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Chameleon Weapons

You can’t detect them, because they look normal:

One type is the exact size and shape of a credit card, except that two of the edges are lethally sharp. It’s made of G10 laminate, an ultra-hard material normally employed for circuit boards. You need a diamond file to get an edge on it.

[…]

Another configuration is a stabbing weapon which is indistinguishable from a pen. This one is made from melamine fiber, and can sit snugly inside a Bic casing. You would only find out it was not the real thing if you tried to write with it. It’s sharpened with a blade edge at the tip which Defense Review describes as “scary sharp.”

Also:

The FBI’s extensive Guide to Concealable Weapons has 89 pages of weapons intended to get through security. These are generally variations of a knifeblade concealed in a pen, comb or a cross—and most of them are pretty obvious on X-ray.

Posted on March 29, 2006 at 6:58 AM • View Comments

Credit Card Companies and Agenda

This has been making the rounds on the Internet. Basically, a guy tears up a credit card application, tapes it back together, fills it out with someone else’s address and a different phone number, and send it in. He still gets a credit card.

Imagine that some fraudster is rummaging through your trash and finds a torn-up credit card application. That’s why this is bad.

To understand why it’s happening, you need to understand the trade-offs and the agenda. From the point of view of the credit card company, the benefits of giving someone a credit card is that he’ll use it and generate revenue. The risk is that it’s a fraudster who will cost the company revenue. The credit card industry has dealt with the risk in two ways: they’ve pushed a lot of the risk onto the merchants, and they’ve implemented fraud detection systems to limit the damage.

All other costs and problems of identity theft are borne by the consumer; they’re an externality to the credit card company. They don’t enter into the trade-off decision at all.

We can laugh at this kind of thing all day, but it’s actually in the best interests of the credit card industry to mail cards in response to torn-up and taped-together applications without doing much checking of the address or phone number. If we want that to change, we need to fix the externality.

Posted on March 13, 2006 at 2:18 PM • View Comments

Data Mining for Terrorists

In the post 9/11 world, there’s much focus on connecting the dots. Many believe that data mining is the crystal ball that will enable us to uncover future terrorist plots. But even in the most wildly optimistic projections, data mining isn’t tenable for that purpose. We’re not trading privacy for security; we’re giving up privacy and getting no security in return.

Most people first learned about data mining in November 2002, when news broke about a massive government data mining program called Total Information Awareness . The basic idea was as audacious as it was repellent: suck up as much data as possible about everyone, sift through it with massive computers, and investigate patterns that might indicate terrorist plots. Americans across the political spectrum denounced the program, and in September 2003, Congress eliminated its funding and closed its offices.

But TIA didn’t die. According to The National Journal, it just changed its name and moved inside the Defense Department.

This shouldn’t be a surprise. In May 2004, the General Accounting Office published a report that listed 122 different federal government data mining programs that used people’s personal information. This list didn’t include classified programs, like the NSA’s eavesdropping effort, or state-run programs like MATRIX.

The promise of data mining is compelling, and convinces many. But it’s wrong. We’re not going to find terrorist plots through systems like this, and we’re going to waste valuable resources chasing down false alarms. To understand why, we have to look at the economics of the system.

Security is always a trade-off, and for a system to be worthwhile, the advantages have to be greater than the disadvantages. A national security data mining program is going to find some percentage of real attacks, and some percentage of false alarms. If the benefits of finding and stopping those attacks outweigh the cost—in money, liberties, etc.—then the system is a good one. If not, then you’d be better off spending that cost elsewhere.

Data mining works best when there’s a well-defined profile you’re searching for, a reasonable number of attacks per year, and a low cost of false alarms. Credit card fraud is one of data mining’s success stories: all credit card companies data mine their transaction databases, looking for spending patterns that indicate a stolen card. Many credit card thieves share a pattern—purchase expensive luxury goods, purchase things that can be easily fenced, etc.—and data mining systems can minimize the losses in many cases by shutting down the card. In addition, the cost of false alarms is only a phone call to the cardholder asking him to verify a couple of purchases. The cardholders don’t even resent these phone calls—as long as they’re infrequent—so the cost is just a few minutes of operator time.

