February 15, 2025

by Bruce Schneier
Fellow and Lecturer, Harvard Kennedy School
schneier@schneier.com
https://www.schneier.com

A free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses, insights, and commentaries on security: computer and otherwise.

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These same essays and news items appear in the Schneier on Security blog, along with a lively and intelligent comment section. An RSS feed is available.

In this issue:

Phishing False Alarm
FBI Deletes PlugX Malware from Thousands of Computers
Social Engineering to Disable iMessage Protections
Biden Signs New Cybersecurity Order
AI Mistakes Are Very Different from Human Mistakes
AI Will Write Complex Laws
Third Interdisciplinary Workshop on Reimagining Democracy (IWORD 2024)
New VPN Backdoor
CISA Under Trump
ExxonMobil Lobbyist Caught Hacking Climate Activists
Fake Reddit and WeTransfer Sites Are Pushing Malware
Journalists and Civil Society Members Using WhatsApp Targeted by Paragon Spyware
Deepfakes and the 2024 US Election
On Generative AI Security
AIs and Robots Should Sound Robotic
Screenshot-Reading Malware
UK Is Ordering Apple to Break Its Own Encryption
Pairwise Authentication of Humans
Trusted Execution Environments
Delivering Malware Through Abandoned Amazon S3 Buckets
DOGE as a National Cyberattack
AI and Civil Service Purges
Upcoming Speaking Engagements

Phishing False Alarm

[2025.01.15] A very security-conscious company was hit with a (presumed) massive state-actor phishing attack with gift cards, and everyone rallied to combat it—until it turned out it was company management sending the gift cards.

FBI Deletes PlugX Malware from Thousands of Computers

[2025.01.16] According to a DOJ press release, the FBI was able to delete the Chinese-used PlugX malware from “approximately 4,258 U.S.-based computers and networks.”

Details:

To retrieve information from and send commands to the hacked machines, the malware connects to a command-and-control server that is operated by the hacking group. According to the FBI, at least 45,000 IP addresses in the US had back-and-forths with the command-and-control server since September 2023.

It was that very server that allowed the FBI to finally kill this pesky bit of malicious software. First, they tapped the know-how of French intelligence agencies, which had recently discovered a technique for getting PlugX to self-destruct. Then, the FBI gained access to the hackers’ command-and-control server and used it to request all the IP addresses of machines that were actively infected by PlugX. Then it sent a command via the server that causes PlugX to delete itself from its victims’ computers.

Social Engineering to Disable iMessage Protections

[2025.01.17] I am always interested in new phishing tricks, and watching them spread across the ecosystem.

A few days ago I started getting phishing SMS messages with a new twist. They were standard messages about delayed packages or somesuch, with the goal of getting me to click on a link and entering some personal information into a website. But because they came from unknown phone numbers, the links did not work. So—this is the new bit—the messages said something like: “Please reply Y, then exit the text message, reopen the text message activation link, or copy the link to Safari browser to open it.”

I saw it once, and now I am seeing it again and again. Everyone has now adopted this new trick.

One article claims that this trick has been popular since last summer. I don’t know; I would have expected to have seen it before last weekend.

Biden Signs New Cybersecurity Order

[2025.01.20] President Biden has signed a new cybersecurity order. It has a bunch of provisions, most notably using the US government’s procurement power to improve cybersecurity practices industry-wide.

Some details:

The core of the executive order is an array of mandates for protecting government networks based on lessons learned from recent major incidents—namely, the security failures of federal contractors.

The order requires software vendors to submit proof that they follow secure development practices, building on a mandate that debuted in 2022 in response to Biden’s first cyber executive order. The Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency would be tasked with double-checking these security attestations and working with vendors to fix any problems. To put some teeth behind the requirement, the White House’s Office of the National Cyber Director is “encouraged to refer attestations that fail validation to the Attorney General” for potential investigation and prosecution.

The order gives the Department of Commerce eight months to assess the most commonly used cyber practices in the business community and issue guidance based on them. Shortly thereafter, those practices would become mandatory for companies seeking to do business with the government. The directive also kicks off updates to the National Institute of Standards and Technology’s secure software development guidance.

More information.

AI Mistakes Are Very Different from Human Mistakes

[2025.01.21] Humans make mistakes all the time. All of us do, every day, in tasks both new and routine. Some of our mistakes are minor and some are catastrophic. Mistakes can break trust with our friends, lose the confidence of our bosses, and sometimes be the difference between life and death.

Over the millennia, we have created security systems to deal with the sorts of mistakes humans commonly make. These days, casinos rotate their dealers regularly, because they make mistakes if they do the same task for too long. Hospital personnel write on limbs before surgery so that doctors operate on the correct body part, and they count surgical instruments to make sure none were left inside the body. From copyediting to double-entry bookkeeping to appellate courts, we humans have gotten really good at correcting human mistakes.

Humanity is now rapidly integrating a wholly different kind of mistake-maker into society: AI. Technologies like large language models (LLMs) can perform many cognitive tasks traditionally fulfilled by humans, but they make plenty of mistakes. It seems ridiculous when chatbots tell you to eat rocks or add glue to pizza. But it’s not the frequency or severity of AI systems’ mistakes that differentiates them from human mistakes. It’s their weirdness. AI systems do not make mistakes in the same ways that humans do.

Much of the friction—and risk—associated with our use of AI arise from that difference. We need to invent new security systems that adapt to these differences and prevent harm from AI mistakes.

Human Mistakes vs AI Mistakes

Life experience makes it fairly easy for each of us to guess when and where humans will make mistakes. Human errors tend to come at the edges of someone’s knowledge: Most of us would make mistakes solving calculus problems. We expect human mistakes to be clustered: A single calculus mistake is likely to be accompanied by others. We expect mistakes to wax and wane, predictably depending on factors such as fatigue and distraction. And mistakes are often accompanied by ignorance: Someone who makes calculus mistakes is also likely to respond “I don’t know” to calculus-related questions.

To the extent that AI systems make these human-like mistakes, we can bring all of our mistake-correcting systems to bear on their output. But the current crop of AI models—particularly LLMs—make mistakes differently.

