Entries Tagged "computer security"

Page 26 of 33

Computer-Controlled Fasteners

It’s a really clever idea: bolts and latches that fasten and unfasten in response to remote computer commands.

What Rudduck developed are fasteners analogous to locks in doors, only in this case messages are sent electronically to engage the parts to lock or unlock. A quick electrical charge triggered remotely by a device or computer may move the part to lock, while another jolt disengages the unit.

Instead of nuts and bolts to hold two things together, these fasteners use hooks, latches and so-called smart materials that can change shape on command.The first commercial applications are intended for aircraft, allowing crews to quickly reshape interiors to maximize payload space. For long flights, the plane may need more high-cost business-class seats, while shorter hauls prefer a more abundant supply of coach seats.

Pretty clever, actually. The whole article is interesting.

But this part scares me:

A potential security breach threat apparently doesn’t exist.

“I wondered what’s to prevent some nut using a garage door opener from pushing the right buttons to make your airplane fall apart,” said Harrison. “But everything is locked down with codes, and the radio signals are scrambled, so this is fully secured against hackers.”

Clearly this Harrison guy knows nothing about computer security.

EDITED TO ADD: Slashdot has a thread on the topic.

Posted on April 3, 2006 at 12:57 PM • View Comments

iJacking

The San Francisco Bay Guardian is reporting on a new crime: people who grab laptops out of their owners’ hands and then run away. It’s called “iJacking,” and there seems to be a wave of this type of crime at Internet cafes in San Francisco:

In 2004 the SFPD Robbery Division recorded 17 strong-arm laptop robberies citywide. This increased to 30 cases in 2005, a total that doesn’t even include thefts that fall under the category of “burglary,” when a victim isn’t present. (SFPD could not provide statistics on the number of laptop burglaries.)

In the past three months alone, Park Station, the police precinct that includes the Western Addition, has reported 11 strong-arm laptop robberies, a statistic that suggests this one district may exceed last year’s citywide total by the end of 2006.

Some stories:

Maloney was absorbed in his work when suddenly a hooded person yanked the laptop from Maloney’s hands and ran out the door. Maloney tried to grab his computer, but he stumbled across a few chairs and landed on the floor as the perpetrator dashed to a vehicle waiting a quarter block away.

[…]

Two weeks before Maloney’s robbery, on a Sunday afternoon, a man had been followed out of the Starbucks on the corner of Fulton Street and Masonic Avenue and was assaulted by two suspects in broad daylight. According to the police report, the suspects dragged the victim 15 feet along the pavement, kicking him in the face before stealing his computer.

In early February a women had her laptop snatched while sitting in Ali’s Café. She pursued the perpetrator out the door, only to be blindsided by a second accomplice. Ali described the assault as “a football tackle” so severe it left the victim’s eyeglasses in the branches of a nearby tree. In the most recent laptop robbery, on March 16 in a café on the 900 block of Valencia Street, police say the victim was actually stabbed.

It’s obvious why these thefts are occurring. Laptops are valuable, easy to steal, and easy to fence. If we want to “solve” this problem, we need to modify at least one of those characteristics. Some Internet cafes are providing locking cables for their patrons, in an attempt to make them harder to steal. But that will only mean that the muggers will follow their victims out of the cafes. Laptops will become less valuable over time, but that really isn’t a good solution. The only thing left is to make them harder to fence.

This isn’t an easy problem. There are a bunch of companies that make solutions that help people recover stolen laptops. There are programs that “phone home” if a laptop is stolen. There are programs that hide a serial number on the hard drive somewhere. There are non-removable tags users can affix to their computers with ID information. But until this kind of thing becomes common, the crimes will continue.

Reminds me of the problem of bicycle thefts.

Posted on March 31, 2006 at 1:06 PM • View Comments

RFID Chips and Viruses

Of course RFID chips can carry viruses. They’re just little computers.

More info here. The coverage is more than a tad sensationalist, though.

EDITED TO ADD (3/16): I thought the attack vector was interesting: a Trojan RFID attacks the central database, rather than attacking other RFID chips directly. Metaphorically, it’s a lot closer to biological viruses, because it actually requires the more powerful host being subverted, and there’s no way an infected tag could propagate directly to another tag.