Terrorist plots are different. There is no well-defined profile, and attacks are very rare. Taken together, these facts mean that data mining systems won’t uncover any terrorist plots until they are very accurate, and that even very accurate systems will be so flooded with false alarms that they will be useless.

All data mining systems fail in two different ways: false positives and false negatives. A false positive is when the system identifies a terrorist plot that really isn’t one. A false negative is when the system misses an actual terrorist plot. Depending on how you “tune” your detection algorithms, you can err on one side or the other: you can increase the number of false positives to ensure that you are less likely to miss an actual terrorist plot, or you can reduce the number of false positives at the expense of missing terrorist plots.

To reduce both those numbers, you need a well-defined profile. And that’s a problem when it comes to terrorism. In hindsight, it was really easy to connect the 9/11 dots and point to the warning signs, but it’s much harder before the fact. Certainly, there are common warning signs that many terrorist plots share, but each is unique, as well. The better you can define what you’re looking for, the better your results will be. Data mining for terrorist plots is going to be sloppy, and it’s going to be hard to find anything useful.

Data mining is like searching for a needle in a haystack. There are 900 million credit cards in circulation in the United States. According to the FTC September 2003 Identity Theft Survey Report, about 1% (10 million) cards are stolen and fraudulently used each year. Terrorism is different. There are trillions of connections between people and events—things that the data mining system will have to “look at”—and very few plots. This rarity makes even accurate identification systems useless.

Let’s look at some numbers. We’ll be optimistic. We’ll assume the system has a 1 in 100 false positive rate (99% accurate), and a 1 in 1,000 false negative rate (99.9% accurate).

Assume one trillion possible indicators to sift through: that’s about ten events—e-mails, phone calls, purchases, web surfings, whatever—per person in the U.S. per day. Also assume that 10 of them are actually terrorists plotting.

This unrealistically-accurate system will generate one billion false alarms for every real terrorist plot it uncovers. Every day of every year, the police will have to investigate 27 million potential plots in order to find the one real terrorist plot per month. Raise that false-positive accuracy to an absurd 99.9999% and you’re still chasing 2,750 false alarms per day—but that will inevitably raise your false negatives, and you’re going to miss some of those ten real plots.

This isn’t anything new. In statistics, it’s called the “base rate fallacy,” and it applies in other domains as well. For example, even highly accurate medical tests are useless as diagnostic tools if the incidence of the disease is rare in the general population. Terrorist attacks are also rare, any “test” is going to result in an endless stream of false alarms.

This is exactly the sort of thing we saw with the NSA’s eavesdropping program: the New York Times reported that the computers spat out thousands of tips per month. Every one of them turned out to be a false alarm.

And the cost was enormous: not just the cost of the FBI agents running around chasing dead-end leads instead of doing things that might actually make us safer, but also the cost in civil liberties. The fundamental freedoms that make our country the envy of the world are valuable, and not something that we should throw away lightly.

Data mining can work. It helps Visa keep the costs of fraud down, just as it helps Amazon.com show me books that I might want to buy, and Google show me advertising I’m more likely to be interested in. But these are all instances where the cost of false positives is low—a phone call from a Visa operator, or an uninteresting ad—and in systems that have value even if there is a high number of false negatives.

Finding terrorism plots is not a problem that lends itself to data mining. It’s a needle-in-a-haystack problem, and throwing more hay on the pile doesn’t make that problem any easier. We’d be far better off putting people in charge of investigating potential plots and letting them direct the computers, instead of putting the computers in charge and letting them decide who should be investigated.

This essay originally appeared on Wired.com.

Posted on March 9, 2006 at 7:44 AM • View Comments

The Terrorist Threat of Paying Your Credit Card Balance

This article shows how badly terrorist profiling can go wrong:

They paid down some debt. The balance on their JCPenney Platinum MasterCard had gotten to an unhealthy level. So they sent in a large payment, a check for $6,522.

And an alarm went off. A red flag went up. The Soehnges’ behavior was found questionable.