AI errors come at seemingly random times, without any clustering around particular topics. LLM mistakes tend to be more evenly distributed through the knowledge space. A model might be equally likely to make a mistake on a calculus question as it is to propose that cabbages eat goats.

And AI mistakes aren’t accompanied by ignorance. A LLM will be just as confident when saying something completely wrong—and obviously so, to a human—as it will be when saying something true. The seemingly random inconsistency of LLMs makes it hard to trust their reasoning in complex, multi-step problems. If you want to use an AI model to help with a business problem, it’s not enough to see that it understands what factors make a product profitable; you need to be sure it won’t forget what money is.

How to Deal with AI Mistakes

This situation indicates two possible areas of research. The first is to engineer LLMs that make more human-like mistakes. The second is to build new mistake-correcting systems that deal with the specific sorts of mistakes that LLMs tend to make.

We already have some tools to lead LLMs to act in more human-like ways. Many of these arise from the field of “alignment” research, which aims to make models act in accordance with the goals and motivations of their human developers. One example is the technique that was arguably responsible for the breakthrough success of ChatGPT: reinforcement learning with human feedback. In this method, an AI model is (figuratively) rewarded for producing responses that get a thumbs-up from human evaluators. Similar approaches could be used to induce AI systems to make more human-like mistakes, particularly by penalizing them more for mistakes that are less intelligible.

When it comes to catching AI mistakes, some of the systems that we use to prevent human mistakes will help. To an extent, forcing LLMs to double-check their own work can help prevent errors. But LLMs can also confabulate seemingly plausible, but truly ridiculous, explanations for their flights from reason.

Other mistake mitigation systems for AI are unlike anything we use for humans. Because machines can’t get fatigued or frustrated in the way that humans do, it can help to ask an LLM the same question repeatedly in slightly different ways and then synthesize its multiple responses. Humans won’t put up with that kind of annoying repetition, but machines will.

Understanding Similarities and Differences

Researchers are still struggling to understand where LLM mistakes diverge from human ones. Some of the weirdness of AI is actually more human-like than it first appears. Small changes to a query to an LLM can result in wildly different responses, a problem known as prompt sensitivity. But, as any survey researcher can tell you, humans behave this way, too. The phrasing of a question in an opinion poll can have drastic impacts on the answers.

LLMs also seem to have a bias towards repeating the words that were most common in their training data; for example, guessing familiar place names like “America” even when asked about more exotic locations. Perhaps this is an example of the human “availability heuristic” manifesting in LLMs, with machines spitting out the first thing that comes to mind rather than reasoning through the question. And like humans, perhaps, some LLMs seem to get distracted in the middle of long documents; they’re better able to remember facts from the beginning and end. There is already progress on improving this error mode, as researchers have found that LLMs trained on more examples of retrieving information from long texts seem to do better at retrieving information uniformly.

In some cases, what’s bizarre about LLMs is that they act more like humans than we think they should. For example, some researchers have tested the hypothesis that LLMs perform better when offered a cash reward or threatened with death. It also turns out that some of the best ways to “jailbreak” LLMs (getting them to disobey their creators’ explicit instructions) look a lot like the kinds of social engineering tricks that humans use on each other: for example, pretending to be someone else or saying that the request is just a joke. But other effective jailbreaking techniques are things no human would ever fall for. One group found that if they used ASCII art (constructions of symbols that look like words or pictures) to pose dangerous questions, like how to build a bomb, the LLM would answer them willingly.

Humans may occasionally make seemingly random, incomprehensible, and inconsistent mistakes, but such occurrences are rare and often indicative of more serious problems. We also tend not to put people exhibiting these behaviors in decision-making positions. Likewise, we should confine AI decision-making systems to applications that suit their actual abilities—while keeping the potential ramifications of their mistakes firmly in mind.

This essay was written with Nathan E. Sanders, and originally appeared in IEEE Spectrum.

EDITED TO ADD (1/24): Slashdot thread.

AI Will Write Complex Laws

[2025.01.22] Artificial intelligence (AI) is writing law today. This has required no changes in legislative procedure or the rules of legislative bodies—all it takes is one legislator, or legislative assistant, to use generative AI in the process of drafting a bill.

In fact, the use of AI by legislators is only likely to become more prevalent. There are currently projects in the US House, US Senate, and legislatures around the world to trial the use of AI in various ways: searching databases, drafting text, summarizing meetings, performing policy research and analysis, and more. A Brazilian municipality passed the first known AI-written law in 2023.

That’s not surprising; AI is being used more everywhere. What is coming into focus is how policymakers will use AI and, critically, how this use will change the balance of power between the legislative and executive branches of government. Soon, US legislators may turn to AI to help them keep pace with the increasing complexity of their lawmaking—and this will suppress the power and discretion of the executive branch to make policy.

Demand for Increasingly Complex Legislation

Legislators are writing increasingly long, intricate, and complicated laws that human legislative drafters have trouble producing. Already in the US, the multibillion-dollar lobbying industry is subsidizing lawmakers in writing baroque laws: suggesting paragraphs to add to bills, specifying benefits for some, carving out exceptions for others. Indeed, the lobbying industry is growing in complexity and influence worldwide.

Several years ago, researchers studied bills introduced into state legislatures throughout the US, looking at which bills were wholly original texts and which borrowed text from other states or from lobbyist-written model legislation. Their conclusion was not very surprising. Those who borrowed the most text were in legislatures that were less resourced. This makes sense: If you’re a part-time legislator, perhaps unpaid and without a lot of staff, you need to rely on more external support to draft legislation. When the scope of policymaking outstrips the resources of legislators, they look for help. Today, that often means lobbyists, who provide expertise, research services, and drafting labor to legislators at the local, state, and federal levels at no charge. Of course, they are not unbiased: They seek to exert influence on behalf of their clients.

