Page 21 of 39
From Salon:
“You ain’t takin’ this through,” she says. “No knives. You can’t bring a knife through here.”
It takes a moment for me to realize that she’s serious. “I’m … but … it’s …”
“Sorry.” She throws it into a bin and starts to walk away.
“Wait a minute,” I say. “That’s airline silverware.”
“Don’t matter what it is. You can’t bring knives through here.”
“Ma’am, that’s an airline knife. It’s the knife they give you on the plane.”
This is a weird statistic:
Some of the largest and medium-sized U.S. airports report close to 637,000 laptops lost each year, according to the Ponemon Institute survey released Monday. Laptops are most commonly lost at security checkpoints, according to the survey.
Close to 10,278 laptops are reported lost every week at 36 of the largest U.S. airports, and 65 percent of those laptops are not reclaimed, the survey said. Around 2,000 laptops are recorded lost at the medium-sized airports, and 69 percent are not reclaimed.
Travelers seem to lack confidence that they will recover lost laptops. About 77 percent of people surveyed said they had no hope of recovering a lost laptop at the airport, with 16 percent saying they wouldn’t do anything if they lost their laptop during business travel. About 53 percent said that laptops contain confidential company information, with 65 percent taking no steps to protect the information.
I don’t know how to generalize that to a total number of lost laptops in the U.S.; let’s call it 750,000. At $1,000 per laptop—a very conservative estimate—that’s $750 million in lost laptops annually. Most are lost at security checkpoints, and I’m sure the numbers went up considerably since those checkpoints got more annoying after 9/11.
There aren’t a lot of real numbers about the costs of increased airport security. We pay in time, in anxiety, in inconvenience. But we also pay in goods. TSA employees steal out of suitcases. And opportunists steal hundreds of millions of dollars of laptops annually.
EDITED TO ADD (7/14): Seems like this is not a story.
The TSA has a new photo ID requirement:
Beginning Saturday, June 21, 2008 passengers that willfully refuse to provide identification at security checkpoint will be denied access to the secure area of airports. This change will apply exclusively to individuals that simply refuse to provide any identification or assist transportation security officers in ascertaining their identity.
This new procedure will not affect passengers that may have misplaced, lost or otherwise do not have ID but are cooperative with officers. Cooperative passengers without ID may be subjected to additional screening protocols, including enhanced physical screening, enhanced carry-on and/or checked baggage screening, interviews with behavior detection or law enforcement officers and other measures.
That’s right; people who refuse to show ID on principle will not be allowed to fly, but people who claim to have lost their ID will. I feel well-protected against terrorists who can’t lie.
I don’t think any further proof is needed that the ID requirement has nothing to do with security, and everything to do with control.
EDITED TO ADD (6/11): Daniel Solove comments.
We’re spending money on this?
…a new GPS device enables authorities to remotely control a bus—slowing it down to 5 mph and preventing it from restarting once it has stopped. The device has been installed on thousands of local commuter and tourist buses.
The technology is designed to prevent a terrorist from ramming a bus filled with people and explosives into buildings or tunnels.
Private bus companies have received millions of dollars from the Department of Homeland Security for the security systems. It costs $1,500 to equip each bus, with $50-per-bus monthly maintenance costs.
Gray Line double-decker tourist buses and Coach USA have spent hundreds of thousands of dollars in federal funds to install 3,000 devices. After receiving a $124,000 federal grant, DeCamp Bus Lines is installing the device on its 80 commuter buses, which travel routes from northern New Jersey to the Port Authority Bus Terminal in Midtown.
New Jersey Transit is currently in the process of equipping all of its roughly 3,000 buses with the technology. NJ Transit Chief of Police Joseph Bober said: “This enhanced technology helps us protect our bus drivers and customers. It’s another proactive tool to protect our property, employees and customers.”
From CNN:
Before 9/11, airlines and security personnel—and I use the term “security personnel” loosely—might have let a nickname or even a maiden name on a ticket slide. No longer. If you have the wrong name on your ticket, you’re probably grounded. And there are two reasons for this: security and greed.
