Last week was the big RSA Conference in San Francisco: something like 20,000 people. From what I saw, these were the major themes on the show floor:
Who else went to RSA? What did you notice?
Posted on March 5, 2012 at 1:30 PM •
It’s taken me a few years, but I’ve come around to this buzzword. It highlights an important characteristic of a particular sort of Internet attacker.
A conventional hacker or criminal isn’t interested in any particular target. He wants a thousand credit card numbers for fraud, or to break into an account and turn it into a zombie, or whatever. Security against this sort of attacker is relative; as long as you’re more secure than almost everyone else, the attackers will go after other people, not you. An APT is different; it’s an attacker who—for whatever reason—wants to attack you. Against this sort of attacker, the absolute level of your security is what’s important. It doesn’t matter how secure you are compared to your peers; all that matters is whether you’re secure enough to keep him out.
APT attackers are more highly motivated. They’re likely to be better skilled, better funded, and more patient. They’re likely to try several different avenues of attack. And they’re much more likely to succeed.
This is why APT is a useful buzzword.
Posted on November 9, 2011 at 1:51 PM •
Brian Krebs has done the analysis; it’s something like 760 companies that were compromised.
Among the more interesting names on the list are Abbott Labs, the Alabama Supercomputer Network, Charles Schwabb & Co., Cisco Systems, eBay, the European Space Agency, Facebook, Freddie Mac, Google, the General Services Administration, the Inter-American Development Bank, IBM, Intel Corp., the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Motorola Inc., Northrop Grumman, Novell, Perot Systems, PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, Research in Motion (RIM) Ltd., Seagate Technology, Thomson Financial, Unisys Corp., USAA, Verisign, VMWare, Wachovia Corp., and Wells Fargo & Co.
Posted on October 28, 2011 at 3:21 PM •
Interesting blog post on the security costs for the $50B Air Force bomber program—estimated to be $8B. This isn’t all computer security, but the original article specifically calls out Chinese computer espionage as a primary threat.
Posted on April 20, 2011 at 6:31 AM •
The company, not the algorithm. Here’s the corporate spin.
Our investigation has led us to believe that the attack is in the category of an Advanced Persistent Threat (APT). Our investigation also revealed that the attack resulted in certain information being extracted from RSA’s systems. Some of that information is specifically related to RSA’s SecurID two-factor authentication products. While at this time we are confident that the information extracted does not enable a successful direct attack on any of our RSA SecurID customers, this information could potentially be used to reduce the effectiveness of a current two-factor authentication implementation as part of a broader attack. We are very actively communicating this situation to RSA customers and providing immediate steps for them to take to strengthen their SecurID implementations.
Here are news articles. The worry is that source code to the company’s SecurID two-factor authentication product was stolen, which would possibly allow hackers to reverse-engineer or otherwise break the system. It’s hard to make any assessments about whether this is possible or likely without knowing 1) how SecurID’s cryptography works, and 2) exactly what was stolen from the company’s servers. We do not know either, and the corporate spin is as short on details as it is long on reassurances.
RSA Data Security, Inc. is probably pretty screwed if SecurID is compromised. Those hardware tokens have no upgrade path, and would have to be replaced. How many of the company’s customers will replace them with competitors’ tokens. Probably a bunch. Hence, it’s in RSA’s best interest for their customers to forget this incident as quickly as possible.
There seems to be two likely scenarios if the attackers have compromised SecurID. One, they are a sophisticated organization who wants the information for a specific purpose. The attackers actually are on RSA’s side in the public-relations spin, and we’re unlikely to see widespread use of this information. Or two, they stole the stuff for conventional criminal purposes and will sell it. In that case, we’re likely to know pretty quickly.
Again, without detailed information—or at least an impartial assessment—it’s impossible to make any recommendations. Security is all about trust, and when trust is lost there is no security. User’s of SecurID trusted RSA Data Security, Inc. to protect the secrets necessary to secure that system. To the extent they did not, the company has lost its customers’ trust.
Posted on March 21, 2011 at 6:52 AM •
This is a really good piece by Paul Roberts on Anonymous vs. HBGary: not the tactics or the politics, but what HBGary demonstrates about the IT security industry.
But I think the real lesson of the hack – and of the revelations that followed it – is that the IT security industry, having finally gotten the attention of law makers, Pentagon generals and public policy establishment wonks in the Beltway, is now in mortal danger of losing its soul. We’ve convinced the world that the threat is real – omnipresent and omnipotent. But in our desire to combat it, we are becoming indistinguishable from the folks with the black hats.
…While “scare ’em and snare ’em” may be business as usual in the IT security industry, other HBGary Federal skunk works projects clearly crossed a line: a proposal for a major U.S. bank, allegedly Bank of America, to launch offensive cyber attacks on the servers that host the whistle blower site Wikileaks. HBGary was part of a triumvirate of firms that also included Palantir Inc and Berico Technologies, that was working with the law firm of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce to develop plans to target progressive groups, labor unions and other left-leaning non profits who the Chamber opposed with a campaign of false information and entrapment. Other leaked e-mail messages reveal work with General Dynamics and a host of other firms to develop custom, stealth malware and collaborations with other firms selling offensive cyber capabilities including knowledge of previously undiscovered (“zero day”) vulnerabilities.
What’s more disturbing is the way that the folks at HBGary – mostly Aaron Barr, but others as well – came to view the infowar tactics they were pitching to the military and its contractors as applicable in the civilian context, as well. How effortlessly and seamlessly the focus on “advanced persistent threats” shifted from government backed hackers in China and Russia to encompass political foes like ThinkProgress or the columnist Glenn Greenwald. Anonymous may have committed crimes that demand punishment – but its up to the FBI to handle that, not “a large U.S. bank” or its attorneys.
Read the whole thing.
Posted on February 25, 2011 at 6:14 AM •
Roger Grimes has an article describing “the seven types of malicious hackers.” I generally like taxonomies, and this one is pretty good.
He says the seven types are:
- Cyber criminals
- Spammers and adware spreaders
- Advanced persistent threat (APT) agents
- Corporate spies
- Cyber warriors
- Rogue hackers
Posted on February 15, 2011 at 1:11 PM •
Three weeks ago, Google announced a sophisticated attack against them from China. There have been some interesting technical details since then. And the NSA is helping Google analyze the attack.
The rumor that China used a system Google put in place to enable lawful intercepts, which I used as a news hook for this essay, has not been confirmed. At this point, I doubt that it’s true.
EDITED TO ADD (2/12): Good article.
Posted on February 8, 2010 at 6:03 AM •
Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.