Ano ther study, at the US federal level, measured the complexity of policies proposed in legislation and tried to determine the factors that led to such growing complexity. While there are numerous ways to measure legal complexity, these authors focused on the specificity of institutional design: How exacting is Congress in laying out the relational network of branches, agencies, and officials that will share power to implement the policy?

In looking at bills enacted between 1993 and 2014, the researchers found two things. First, they concluded that ideological polarization drives complexity. The suggestion is that if a legislator is on the extreme end of the ideological spectrum, they’re more likely to introduce a complex law that constrains the discretion of, as the authors put it, “entrenched bureaucratic interests.” And second, they found that divided government drives complexity to a large degree: Significant legislation passed under divided government was found to be 65 percent more complex than similar legislation passed under unified government. Their conclusion is that, if a legislator’s party controls Congress, and the opposing party controls the White House, the legislator will want to give the executive as little wiggle room as possible. When legislators’ preferences disagree with the executive’s, the legislature is incentivized to write laws that specify all the details. This gives the agency designated to implement the law as little discretion as possible.

Because polarization and divided government are increasingly entrenched in the US, the demand for complex legislation at the federal level is likely to grow. Today, we have both the greatest ideological polarization in Congress in living memory and an increasingly divided government at the federal level. Between 1900 and 1970 (57th through 90th Congresses), we had 27 instances of unified government and only seven divided; nearly a four-to-one ratio. Since then, the trend is roughly the opposite. As of the start of the next Congress, we will have had 20 divided governments and only eight unified (nearly a three-to-one ratio). And while the incoming Trump administration will see a unified government, the extremely closely divided House may often make this Congress look and feel like a divided one (see the recent government shutdown crisis as an exemplar) and makes truly divided government a strong possibility in 2027.

Another related factor driving the complexity of legislation is the need to do it all at once. The lobbyist feeding frenzy—spurring major bills like the Affordable Care Act to be thousands of pages in length—is driven in part by gridlock in Congress. Congressional productivity has dropped so low that bills on any given policy issue seem like a once-in-a-generation opportunity for legislators—and lobbyists—to set policy.

These dynamics also impact the states. States often have divided governments, albeit less often than they used to, and their demand for drafting assistance is arguably higher due to their significantly smaller staffs. And since the productivity of Congress has cratered in recent years, significantly more policymaking is happening at the state level.

But there’s another reason, particular to the US federal government, that will likely force congressional legislation to be more complex even during unified government. In June 2024, the US Supreme Court overturned the Chevron doctrine, which gave executive agencies broad power to specify and implement legislation. Suddenly, there is a mandate from the Supreme Court for more specific legislation. Issues that have historically been left implicitly to the executive branch are now required to be either explicitly delegated to agencies or specified directly in statute. Either way, the Court’s ruling implied that law should become more complex and that Congress should increase its policymaking capacity.

This affects the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches of government. When the legislature delegates less to the executive branch, it increases its own power. Every decision made explicitly in statute is a decision the executive makes not on its own but, rather, according to the directive of the legislature. In the US system of separation of powers, administrative law is a tool for balancing power among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches. The legislature gets to decide when to delegate and when not to, and it can respond to judicial review to adjust its delegation of control as needed. The elimination of Chevron will induce the legislature to exert its control over delegation more robustly.

At the same time, there are powerful political incentives for Congress to be vague and to rely on someone else, like agency bureaucrats, to make hard decisions. That empowers third parties—the corporations, or lobbyists—that have been gifted by the overturning of Chevron a new tool in arguing against administrative regulations not specifically backed up by law. A continuing stream of Supreme Court decisions handing victories to unpopular industries could be another driver of complex law, adding political pressure to pass legislative fixes.

AI Can Supply Complex Legislation

Congress may or may not be up to the challenge of putting more policy details into law, but the external forces outlined above—lobbyists, the judiciary, and an increasingly divided and polarized government—are pushing them to do so. When Congress does take on the task of writing complex legislation, it’s quite likely it will turn to AI for help.

Two particular AI capabilities enable Congress to write laws different from laws humans tend to write. One, AI models have an enormous scope of expertise, whereas people have only a handful of specializations. Large language models (LLMs) like the one powering ChatGPT can generate legislative text on funding specialty crop harvesting mechanization equally as well as material on energy efficiency standards for street lighting. This enables a legislator to address more topics simultaneously. Two, AI models have the sophistication to work with a higher degree of complexity than people can. Modern LLM systems can instantaneously perform several simultaneous multistep reasoning tasks using information from thousands of pages of documents. This enables a legislator to fill in more baroque detail on any given topic.

That’s not to say that handing over legislative drafting to machines is easily done. Modernizing any institutional process is extremely hard, even when the technology is readily available and performant. And modern AI still has a ways to go to achieve mastery of complex legal and policy issues. But the basic tools are there.

AI can be used in each step of lawmaking, and this will bring various benefits to policymakers. It could let them work on more policies—more bills—at the same time, add more detail and specificity to each bill, or interpret and incorporate more feedback from constituents and outside groups. The addition of a single AI tool to a legislative office may have an impact similar to adding several people to their staff, but with far lower cost.

Speed sometimes matters when writing law. When there is a change of governing party, there is often a rush to change as much policy as possible to match the platform of the new regime. AI could help legislators do that kind of wholesale revision. The result could be policy that is more responsive to voters—or more political instability. Already in 2024, the US House’s Office of the Clerk has begun using AI to speed up the process of producing cost estimates for bills and understanding how new legislation relates to existing code. Ohio has used an AI tool to do wholesale revision of state administrative law since 2020.

AI can also make laws clearer and more consistent. With their superhuman attention spans, AI tools are good at enforcing syntactic and grammatical rules. They will be effective at drafting text in precise and proper legislative language, or offering detailed feedback to human drafters. Borrowing ideas from software development, where coders use tools to identify common instances of bad programming practices, an AI reviewer can highlight bad law-writing practices. For example, it can detect when significant phrasing is inconsistent across a long bill. If a bill about insurance repeatedly lists a variety of disaster categories, but leaves one out one time, AI can catch that.