And all they did was pay down their debt. They didn’t call a suspected terrorist on their cell phone. They didn’t try to sneak a machine gun through customs.

They just paid a hefty chunk of their credit card balance. And they learned how frighteningly wide the net of suspicion has been cast.

After sending in the check, they checked online to see if their account had been duly credited. They learned that the check had arrived, but the amount available for credit on their account hadn’t changed.

So Deana Soehnge called the credit-card company. Then Walter called.

“When you mess with my money, I want to know why,” he said.

They both learned the same astounding piece of information about the little things that can set the threat sensors to beeping and blinking.

They were told, as they moved up the managerial ladder at the call center, that the amount they had sent in was much larger than their normal monthly payment. And if the increase hits a certain percentage higher than that normal payment, Homeland Security has to be notified. And the money doesn’t move until the threat alert is lifted.

The article goes on to blame something called the Bank Privacy Act, but that’s not correct. The culprit here is the amendments made to the Bank Secrecy Act by the USA Patriot Act, Sections 351 and 352. There’s a general discussion here, and the Federal Register here.

There has been some rumbling on the net that this story is badly garbled—or even a hoax—but certainly this kind of thing is what financial institutions are required to report under the Patriot Act.

Remember, all the time spent chasing down silly false alarms is time wasted. Finding terrorist plots is a signal-to-noise problem, and stuff like this substantially decreases that ratio: it adds a lot of noise without adding enough signal. It makes us less safe, because it makes terrorist plots harder to find.

Posted on March 6, 2006 at 10:45 AM • View Comments

Caller ID Spoofing

What’s worse than a bad authentication system? A bad authentication system that people have learned to trust. According to the Associated Press:

In the last few years, Caller ID spoofing has become much easier. Millions of people have Internet telephone equipment that can be set to make any number appear on a Caller ID system. And several Web sites have sprung up to provide Caller ID spoofing services, eliminating the need for any special hardware.

For instance, Spoofcard.com sells a virtual “calling card” for $10 that provides 60 minutes of talk time. The user dials a toll-free number, then keys in the destination number and the Caller ID number to display.

Near as anyone can tell, this is perfectly legal. (Although the FCC is investigating.)

The applications for Caller ID spoofing are not limited to fooling people. There’s real fraud that can be committed:

Lance James, chief scientist at security company Secure Science Corp., said Caller ID spoofing Web sites are used by people who buy stolen credit card numbers. They will call a service such as Western Union, setting Caller ID to appear to originate from the card holder’s home, and use the credit card number to order cash transfers that they then pick up.

Exposing a similar vulnerability, Caller ID is used by credit-card companies to authenticate newly issued cards. The recipients are generally asked to call from their home phones to activate their cards.

And, of course, harmful pranks:

In one case, SWAT teams surrounded a building in New Brunswick, N.J., last year after police received a call from a woman who said she was being held hostage in an apartment. Caller ID was spoofed to appear to come from the apartment.

It’s also easy to break into a cell phone voice mailbox using spoofing, because many systems are set to automatically grant entry to calls from the owner of the account. Stopping that requires setting a PIN code or password for the mailbox.

I have never been a fan of Caller ID. My phone number is configured to block Caller ID on outgoing calls. The number of phone numbers that refuse to accept my calls is growing, however.

Posted on March 3, 2006 at 7:10 AM •

Multi-Use ID Cards

My eleventh column for Wired.com is about ID cards, and why you don’t—and won’t—have a single card in your wallet for everything. It has nothing to do with security.

My airline wants a card with its logo on it in my wallet. So does my rental car company, my supermarket and everyone else I do business with. My credit card company wants me to open up my wallet and notice its card; I’m far more likely to use a physical card than a virtual one that I have to remember is attached to my driver’s license number. And I’m more likely to feel important if I have a card, especially a card that recognizes me as a frequent flier or a preferred customer.

