideal environmental conditions.

Unit Cost: Varies from platform to platform

Status: Product has been deployed in the field. Upgrades to the system continue to be developed.

Page, with graphics, is here. General information about TAO and the catalog is here.

Presumably, the NSA can use this “injection tool” in all the same ways it uses QUANTUM. For example, it can redirect users to FOXACID servers in order to attack their computers.

In the comments, feel free to discuss how the exploit works, how we might detect it, how it has probably been improved since the catalog entry in 2008, and so on.

Posted on January 22, 2014 at 2:15 PMView Comments

LOUDAUTO: NSA Exploit of the Day

Today’s item from the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations (TAO) group implant catalog:

LOUDAUTO

(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) Audio-based RF retro-reflector. Provides room audio from targeted space using radar and basic post-processing.

(U) Capabilities
(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) LOUDAUTO’s current design maximizes the gain of the microphone. This makes it extremely useful for picking up room audio. It can pick up speech at a standard, ofice volume from over 20′ away. (NOTE: Concealments may reduce this distance.) It uses very little power (~15 uA at 3.0 VDC), so little, in fact, that battery self-discharge is more of an issue for serviceable lifetime than the power draw from this unit. The simplicity of the design allows the form factor to be tailored for specific operation requirements. All components at COTS and so are non-attributable to NSA.

(U) Concept of Operation
(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) Room audio is picked up by the microphone and converted into an analog electrical signal. This signal is used to pulse position modulate (PPM) a square wave signal running at a pre-set frequency. This square wave is used to turn a FET (field effect transistor) on and off. When the unit is illuminated with a CW signal from a nearby radar unit, the illuminating signal is amplitude-modulated with the PPM square wave. This signal is re-radiated, where it is picked up by the radar, then processed to recover the room audio. Processing is currently performed by COTS equipment with FM demodulation capability (Rohde & Schwarz FSH-series portable spectrum analyzers, etc.) LOUDAUTO is part of the ANGRYNEIGHBOR family of radar retro-reflectors.

Unit Cost: $30

Status: End processing still in development

Page, with graphics, is here. General information about TAO and the catalog is here.

This one is kind of cool, I think.

In the comments, feel free to discuss how the exploit works, how we might detect it, how it has probably been improved since the catalog entry in 2008, and so on.

Posted on January 21, 2014 at 2:11 PMView Comments

CTX4000: NSA Exploit of the Day

Today’s device—this one isn’t an implant—from the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations (TAO) group implant catalog:

CTX4000

(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) The CTX4000 is a portable continuous wave (CW) radar unit. It can be used to illuminate a target system to recover different off net information. Primary uses include VAGRANT and DROPMIRE collection.

(TS//SI//REL TO USA,FVEY) The CTX4000 provides the means to collect signals that otherwise would not be collectable, or would be extremely difficult to collect and process. It provides the following features:

  • Frequency Range: 1 – 2 GHz.
  • Bandwidth: Up to 45 MHz
  • Output Power: User adjustable up to 2 W using the internal amplifier; external amplifiers make it possible to go up to 1 kW.
  • Phase adjustment with front panel knob
  • User-selectable high- and low-pass filters.
  • Remote controllable
  • Outputs:
  • Transmit antenna
  • I and Q video outputs
  • DC bias for an external pre-amp on the Receive input connector
  • Inputs:
    • External oscillator
    • Receive antenna

Unit Cost: N/A

Status: unit is operational. However, it is reaching the end of its service life. It is scheduled to be replaced by PHOTOANGLO staring in September 2008.

Page, with graphics, is here. General information about TAO and the catalog is here.

We’ve already seen reference to VAGRANT and DROPMIRE. The first collects data off computer screens, the second from printers with “purely proximal access.”

In the comments, feel free to discuss how the exploit works, how we might detect it, how it has probably been improved since the catalog entry in 2008, and so on.

Posted on January 20, 2014 at 2:20 PMView Comments

STUCCOMONTANA: NSA Exploit of the Day

Today’s implant from the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations (TAO) group implant catalog:

STUCCOMONTANA

(TS//SI//REL) STUCCOMONTANA provides persistence for DNT implants. The DNT implant will survive an upgrade or replacement of the operating system—including physically replacing the router’s compact flash card.

(TS//SI//REL) Currently, the intended DNT Implant to persist is VALIDATOR, which must be run as a user process on the target operating system. The vector of attack is the modification of the target’s BIOS. The modification will add the necessary software to the BIOS and modify its software to execute the SIERRAMONTANA implant at the end of its native System Management Mode (SMM) handler.

(TS//SI//REL) STUCCOMONTANA must support all modern versions of JUNOS, which is a version of FreeBSD customized by Juniper. Upon system boot, the JUNOS operating system is modified in memory to run the implant, and provide persistent kernel modifications to support implant execution.

(TS//SI//REL) STUCCOMONTANA is the cover term for the persistence technique to deploy a DNT implant to Juniper T-Series routers.

Unit Cost: $

Status: (U//FOUO) STUCCOMONTANA under development and is expected to be released by 30 November 2008.

Page, with graphics, is here. General information about TAO and the catalog is here.

In the comments, feel free to discuss how the exploit works, how we might detect it, how it has probably been improved since the catalog entry in 2008, and so on.

Posted on January 17, 2014 at 2:06 PMView Comments

SIERRAMONTANA: NSA Exploit of the Day

Today’s implant from the NSA’s Tailored Access Operations (TAO) group implant catalog:

SIERRAMONTANA

(TS//SI//REL) SIERRAMONTANA provides persistence for DNT implants. The DNT implant will survive an upgrade or replacement of the operating system—including physically replacing the router’s compact flash card.

(TS//SI//REL) Currently, the intended DNT Implant to persist is VALIDATOR, which must be run as a user process on the target operating system. The vector of attack is the modification of the target’s BIOS. The modification will add the necessary software to the BIOS and modify its software to execute the SIERRAMONTANA implant at the end of its native System Management Mode (SMM) handler.

(TS//SI//REL) SIERRAMONTANA must support all modern versions of JUNOS, which is a version of FreeBSD customized by Juniper. Upon system boot, the JUNOS operating system is modified in memory to run the implant, and provide persistent kernel modifications to support implant execution.

(TS//SI//REL) SIERRAMONTANA is the cover term for the persistence technique to deploy a DNT implant to Juniper M-Series routers.

Unit Cost: $

Status: (U//FOUO) SIERRAMONTANA under development and is expected to be released by 30 November 2008.

Page, with graphics, is here. General information about TAO and the catalog is here.

We have already seen the codename VALIDATOR. It’s the code name for a default, or basic, NSA exploit. It’s the exploit that FOXACID defaults to using.

In the comments, feel free to discuss how the exploit works, how we might detect it, how it has probably been improved since the catalog entry in 2008, and so on.

Posted on January 16, 2014 at 2:00 PMView Comments

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.