Perhaps this seems like minutiae, but a small ambiguity or mistake in law can have massive consequences. In 2015, the Affordable Care Act came close to being struck down because of a typo in four words, imperiling health care services extended to more than 7 million Americans.

There’s more that AI can do in the legislative process. AI can summarize bills and answer questions about their provisions. It can highlight aspects of a bill that align with, or are contrary to, different political points of view. We can even imagine a future in which AI can be used to simulate a new law and determine whether or not it would be effective, or what the side effects would be. This means that beyond writing them, AI could help lawmakers understand laws. Congress is notorious for producing bills hundreds of pages long, and many other countries sometimes have similarly massive omnibus bills that address many issues at once. It’s impossible for any one person to understand how each of these bills’ provisions would work. Many legislatures employ human analysis in budget or fiscal offices that analyze these bills and offer reports. AI could do this kind of work at greater speed and scale, so legislators could easily query an AI tool about how a particular bill would affect their district or areas of concern.

This is a use case that the House subcommittee on modernization has urged the Library of Congress to take action on. Numerous software vendors are already marketing AI legislative analysis tools. These tools can potentially find loopholes or, like the human lobbyists of today, craft them to benefit particular private interests.

These capabilities will be attractive to legislators who are looking to expand their power and capabilities but don’t necessarily have more funding to hire human staff. We should understand the idea of AI-augmented lawmaking contextualized within the longer history of legislative technologies. To serve society at modern scales, we’ve had to come a long way from the Athenian ideals of direct democracy and sortition. Democracy no longer involves just one person and one vote to decide a policy. It involves hundreds of thousands of constituents electing one representative, who is augmented by a staff as well as subsidized by lobbyists, and who implements policy through a vast administrative state coordinated by digital technologies. Using AI to help those representatives specify and refine their policy ideas is part of a long history of transformation.

Whether all this AI augmentation is good for all of us subject to the laws they make is less clear. There are real risks to AI-written law, but those risks are not dramatically different from what we endure today. AI-written law trying to optimize for certain policy outcomes may get it wrong (just as many human-written laws are misguided). AI-written law may be manipulated to benefit one constituency over others, by the tech companies that develop the AI, or by the legislators who apply it, just as human lobbyists steer policy to benefit their clients.

Regardless of what anyone thinks of any of this, regardless of whether it will be a net positive or a net negative, AI-made legislation is coming—the growing complexity of policy demands it. It doesn’t require any changes in legislative procedures or agreement from any rules committee. All it takes is for one legislative assistant, or lobbyist, to fire up a chatbot and ask it to create a draft. When legislators voted on that Brazilian bill in 2023, they didn’t know it was AI-written; the use of ChatGPT was undisclosed. And even if they had known, it’s not clear it would have made a difference. In the future, as in the past, we won’t always know which laws will have good impacts and which will have bad effects, regardless of the words on the page, or who (or what) wrote them.

This essay was written with Nathan E. Sanders, and originally appeared in Lawfare.

Third Interdisciplinary Workshop on Reimagining Democracy (IWORD 2024)

[2025.01.23] Last month, Henry Farrell and I convened the Third Interdisciplinary Workshop on Reimagining Democracy (IWORD 2024) at Johns Hopkins University’s Bloomberg Center in Washington DC. This is a small, invitational workshop on the future of democracy. As with the previous two workshops, the goal was to bring together a diverse set of political scientists, law professors, philosophers, AI researchers and other industry practitioners, political activists, and creative types (including science fiction writers) to discuss how democracy might be reimagined in the current century.

The goal of the workshop is to think very broadly. Modern democracy was invented in the mid-eighteenth century, using mid-eighteenth-century technology. If democracy were to be invented today, it would look very different. Elections would look different. The balance between representation and direct democracy would look different. Adjudication and enforcement would look different. Everything would look different, because our conceptions of fairness, justice, equality, and rights are different, and we have much more powerful technology to bring to bear on the problems. Also, we could start from scratch without having to worry about evolving our current democracy into this imagined future system.

We can’t do that, of course, but it’s still still valuable to speculate. Of course we need to figure out how to reform our current systems, but we shouldn’t limit our thinking to incremental steps. We also need to think about discontinuous changes as well. I wrote about the philosophy more in this essay about IWORD 2022.

IWORD 2024 was easily the most intellectually stimulating two days of my year. It’s also intellectually exhausting; the speed and intensity of ideas is almost too much. I wrote about the format in my blog post on IWORD 2023.

Summaries of all the IWORD 2024 talks are in the first set of comments below. And here are links to the previous IWORDs:

IWORD 2022: home page, essay, and talk summaries
IWORD 2023: home page and talk summaries.

IWORD 2025 will be held either in New York or New Haven; still to be determined.

New VPN Backdoor

[2025.01.27] A newly discovered VPN backdoor uses some interesting tactics to avoid detection:

When threat actors use backdoor malware to gain access to a network, they want to make sure all their hard work can’t be leveraged by competing groups or detected by defenders. One countermeasure is to equip the backdoor with a passive agent that remains dormant until it receives what’s known in the business as a “magic packet.” On Thursday, researchers revealed that a never-before-seen backdoor that quietly took hold of dozens of enterprise VPNs running Juniper Network’s Junos OS has been doing just that.

J-Magic, the tracking name for the backdoor, goes one step further to prevent unauthorized access. After receiving a magic packet hidden in the normal flow of TCP traffic, it relays a challenge to the device that sent it. The challenge comes in the form of a string of text that’s encrypted using the public portion of an RSA key. The initiating party must then respond with the corresponding plaintext, proving it has access to the secret key.

The lightweight backdoor is also notable because it resided only in memory, a trait that makes detection harder for defenders. The combination prompted researchers at Lumin Technology’s Black Lotus Lab to sit up and take notice.

[…]

The researchers found J-Magic on VirusTotal and determined that it had run inside the networks of 36 organizations. They still don’t know how the backdoor got installed.

Slashdot thread.

EDITED TO ADD (2/1): Another article.