Posted on March 16, 2006 at 6:55 AM • View Comments

AT&T's 1.9-Trillion-Call Database

This whole article is worth reading, but I found this tidbit particularly interesting:

He was alluding to databases maintained at an AT&T data center in Kansas, which now contain electronic records of 1.92 trillion telephone calls, going back decades. The Electronic Frontier Foundation, a digital-rights advocacy group, has asserted in a lawsuit that the AT&T Daytona system, a giant storehouse of calling records and Internet message routing information, was the foundation of the N.S.A.’s effort to mine telephone records without a warrant.

An AT&T spokeswoman said the company would not comment on the claim, or generally on matters of national security or customer privacy.

But the mining of the databases in other law enforcement investigations is well established, with documented results. One application of the database technology, called Security Call Analysis and Monitoring Platform, or Scamp, offers access to about nine weeks of calling information. It currently handles about 70,000 queries a month from fraud and law enforcement investigators, according to AT&T documents.

A former AT&T official who had detailed knowledge of the call-record database said the Daytona system takes great care to make certain that anyone using the database – whether AT&T employee or law enforcement official with a subpoena – sees only information he or she is authorized to see, and that an audit trail keeps track of all users. Such information is frequently used to build models of suspects’ social networks.

The official, speaking on condition of anonymity because he was discussing sensitive corporate matters, said every telephone call generated a record: number called, time of call, duration of call, billing category and other details. While the database does not contain such billing data as names, addresses and credit card numbers, those records are in a linked database that can be tapped by authorized users.

New calls are entered into the database immediately after they end, the official said, adding, “I would characterize it as near real time.”

According to a current AT&T employee, whose identity is being withheld to avoid jeopardizing his job, the mining of the AT&T databases had a notable success in helping investigators find the perpetrators of what was known as the Moldovan porn scam.

In 1997 a shadowy group in Moldova, a former Soviet republic, was tricking Internet users by enticing them to a pornography Web site that would download a piece of software that disconnected the computer user from his local telephone line and redialed a costly 900 number in Moldova.

While another long-distance carrier simply cut off the entire nation of Moldova from its network, AT&T and the Moldovan authorities were able to mine the database to track the culprits.

Posted on March 3, 2006 at 11:45 AM • View Comments

Quantum Computing Just Got More Bizarre

You don’t even have to turn it on:

With the right set-up, the theory suggested, the computer would sometimes get an answer out of the computer even though the program did not run. And now researchers from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign have improved on the original design and built a non-running quantum computer that really works.

So now, even turning the machine off won’t necessarily prevent hackers from stealing passwords.

And as long as we’re on the topic of quantum computing, here’s a piece of quantum snake oil:

A University of Toronto professor says he can now use a photon of light to smash through the most sophisticated computer theft schemes that hackers can devise.

EDITED TO ADD (3/1): More information about the University of Illinois result is here.

Posted on February 28, 2006 at 1:14 PM • View Comments

More on Port Security

From Defective Yeti:

Sark Defends Port Deal

Sark today sought to quell the growing controversy over his decision to grant the MCP control of several major ports throughout the region.

“I believe that this arrangement with the Master Control Program should go forward,” Sark told reporters aboard Solar Sailer One. He emphasized that security would continued to be handled by Tank and Recognizer programs, with the MCP only be in charge of port operations.

But Dumont, guardian of the I/O towers, voiced skepticism. “I could understand ceding authority over ports 21 and 80,” said Dumont. “But port 443? That’s supposed to be secure!”

The public’s reaction to the plan has also been overwhelmingly negative. “No no no,” said a bit upon hearing the news. “No no no no.” Others were more blunt. “Sark should be de-rezzed for even proposing this,” said Ram, a financial program.

Sark, who has repeatedly denied having ties to the MCP, has insisted that the hand-over go through, and says that he will vigorously resist any effort to block it. But programs such as Yori are equally adamant that the deal be scuttled. “My User,” she said, “have we already forgotten the lessons of 1000222846?”

