Lessons in Key Management
Encrypting your USB drive is smart. Writing the encryption key on a piece of paper and attaching it to the USB drive is not.
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Encrypting your USB drive is smart. Writing the encryption key on a piece of paper and attaching it to the USB drive is not.
From Cryptosmith:
The NSA had an incinerator in their old Arlington Hall facility that was designed to reduce top secret crypto materials and such to ash. Someone discovered that it wasn’t in fact working. Contract disposal trucks had been disposing of this not-quite-sanitized rubish, and officers tracked down a huge pile in a field in Ft. Meyer.
How did they dispose of it? The answer is encrypted in the story’s text!
The story sounds like it’s from the early 1960s. The Arlington Hall incinerator contained a grating that was to keep the documents in the flames until reduced to ash. The grate failed, and “there was no telling how long the condition had persisted before discovery.”
Last month, I posted this. There’s an update with new information (the FOIA redactions were appealed).
Interesting piece of cryptographic history: a cipher designed by Robert Patterson and sent to Thomas Jefferson. The full story is behind a paywall.
EDITED TO ADD (4/14): The cipher itself is here.
“Optimised to Fail: Card Readers for Online Banking,” by Saar Drimer, Steven J. Murdoch, and Ross Anderson.
Abstract
The Chip Authentication Programme (CAP) has been introduced by banks in Europe to deal with the soaring losses due to online banking fraud. A handheld reader is used together with the customer’s debit card to generate one-time codes for both login and transaction authentication. The CAP protocol is not public, and was rolled out without any public scrutiny. We reverse engineered the UK variant of card readers and smart cards and here provide the first public description of the protocol. We found numerous weaknesses that are due to design errors such as reusing authentication tokens, overloading data semantics, and failing to ensure freshness of responses. The overall strategic error was excessive optimisation. There are also policy implications. The move from signature to PIN for authorising point-of-sale transactions shifted liability from banks to customers; CAP introduces the same problem for online banking. It may also expose customers to physical harm.
EDITED TO ADD (3/12): More info.
Programs staple and unstaple perform all-or-nothing encryption. Just demonstration code, but interesting all the same.
This is priceless:
Our advances in Prime Number Theory have led to a new branch of mathematics called Neutronics. Neutronic functions make possible for the first time the ability to analyze regions of mathematics commonly thought to be undefined, such as the point where one is divided by zero. In short, we have developed a new way to analyze the undefined point at the singularity which appears throughout higher mathematics.
This new analytic technique has given us profound insight into the way that prime numbers are distributed throughout the integers. According to RSA’s website, there are over 1 billion licensed instances of RSA public-key encryption in use in the world today. Each of these instances of the prime number based RSA algorithm can now be deciphered using Neutronic analysis. Unlike RSA, Neutronic Encryption is not based on two large prime numbers but rather on the Neutronic forces that govern the distribution of the primes themselves. The encryption that results from Singularic’s Neutronic public-key algorithm is theoretically impossible to break.
You’d think that anyone who claims to be able to decrypt RSA at the key lengths in use today would, maybe, um, demonstrate that at least once. Otherwise, this can all be safely ignored as snake oil.
The founder and CTO also claims to have proved the Riemann Hypothesis, if you care to wade through the 63-page paper.
EDITED TO ADD (3/30): The CTO has responded to me.
Turns out the algorithm is linear.
When you’re buying security products, you have to trust the vendor. That’s why I don’t buy any of these hardware-encrypted drives. I don’t trust the vendors.
Good xkcd comic on the difference between theoretical and practical cryptanalysis.
Interesting, at least to me. It helps if you know the various code names and the names of the different equipment.
Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.