CISA Under Trump

[2025.01.28] Jen Easterly is out as the Director of CISA. Read her final interview:

There’s a lot of unfinished business. We have made an impact through our ransomware vulnerability warning pilot and our pre-ransomware notification initiative, and I’m really proud of that, because we work on preventing somebody from having their worst day. But ransomware is still a problem. We have been laser-focused on PRC cyber actors. That will continue to be a huge problem. I’m really proud of where we are, but there’s much, much more work to be done. There are things that I think we can continue driving, that the next administration, I hope, will look at, because, frankly, cybersecurity is a national security issue.

If Project 2025 is a guide, the agency will be gutted under Trump:

“Project 2025’s recommendations—essentially because this one thing caused anger—is to just strip the agency of all of its support altogether,” he said. “And CISA’s functions go so far beyond its role in the information space in a way that would do real harm to election officials and leave them less prepared to tackle future challenges.”

In the DHS chapter of Project 2025, Cucinelli suggests gutting CISA almost entirely, moving its core responsibilities on critical infrastructure to the Department of Transportation. It’s a suggestion that Adav Noti, the executive director of the nonpartisan voting rights advocacy organization Campaign Legal Center, previously described to Democracy Docket as “absolutely bonkers.”

“It’s located at Homeland Security because the whole premise of the Department of Homeland Security is that it’s supposed to be the central resource for the protection of the nation,” Noti said. “And that the important functions shouldn’t be living out in siloed agencies.”

ExxonMobil Lobbyist Caught Hacking Climate Activists

[2025.01.29] The Department of Justice is investigating a lobbying firm representing ExxonMobil for hacking the phones of climate activists:

The hacking was allegedly commissioned by a Washington, D.C., lobbying firm, according to a lawyer representing the U.S. government. The firm, in turn, was allegedly working on behalf of one of the world’s largest oil and gas companies, based in Texas, that wanted to discredit groups and individuals involved in climate litigation, according to the lawyer for the U.S. government. In court documents, the Justice Department does not name either company.

As part of its probe, the U.S. is trying to extradite an Israeli private investigator named Amit Forlit from the United Kingdom for allegedly orchestrating the hacking campaign. A lawyer for Forlit claimed in a court filing that the hacking operation her client is accused of leading “is alleged to have been commissioned by DCI Group, a lobbying firm representing ExxonMobil, one of the world’s largest fossil fuel companies.”

Fake Reddit and WeTransfer Sites Are Pushing Malware

[2025.01.30] There are thousands of fake Reddit and WeTransfer webpages that are pushing malware. They exploit people who are using search engines to search sites like Reddit.

Unsuspecting victims clicking on the link are taken to a fake WeTransfer site that mimicks the interface of the popular file-sharing service. The ‘Download’ button leads to the Lumma Stealer payload hosted on “weighcobbweo[.]top.”

Boing Boing post.

Journalists and Civil Society Members Using WhatsApp Targeted by Paragon Spyware

[2025.02.03] This is yet another story of commercial spyware being used against journalists and civil society members.

The journalists and other civil society members were being alerted of a possible breach of their devices, with WhatsApp telling the Guardian it had “high confidence” that the 90 users in question had been targeted and “possibly compromised.”

It is not clear who was behind the attack. Like other spyware makers, Paragon’s hacking software is used by government clients and WhatsApp said it had not been able to identify the clients who ordered the alleged attacks.

Experts said the targeting was a “zero-click” attack, which means targets would not have had to click on any malicious links to be infected.

Deepfakes and the 2024 US Election

[2025.02.04] Interesting analysis:

We analyzed every instance of AI use in elections collected by the WIRED AI Elections Project (source for our analysis), which tracked known uses of AI for creating political content during elections taking place in 2024 worldwide. In each case, we identified what AI was used for and estimated the cost of creating similar content without AI.

We find that (1) half of AI use isn’t deceptive, (2) deceptive content produced using AI is nevertheless cheap to replicate without AI, and (3) focusing on the demand for misinformation rather than the supply is a much more effective way to diagnose problems and identify interventions.

This tracks with my analysis. People share as a form of social signaling. I send you a meme/article/clipping/photo to show that we are on the same team. Whether it is true, or misinformation, or actual propaganda, is of secondary importance. Sometimes it’s completely irrelevant. This is why fact checking doesn’t work. This is why “cheap fakes”—obviously fake photos and videos—are effective. This is why, as the authors of that analysis said, the demand side is the real problem.

On Generative AI Security

[2025.02.05] Microsoft’s AI Red Team just published “Lessons from Red Teaming 100 Generative AI Products.” Their blog post lists “three takeaways,” but the eight lessons in the report itself are more useful:

Understand what the system can do and where it is applied.

You don’t have to compute gradients to break an AI system.

AI red teaming is not safety benchmarking.

Automation can help cover more of the risk landscape.

The human element of AI red teaming is crucial.

Responsible AI harms are pervasive but difficult to measure.

LLMs amplify existing security risks and introduce new ones.

The work of securing AI systems will never be complete.

AIs and Robots Should Sound Robotic

[2025.02.06] Most people know that robots no longer sound like tinny trash cans. They sound like Siri, Alexa, and Gemini. They sound like the voices in labyrinthine customer support phone trees. And even those robot voices are being made obsolete by new AI-generated voices that can mimic every vocal nuance and tic of human speech, down to specific regional accents. And with just a few seconds of audio, AI can now clone someone’s specific voice.

This technology will replace humans in many areas. Automated customer support will save money by cutting staffing at call centers. AI agents will make calls on our behalf, conversing with others in natural language. All of that is happening, and will be commonplace soon.

But there is something fundamentally different about talking with a bot as opposed to a person. A person can be a friend. An AI cannot be a friend, despite how people might treat it or react to it. AI is at best a tool, and at worst a means of manipulation. Humans need to know whether we’re talking with a living, breathing person or a robot with an agenda set by the person who controls it. That’s why robots should sound like robots.

You can’t just label AI-generated speech. It will come in many different forms. So we need a way to recognize AI that works no matter the modality. It needs to work for long or short snippets of audio, even just a second long. It needs to work for any language, and in any cultural context. At the same time, we shouldn’t constrain the underlying system’s sophistication or language complexity.