Posted on February 27, 2006 at 6:12 AM • View Comments

Proof that Employees Don't Care About Security

Does anyone think that this experiment would turn out any differently?

An experiment carried out within London’s square mile has revealed that employees in some of the City’s best known financial services companies don’t care about basic security policy.

CDs were handed out to commuters as they entered the City by employees of IT skills specialist The Training Camp and recipients were told the disks contained a special Valentine’s Day promotion.

However, the CDs contained nothing more than code which informed The Training Camp how many of the recipients had tried to open the CD. Among those who were duped were employees of a major retail bank and two global insurers.

The CD packaging even contained a clear warning about installing third-party software and acting in breach of company acceptable-use policies—but that didn’t deter many individuals who showed little regard for the security of their PC and their company.

This was a benign stunt, but it could have been much more serious. A CD-ROM carried into the office and run on a computer bypasses the company’s network security systems. You could easily imagine a criminal ring using this technique to deliver a malicious program into a corporate network—and it would work.

But concluding that employees don’t care about security is a bit naive. Employees care about security; they just don’t understand it. Computer and network security is complicated and confusing, and unless you’re technologically inclined, you’re just not going to have an intuitive feel for what’s appropriate and what’s a security risk. Even worse, technology changes quickly, and any security intuition an employee has is likely to be out of date within a short time.

Education is one way to deal with this, but education has its limitations. I’m sure these banks had security awareness campaigns; they just didn’t stick. Punishment is another form of education, and my guess it would be more effective. If the banks fired everyone who fell for the CD-ROM-on-the-street trick, you can be sure that no one would ever do that again. (At least, until everyone forgot.) That won’t ever happen, though, because the morale effects would be huge.

Rather than blaming this kind of behavior on the users, we would be better served by focusing on the technology. Why does the average computer user at a bank need the ability to install software from a CD-ROM? Why doesn’t the computer block that action, or at least inform the IT department? Computers need to be secure regardless of who’s sitting in front of them, irrespective of what they do.

If I go downstairs and try to repair the heating system in my home, I’m likely to break all sorts of safety rules—and probably the system and myself in the process. I have no experience in that sort of thing, and honestly, there’s no point trying to educate me. But my home heating system works fine without my having to learn anything about it. I know how to set my thermostat, and to call a professional if something goes wrong.

Computers need to work more like that.

Posted on February 20, 2006 at 8:11 AM • View Comments

Security in the Cloud

One of the basic philosophies of security is defense in depth: overlapping systems designed to provide security even if one of them fails. An example is a firewall coupled with an intrusion-detection system (IDS). Defense in depth provides security, because there’s no single point of failure and no assumed single vector for attacks.

It is for this reason that a choice between implementing network security in the middle of the network—in the cloud—or at the endpoints is a false dichotomy. No single security system is a panacea, and it’s far better to do both.

This kind of layered security is precisely what we’re seeing develop. Traditionally, security was implemented at the endpoints, because that’s what the user controlled. An organization had no choice but to put its firewalls, IDSs, and anti-virus software inside its network. Today, with the rise of managed security services and other outsourced network services, additional security can be provided inside the cloud.

I’m all in favor of security in the cloud. If we could build a new Internet today from scratch, we would embed a lot of security functionality in the cloud. But even that wouldn’t substitute for security at the endpoints. Defense in depth beats a single point of failure, and security in the cloud is only part of a layered approach.

For example, consider the various network-based e-mail filtering services available. They do a great job of filtering out spam and viruses, but it would be folly to consider them a substitute for anti-virus security on the desktop. Many e-mails are internal only, never entering the cloud at all. Worse, an attacker might open up a message gateway inside the enterprise’s infrastructure. Smart organizations build defense in depth: e-mail filtering inside the cloud plus anti-virus on the desktop.

The same reasoning applies to network-based firewalls and intrusion-prevention systems (IPS). Security would be vastly improved if the major carriers implemented cloud-based solutions, but they’re no substitute for traditional firewalls, IDSs, and IPSs.

This should not be an either/or decision. At Counterpane, for example, we offer cloud services and more traditional network and desktop services. The real trick is making everything work together.

