Schneier on Security

ResearcherZero • October 24, 2026 9:43 AM

GRU agent caught on CCTV in the diplomatic residence of the African Union Commission.

The break-in took place in 2025 in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. The man responsible, Aleksandr Dubikov, worked undercover for the GRU. He frequently made calls to a member of GRU unit 74455, otherwise known as Sandworm. He is the assistant to Russia’s military attaché in Ethiopia, Nikita Zayats. Major Dubikov is still in place in Ethiopia, remaining at large, or perhaps ignored by Ethiopian authorities.

The incident did not go down well, nor improve relations with Moscow and the African Union.

‘https://theins.press/en/inv/298635

Current targets of interest for the GRU include law enforcement, defense manufacturing and shipbuilding (i.e., national security). Sabotage has been contracted out to gig workers.

The GRU is highly active conducting espionage either physically, or via cyber and signals operations. Recently Russian spies have been expelled from a number of European countries for conducting espionage from diplomatic buildings. The GRU, SVR and FSB have all used consular facilities to host signals interdiction equipment and oversee and direct espionage activities – interference, bombings, assassinations, and sabotage of infrastructure.

As a result of hundreds of Russian spies being caught and expelled, they have now switched to recruiting “disposables” online. Due to the low quality of these recruits, and their lack of training, evidence from crime scenes has helped build a picture of the operations.

Moscow cares not if cheap recruits are caught and jailed, or that evidence links different operations together. They can be used for acts of sabotage, and bombings, then left to take the fall for the Kremlin. Leaving GRU agents free to plan the attacks and direct them.

https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/a74027716/russia-espionage-gig-economy-sabotage/