We have a simple proposal: all talking AIs and robots should use a ring modulator. In the mid-twentieth century, before it was easy to create actual robotic-sounding speech synthetically, ring modulators were used to make actors’ voices sound robotic. Over the last few decades, we have become accustomed to robotic voices, simply because text-to-speech systems were good enough to produce intelligible speech that was not human-like in its sound. Now we can use that same technology to make robotic speech that is indistinguishable from human sound robotic again.

A ring modulator has several advantages: It is computationally simple, can be applied in real-time, does not affect the intelligibility of the voice, and—most importantly—is universally “robotic sounding” because of its historical usage for depicting robots.

Responsible AI companies that provide voice synthesis or AI voice assistants in any form should add a ring modulator of some standard frequency (say, between 30-80 Hz) and of a minimum amplitude (say, 20 percent). That’s it. People will catch on quickly.

Here are a couple of examples you can listen to for examples of what we’re suggesting. The first clip is an AI-generated “podcast” of this article made by Google’s NotebookLM featuring two AI “hosts.” Google’s NotebookLM created the podcast script and audio given only the text of this article. The next two clips feature that same podcast with the AIs’ voices modulated more and less subtly by a ring modulator:

Raw audio sample generated by Google’s NotebookLM

Audio sample with added ring modulator (30 Hz-25%)

Audio sample with added ring modulator (30 Hz-40%)

We were able to generate the audio effect with a 50-line Python script generated by Anthropic’s Claude. One of the most well-known robot voices were those of the Daleks from Doctor Who in the 1960s. Back then robot voices were difficult to synthesize, so the audio was actually an actor’s voice run through a ring modulator. It was set to around 30 Hz, as we did in our example, with different modulation depth (amplitude) depending on how strong the robotic effect is meant to be. Our expectation is that the AI industry will test and converge on a good balance of such parameters and settings, and will use better tools than a 50-line Python script, but this highlights how simple it is to achieve.

Of course there will also be nefarious uses of AI voices. Scams that use voice cloning have been getting easier every year, but they’ve been possible for many years with the right know-how. Just like we’re learning that we can no longer trust images and videos we see because they could easily have been AI-generated, we will all soon learn that someone who sounds like a family member urgently requesting money may just be a scammer using a voice-cloning tool.

We don’t expect scammers to follow our proposal: They’ll find a way no matter what. But that’s always true of security standards, and a rising tide lifts all boats. We think the bulk of the uses will be with popular voice APIs from major companies—and everyone should know that they’re talking with a robot.

This essay was written with Barath Raghavan, and originally appeared in IEEE Spectrum.

Screenshot-Reading Malware

[2025.02.07] Kaspersky is reporting on a new type of smartphone malware.

The malware in question uses optical character recognition (OCR) to review a device’s photo library, seeking screenshots of recovery phrases for crypto wallets. Based on their assessment, infected Google Play apps have been downloaded more than 242,000 times. Kaspersky says: “This is the first known case of an app infected with OCR spyware being found in Apple’s official app marketplace.”

That’s a tactic I have not heard of before.

UK Is Ordering Apple to Break Its Own Encryption

[2025.02.08] The Washington Post is reporting that the UK government has served Apple with a “technical capability notice” as defined by the 2016 Investigatory Powers Act, requiring it to break the Advanced Data Protection encryption in iCloud for the benefit of law enforcement.

This is a big deal, and something we in the security community have worried was coming for a while now.

The law, known by critics as the Snoopers’ Charter, makes it a criminal offense to reveal that the government has even made such a demand. An Apple spokesman declined to comment.

Apple can appeal the U.K. capability notice to a secret technical panel, which would consider arguments about the expense of the requirement, and to a judge who would weigh whether the request was in proportion to the government’s needs. But the law does not permit Apple to delay complying during an appeal.

In March, when the company was on notice that such a requirement might be coming, it told Parliament: “There is no reason why the U.K. [government] should have the authority to decide for citizens of the world whether they can avail themselves of the proven security benefits that flow from end-to-end encryption.”

Apple is likely to turn the feature off for UK users rather than break it for everyone worldwide. Of course, UK users will be able to spoof their location. But this might not be enough. According to the law, Apple would not be able to offer the feature to anyone who is in the UK at any point: for example, a visitor from the US.

And what happens next? Australia has a law enabling it to ask for the same thing. Will it? Will even more countries follow?

This is madness.

Pairwise Authentication of Humans

[2025.02.10] Here’s an easy system for two humans to remotely authenticate to each other, so they can be sure that neither are digital impersonations.

To mitigate that risk, I have developed this simple solution where you can setup a unique time-based one-time passcode (TOTP) between any pair of persons.

This is how it works:

Two people, Person A and Person B, sit in front of the same computer and open this page;

They input their respective names (e.g. Alice and Bob) onto the same page, and click “Generate”;

The page will generate two TOTP QR codes, one for Alice and one for Bob;

Alice and Bob scan the respective QR code into a TOTP mobile app (such as Authy or Google Authenticator) on their respective mobile phones;

In the future, when Alice speaks with Bob over the phone or over video call, and wants to verify the identity of Bob, Alice asks Bob to provide the 6-digit TOTP code from the mobile app. If the code matches what Alice has on her own phone, then Alice has more confidence that she is speaking with the real Bob.

Simple, and clever.

Trusted Execution Environments

[2025.02.11] Really good—and detailed—survey of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs.)

Delivering Malware Through Abandoned Amazon S3 Buckets

[2025.02.12] Here’s a supply-chain attack just waiting to happen. A group of researchers searched for, and then registered, abandoned Amazon S3 buckets for about $400. These buckets contained software libraries that are still used. Presumably the projects don’t realize that they have been abandoned, and still ping them for patches, updates, and etc.

The TL;DR is that this time, we ended up discovering ~150 Amazon S3 buckets that had previously been used across commercial and open source software products, governments, and infrastructure deployment/update pipelines—and then abandoned.