Security is about technology, people, and processes. Regardless of where your security systems are, they’re not going to work unless human experts are paying attention. Real-time monitoring and response is what’s most important; where the equipment goes is secondary.

Security is always a trade-off. Budgets are limited and economic considerations regularly trump security concerns. Traditional security products and services are centered on the internal network, because that’s the target of attack. Compliance focuses on that for the same reason. Security in the cloud is a good addition, but it’s not a replacement for more traditional network and desktop security.

This was published as a “Face-Off” in Network World.

The opposing view is here.

Posted on February 15, 2006 at 8:18 AM • View Comments

The New Internet Explorer

I’m just starting to read about the new security features in Internet Explorer 7. So far, I like what I am reading.

IE 7 requires that all browser windows display an address bar. This helps foil attackers that operate by popping up new windows masquerading as pages on a legitimate site, when in fact the site is fraudulent. By requiring an address bar, users will immediately see the true URL of the displayed page, making these types of attacks more obvious. If you think you’re looking at www.microsoft.com, but the browser address bar says www.illhackyou.net, you ought to be suspicious.

I use Opera, and have long used the address bar to “check” on URLs. This is an excellent idea. So is this:

In early November, a bunch of Web browser developers got together and started fleshing out standards for address bar coloring, which can cue users to secured connections. Under the proposal laid out by IE 7 team member Rob Franco, even sites that use a standard SSL certificate will display a standard white address bar. Sites that use a stronger, as yet undetermined level of protection will use a green bar.

I like easy visual indications about what’s going on. And I really like that SSL is generic white, because it really doesn’t prove that you’re communicating with the site you think you’re communicating with. This feature helps with that, though:

Franco also said that when navigating to an SSL-protected site, the IE 7 address bar will display the business name and certification authority’s name in the address bar.

Some of the security measures in IE7 weaken the integration between the browser and the operating system:

People using Windows Vista beta 2 will find a new feature called Protected Mode, which renders IE 7 unable to modify system files and settings. This essentially breaks down part of the integration between IE and Windows itself.

Think of it is as a wall between IE and the rest of the operating system. No, the code won’t be perfect, and yes, there’ll be ways found to circumvent this security, but this is an important and long-overdue feature.

The majority of IE’s notorious security flaws stem from its pervasive integration with Windows. That is a feature no other Web browser offers—and an ability that Vista’s Protected Mode intends to mitigate. IE 7 obviously won’t remove all of that tight integration. Lacking deep architectural changes, the effort has focused instead on hardening or eliminating potential vulnerabilities. Unfortunately, this approach requires Microsoft to anticipate everything that could go wrong and block it in advance—hardly a surefire way to secure a browser.

That last sentence is about the general Internet attitude to allow everything that is not explicitly denied, rather than deny everything that is not explicitly allowed.

Also, you’ll have to wait until Vista to use it:

…this capability will not be available in Windows XP because it’s woven directly into Windows Vista itself.

There are also some good changes under the hood:

IE 7 does eliminate a great deal of legacy code that dates back to the IE 4 days, which is a welcome development.

And:

Microsoft has rewritten a good bit of IE 7’s core code to help combat attacks that rely on malformed URLs (that typically cause a buffer overflow). It now funnels all URL processing through a single function (thus reducing the amount of code that “looks” at URLs).

All good stuff, but I agree with this conclusion:

IE 7 offers several new security features, but it’s hardly a given that the situation will improve. There has already been a set of security updates for IE 7 beta 1 released for both Windows Vista and Windows XP computers. Security vulnerabilities in a beta product shouldn’t be alarming (IE 7 is hardly what you’d consider “finished” at this point), but it may be a sign that the product’s architecture and design still have fundamental security issues.

I’m not switching from Opera yet, and my second choice is still Firefox. But the masses still use IE, and our security depends in part on those masses keeping their computers worm-free and bot-free.

NOTE: Here’s some info on how to get your own copy of Internet Explorer 7 beta 2.

Posted on February 9, 2006 at 3:37 PM • View Comments

1 … 24 25 26 27 28 … 33

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.