The Transportation Security Administration wants to be sure the same person who bought the ticket, and who was screened, is boarding the plane. But when there’s an inexact match, the airline can either charge a $100 “change” fee or force you to buy a new ticket. In an industry where every dollar counts, the exact-name rule is the government’s gift to cash-starved air carriers.
That’s the situation Gordon was confronted with, even when it was obvious that “Jan” and “Janet” were one and the same. There were suggestions that a new ticket might need to be purchased. “We didn’t let it get to that,” he recalls. Instead, he asked to speak with a supervisor who could finally fix the codes so that the ticket and passport matched up. How did all of this happen in the first place? Turns out Jan Gordon had signed up for a frequent flier account under her informal name, so when she booked an award ticket, it also used her informal—and inaccurate—name.
There are two things to get pissed off about here. One, the airlines profiting off a TSA rule. And two, a TSA rule that requires them to ignore what is obvious.
EDITED TO ADD (5/28): To add some more detail here, the rule makes absolutely no sense. If this were sensible, the TSA employee who checks the ticket against the ID would make the determination if the names were the same. Instead, the passenger is forced to go back to the airline who, for a fee, changes the name on the ticket to match the ID. This latter system is no more secure. If anything, it’s less secure. But rules are rules, so it’s what has to happen.
From the DHS and the FBI, a great movie-plot threat:
It is possible to introduce chemical or biological agents directly into external air-intakes or internal air-circulation systems. Unless the building has carbon filters (or the equivalent), volatile chemical agents would not be stopped and would enter the building untenanted.
[…]
Other scenarios involve the use of helicopters equipped with agricultural spraying equipment to discharge large chemical or biological contaminant clouds near external or roof-mounted air intakes or ventilators.
[…]
Terrorists have considered producing a radiological dispersal device (RDD) by burning or exploding a source or sources containing radioactive material. If large quantities of easily dispersed radioactive material were released or exploded near an HVAC intake or circulation system, it is possible that targeted individuals could suffer some adverse health effects.
I’m sure glad my government is working on this stuff.
If this weren’t so sad, it would be funny:
The problem with federal air marshals (FAM) names matching those of suspected terrorists on the no-fly list has persisted for years, say air marshals familiar with the situation.
One air marshal said it has been “a major problem, where guys are denied boarding by the airline.”
“In some cases, planes have departed without any coverage because the airline employees were adamant they would not fly,” the air marshal said. “I’ve seen guys actually being denied boarding.”
A second air marshal says one agent “has been getting harassed for six years because his exact name is on the no-fly list.”
Seriously—if these people can’t get their names off the list, what hope do the rest of us have? Not that the no-fly list has any real value, anyway.
The TSA wants a tool that will assess risks against transportation networks:
“The tool will assist in prioritization of security measures based on their risk reduction potential,” said the statement of work accompanying TSA’s formal solicitation, which was posted April 18.
The software tool would help TSA gather and organize information about specific transport modes and assist agency officials to make risk management decisions.
The contract, which will be issued by TSA’s office of operational process and technology, envisions a one-year base period plus four one-year options. The chosen vendor will be expected to install the software, troubleshoot any hardware or software problems, consult on building risk assessment modules, attend classified intelligence meetings at TSA headquarters and maintain the software.
I don’t think you have to be very good to qualify here. This automated system put Boise, ID, on the top of its list of most vulnerable cities. The bar isn’t very high here; I’m just saying.
Homeland Security Secretary Michael Chertoff says:
QUESTION: Some are raising that the privacy aspects of this thing, you know, sharing of that kind of data, very personal data, among four countries is quite a scary thing.
SECRETARY CHERTOFF: Well, first of all, a fingerprint is hardly personal data because you leave it on glasses and silverware and articles all over the world, they’re like footprints. They’re not particularly private.
Sounds like he’s confusing “secret” data with “personal” data. Lots of personal data isn’t particularly secret.
Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.