Naturally, we registered them, just to see what would happen—”how many people are really trying to request software updates from S3 buckets that appear to have been abandoned months or even years ago?”, we naively thought to ourselves.

Turns out they got eight million requests over two months.

Had this been an actual attack, they would have modified the code in those buckets to contain malware and watch as it was incorporated in different software builds around the internet. This is basically the SolarWinds attack, but much more extensive.

But there’s a second dimension to this attack. Because these update buckets are abandoned, the developers who are using them also no longer have the power to patch them automatically to protect them. The mechanism they would use to do so is now in the hands of adversaries. Moreover, often—but not always—losing the bucket that they’d use for it also removes the original vendor’s ability to identify the vulnerable software in the first place. That hampers their ability to communicate with vulnerable installations.

Software supply-chain security is an absolute mess. And it’s not going to be easy, or cheap, to fix. Which means that it won’t be. Which is an even worse mess.

DOGE as a National Cyberattack

[2025.02.13] In the span of just weeks, the US government has experienced what may be the most consequential security breach in its history—not through a sophisticated cyberattack or an act of foreign espionage, but through official orders by a billionaire with a poorly defined government role. And the implications for national security are profound.

First, it was reported that people associated with the newly created Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE) had accessed the US Treasury computer system, giving them the ability to collect data on and potentially control the department’s roughly $5.45 trillion in annual federal payments.

Then, we learned that uncleared DOGE personnel had gained access to classified data from the US Agency for International Development, possibly copying it onto their own systems. Next, the Office of Personnel Management—which holds detailed personal data on millions of federal employees, including those with security clearances—was compromised. After that, Medicaid and Medicare records were compromised.

Meanwhile, only partially redacted names of CIA employees were sent over an unclassified email account. DOGE personnel are also reported to be feeding Education Department data into artificial intelligence software, and they have also started working at the Department of Energy.

This story is moving very fast. On Feb. 8, a federal judge blocked the DOGE team from accessing the Treasury Department systems any further. But given that DOGE workers have already copied data and possibly installed and modified software, it’s unclear how this fixes anything.

In any case, breaches of other critical government systems are likely to follow unless federal employees stand firm on the protocols protecting national security.

The systems that DOGE is accessing are not esoteric pieces of our nation’s infrastructure—they are the sinews of government.

For example, the Treasury Department systems contain the technical blueprints for how the federal government moves money, while the Office of Personnel Management (OPM) network contains information on who and what organizations the government employs and contracts with.

What makes this situation unprecedented isn’t just the scope, but also the method of attack. Foreign adversaries typically spend years attempting to penetrate government systems such as these, using stealth to avoid being seen and carefully hiding any tells or tracks. The Chinese government’s 2015 breach of OPM was a significant US security failure, and it illustrated how personnel data could be used to identify intelligence officers and compromise national security.

In this case, external operators with limited experience and minimal oversight are doing their work in plain sight and under massive public scrutiny: gaining the highest levels of administrative access and making changes to the United States’ most sensitive networks, potentially introducing new security vulnerabilities in the process.

But the most alarming aspect isn’t just the access being granted. It’s the systematic dismantling of security measures that would detect and prevent misuse—including standard incident response protocols, auditing, and change-tracking mechanisms—by removing the career officials in charge of those security measures and replacing them with inexperienced operators.

The Treasury’s computer systems have such an impact on national security that they were designed with the same principle that guides nuclear launch protocols: No single person should have unlimited power. Just as launching a nuclear missile requires two separate officers turning their keys simultaneously, making changes to critical financial systems traditionally requires multiple authorized personnel working in concert.

This approach, known as “separation of duties,” isn’t just bureaucratic red tape; it’s a fundamental security principle as old as banking itself. When your local bank processes a large transfer, it requires two different employees to verify the transaction. When a company issues a major financial report, separate teams must review and approve it. These aren’t just formalities—they’re essential safeguards against corruption and error. These measures have been bypassed or ignored. It’s as if someone found a way to rob Fort Knox by simply declaring that the new official policy is to fire all the guards and allow unescorted visits to the vault.

The implications for national security are staggering. Sen. Ron Wyden said his office had learned that the attackers gained privileges that allow them to modify core programs in Treasury Department computers that verify federal payments, access encrypted keys that secure financial transactions, and alter audit logs that record system changes. Over at OPM, reports indicate that individuals associated with DOGE connected an unauthorized server into the network. They are also reportedly training AI software on all of this sensitive data.

This is much more critical than the initial unauthorized access. These new servers have unknown capabilities and configurations, and there’s no evidence that this new code has gone through any rigorous security testing protocols. The AIs being trained are certainly not secure enough for this kind of data. All are ideal targets for any adversary, foreign or domestic, also seeking access to federal data.

There’s a reason why every modification—hardware or software—to these systems goes through a complex planning process and includes sophisticated access-control mechanisms. The national security crisis is that these systems are now much more vulnerable to dangerous attacks at the same time that the legitimate system administrators trained to protect them have been locked out.

By modifying core systems, the attackers have not only compromised current operations, but have also left behind vulnerabilities that could be exploited in future attacks—giving adversaries such as Russia and China an unprecedented opportunity. These countries have long targeted these systems. And they don’t just want to gather intelligence—they also want to understand how to disrupt these systems in a crisis.

Now, the technical details of how these systems operate, their security protocols, and their vulnerabilities are now potentially exposed to unknown parties without any of the usual safeguards. Instead of having to breach heavily fortified digital walls, these parties can simply walk through doors that are being propped open—and then erase evidence of their actions.

The security implications span three critical areas.

First, system manipulation: External operators can now modify operations while also altering audit trails that would track their changes. Second, data exposure: Beyond accessing personal information and transaction records, these operators can copy entire system architectures and security configurations—in one case, the technical blueprint of the country’s federal payment infrastructure. Third, and most critically, is the issue of system control: These operators can alter core systems and authentication mechanisms while disabling the very tools designed to detect such changes. This is more than modifying operations; it is modifying the infrastructure that those operations use.