Some years ago, when credit cards with embedded chips were new, the card manufacturers designed a secure, multi-application operating system for these smartcards. The idea was that a single physical card could be used for everything: multiple credit card accounts, airline affinity memberships, public-transportation payment cards, etc. Nobody bought into the system: not because of security concerns, but because of branding concerns. Whose logo would get to be on the card? When the manufacturers envisioned a card with multiple small logos, one for each application, everyone wanted to know: Whose logo would be first? On top? In color?

The companies give you their own card partly because they want complete control of the rules around their own system, but mostly because they want you to carry around a small piece of advertising in your wallet. An American Express Gold Card is supposed to make you feel powerful and everyone else feel green. They want you to wave it around.

Posted on February 9, 2006 at 6:39 AM • View Comments

Most Stolen Identities Never Used

This is something I’ve been saying for a while, and it’s nice to see some independent confirmation:

A new study suggests consumers whose credit cards are lost or stolen or whose personal information is accidentally compromised face little risk of becoming victims of identity theft.

The analysis, released on Wednesday, also found that even in the most dangerous data breaches—where thieves access social security numbers and other sensitive information on consumers they have deliberately targeted—only about 1 in 1,000 victims had their identities stolen.

The reason is that thieves are stealing far more identities than they need. Two years ago, if someone asked me about protecting against identity theft, I would tell them to shred their trash and be careful giving information over the Internet. Today, that advice is obsolete. Criminals are not stealing identity information in ones and twos; they’re stealing identity information in blocks of hundreds of thousands and even millions.

If a criminal ring wants a dozen identities for some fraud scam, and they steal a database with 500,000 identities, then—as a percentage—almost none of those identities will ever be the victims of fraud.

Some other findings from their press release:

A significant finding from the research is that different breaches pose different degrees of risk. In the research, ID Analytics distinguishes between “identity-level” breaches, where names and Social Security numbers were stolen and “account-level” breaches, where only account numbers—sometimes associated with names—were stolen. ID Analytics also discovered that the degree of risk varies based on the nature of the data breach, for example, whether the breach was the result of a deliberate hacking into a database or a seemingly unintentional loss of data, such as tapes or disks being lost in transit.

And:

ID Analytics’ fraud experts believe the reason for the minimal use of stolen identities is based on the amount of time it takes to actually perpetrate identity theft against a consumer. As an example, it takes approximately five minutes to fill out a credit application. At this rate, it would take a fraudster working full-time averaging 6.5 hours day, five days a week, 50 weeks a year over 50 years to fully utilize a breached file consisting of one million consumer identities. If the criminal outsourced the work at a rate of $10 an hour in an effort to use a breached file of the same size in one year, it would cost that criminal about $830,000.

Another key finding indicates that in certain targeted data breaches, notices may have a deterrent effect. In one large-scale identity-level breach, thieves slowed their use of the data to commit identity theft after public notification. The research also showed how the criminals who stole the data in the breaches used identity data manipulation, or “tumbling” to avoid detection and to prolong the scam.

That last bit is interesting, and it makes this recommendation even more surprising:

The company suggests, for instance, that companies shouldn’t always notify consumers of data breaches because they may be unnecessarily alarming people who stand little chance of being victimized.

I agree with them that all this notification is having a “boy who cried wolf” effect on people. I know people living in California who get disclosure notifications in the mail regularly, and who have stopped paying attention to them.

But remember, the main security value of notification requirements is the cost. By increasing the cost to companies of data thefts, the goal is for them to increase their security. (The main security value used to be the public shaming, but these breaches are now so common that the press no longer writes about them.) Direct fines would be a better way of dealing with the economic externality, but the notification law is all we’ve got right now. I don’t support eliminating it until there’s something else in its place.

Posted on December 12, 2005 at 9:50 AM • View Comments

Identity Theft Over-Reported

I’m glad to see that someone wrote this article. For a long time now, I’ve been saying that the rate of identity theft has been grossly overestimated: too many things are counted as identity theft that are just traditional fraud. Here’s some interesting data to back that claim up:

Multiple surveys have found that around 20 percent of Americans say they have been beset by identity theft. But what exactly is identity theft?

The Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act of 1998 defines it as the illegal use of someone’s “means of identification”—including a credit card. So if you lose your card and someone else uses it to buy a candy bar, technically you have been the victim of identity theft.

Of course misuse of lost, stolen or surreptitiously copied credit cards is a serious matter. But it shouldn’t force anyone to hide in a cave.

Federal law caps our personal liability at $50, and even that amount is often waived. That’s why surveys have found that about two-thirds of people classified as identity theft victims end up paying nothing out of their own pockets.

The more pernicious versions of identity theft, in which fraudsters use someone else’s name to open lines of credit or obtain government documents, are much rarer.

Consider a February survey for insurer Chubb Corp. of 1,866 people nationwide. Nearly 21 percent said they had been an identity theft victim in the previous year.

But when the questioners asked about specific circumstances—and broadened the time frame beyond just the previous year—the percentages diminished. About 12 percent said a collection agency had demanded payment for purchases they hadn’t made. Some 8 percent said fraudulent checks had been drawn against their accounts.

In both cases, the survey didn’t ask whether a faulty memory or a family member—rather than a shadowy criminal—turned out to be to be the culprit.

It wouldn’t be uncommon. In a 2005 study by Synovate, a research firm, half of self-described victims blamed relatives, friends, neighbors or in-home employees.

When Chubb’s report asked whether people had suffered the huge headache of finding that someone else had taken out loans in their name, 2.4 percent—one in 41 people—said yes.

So what about the claim that 10 million Americans are hit every year, a number often used to pitch credit monitoring services? That statistic, which would amount to about one in 22 adults, also might not be what it seems.

The figure arose in a 2003 report by Synovate commissioned by the Federal Trade Commission. A 2005 update by Synovate put the figure closer to 9 million.

Both totals include misuse of existing credit cards.

Subtracting that, the identity theft numbers were still high but not as frightful: The FTC report determined that fraudsters had opened new accounts or committed similar misdeeds in the names of 3.2 million Americans in the previous year.

The average victim lost $1,180 and wasted 60 hours trying to resolve the problem. Clearly, it’s no picnic.

But there was one intriguing nugget deep in the report.

Some 38 percent of identity theft victims said they hadn’t bothered to notify anyone—not the police, not their credit card company, not a credit bureau. Even when fraud losses purportedly exceeded $5,000, the kept-it-to-myself rate was 19 percent.

Perhaps some people decide that raising a stink over a wrongful charge isn’t worth the trouble. Even so, the finding made the overall validity of the data seem questionable to Fred Cate, an Indiana University law professor who specializes in privacy and security issues.

“That’s not identity theft,” he said. “I’m just confident if you saw a charge that wasn’t yours, you’d contact somebody.”

Identity theft is a serious crime, and it’s a major growth industry in the criminal world. But we do everyone a disservice when we count things as identity theft that really aren’t.

Posted on November 16, 2005 at 1:21 PM • View Comments

Instantaneous Data Grabbing

I think this is a harbinger of the future:

A high roller walks into the casino, ever so mindful of the constant surveillance cameras. Wanting to avoid sales pitches and other unwanted attention, he pays cash at each table and anonymously moves around frequently to discourage people who are trying to track his movements.

After a few hours of losses, he goes to the cashier and asks for a cash advance off of his credit card. The card tells the casino his name, but not much else. As is required by card issuers, the cashier asks for some other identification, such as a driver’s license. That license offers the casino a ton of CRM identification goodies, but the cashier is only supposed to glance at the picture and the name to verify identity and hand the license—and its info treasure trove—back to the gambler.

Not any more, at least if a Minneapolis company called Cash Systems Inc. has anything to say about it. The firm was recently awarded a U.S. patent for a device that can grab all of the data of almost any U.S. driver’s license in seconds and instantly dump it into a casino’s CRM system.

On the one hand, the technology isn’t very interesting; it’s probably just a camera and some OCR software optimized for driver’s licenses. But what is interesting is that the technology is available as a mass-market product.

Where else do you routinely show your ID? Who else might want all that information for marketing purposes?

Posted on November 7, 2005 at 7:45 AM • View Comments