To address these vulnerabilities, three immediate steps are essential. First, unauthorized access must be revoked and proper authentication protocols restored. Next, comprehensive system monitoring and change management must be reinstated—which, given the difficulty of cleaning a compromised system, will likely require a complete system reset. Finally, thorough audits must be conducted of all system changes made during this period.

This is beyond politics—this is a matter of national security. Foreign national intelligence organizations will be quick to take advantage of both the chaos and the new insecurities to steal US data and install backdoors to allow for future access.

Each day of continued unrestricted access makes the eventual recovery more difficult and increases the risk of irreversible damage to these critical systems. While the full impact may take time to assess, these steps represent the minimum necessary actions to begin restoring system integrity and security protocols.

Assuming that anyone in the government still cares.

This essay was written with Davi Ottenheimer, and originally appeared in Foreign Policy.

AI and Civil Service Purges

[2025.02.14] Donald Trump and Elon Musk’s chaotic approach to reform is upending government operations. Critical functions have been halted, tens of thousands of federal staffers are being encouraged to resign, and congressional mandates are being disregarded. The next phase: The Department of Government Efficiency reportedly wants to use AI to cut costs. According to The Washington Post, Musk’s group has started to run sensitive data from government systems through AI programs to analyze spending and determine what could be pruned. This may lead to the elimination of human jobs in favor of automation. As one government official who has been tracking Musk’s DOGE team told the Post, the ultimate aim is to use AI to replace “the human workforce with machines.” (Spokespeople for the White House and DOGE did not respond to requests for comment.)

Using AI to make government more efficient is a worthy pursuit, and this is not a new idea. The Biden administration disclosed more than 2,000 AI applications in development across the federal government. For example, FEMA has started using AI to help perform damage assessment in disaster areas. The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services has started using AI to look for fraudulent billing. The idea of replacing dedicated and principled civil servants with AI agents, however, is new—and complicated.

The civil service—the massive cadre of employees who operate government agencies—plays a vital role in translating laws and policy into the operation of society. New presidents can issue sweeping executive orders, but they often have no real effect until they actually change the behavior of public servants. Whether you think of these people as essential and inspiring do-gooders, boring bureaucratic functionaries, or as agents of a “deep state,” their sheer number and continuity act as ballast that resists institutional change.

This is why Trump and Musk’s actions are so significant. The more AI decision making is integrated into government, the easier change will be. If human workers are widely replaced with AI, executives will have unilateral authority to instantaneously alter the behavior of the government, profoundly raising the stakes for transitions of power in democracy. Trump’s unprecedented purge of the civil service might be the last time a president needs to replace the human beings in government in order to dictate its new functions. Future leaders may do so at the press of a button.

To be clear, the use of AI by the executive branch doesn’t have to be disastrous. In theory, it could allow new leadership to swiftly implement the wishes of its electorate. But this could go very badly in the hands of an authoritarian leader. AI systems concentrate power at the top, so they could allow an executive to effectuate change over sprawling bureaucracies instantaneously. Firing and replacing tens of thousands of human bureaucrats is a huge undertaking. Swapping one AI out for another, or modifying the rules that those AIs operate by, would be much simpler.

Social-welfare programs, if automated with AI, could be redirected to systematically benefit one group and disadvantage another with a single prompt change. Immigration-enforcement agencies could prioritize people for investigation and detainment with one instruction. Regulatory-enforcement agencies that monitor corporate behavior for malfeasance could turn their attention to, or away from, any given company on a whim.

Even if Congress were motivated to fight back against Trump and Musk, or against a future president seeking to bulldoze the will of the legislature, the absolute power to command AI agents would make it easier to subvert legislative intent. AI has the power to diminish representative politics. Written law is never fully determinative of the actions of government—there is always wiggle room for presidents, appointed leaders, and civil servants to exercise their own judgment. Whether intentional or not, whether charitably or not, each of these actors uses discretion. In human systems, that discretion is widely distributed across many individuals—people who, in the case of career civil servants, usually outlast presidencies.

Today, the AI ecosystem is dominated by a small number of corporations that decide how the most widely used AI models are designed, which data they are trained on, and which instructions they follow. Because their work is largely secretive and unaccountable to public interest, these tech companies are capable of making changes to the bias of AI systems—either generally or with aim at specific governmental use cases—that are invisible to the rest of us. And these private actors are both vulnerable to coercion by political leaders and self-interested in appealing to their favor. Musk himself created and funded xAI, now one of the world’s largest AI labs, with an explicitly ideological mandate to generate anti-“woke” AI and steer the wider AI industry in a similar direction.

But there’s a second way that AI’s transformation of government could go. AI development could happen inside of transparent and accountable public institutions, alongside its continued development by Big Tech. Applications of AI in democratic governments could be focused on benefitting public servants and the communities they serve by, for example, making it easier for non-English speakers to access government services, making ministerial tasks such as processing routine applications more efficient and reducing backlogs, or helping constituents weigh in on the policies deliberated by their representatives. Such AI integrations should be done gradually and carefully, with public oversight for their design and implementation and monitoring and guardrails to avoid unacceptable bias and harm.

Governments around the world are demonstrating how this could be done, though it’s early days. Taiwan has pioneered the use of AI models to facilitate deliberative democracy at an unprecedented scale. Singapore has been a leader in the development of public AI models, built transparently and with public-service use cases in mind. Canada has illustrated the role of disclosure and public input on the consideration of AI use cases in government. Even if you do not trust the current White House to follow any of these examples, U.S. states—which have much greater contact and influence over the daily lives of Americans than the federal government—could lead the way on this kind of responsible development and deployment of AI.

As the political theorist David Runciman has written, AI is just another in a long line of artificial “machines” used to govern how people live and act, not unlike corporations and states before it. AI doesn’t replace those older institutions, but it changes how they function. As the Trump administration forges stronger ties to Big Tech and AI developers, we need to recognize the potential of that partnership to steer the future of democratic governance—and act to make sure that it does not enable future authoritarians.

This essay was written with Nathan E. Sanders, and originally appeared in The Atlantic.

Upcoming Speaking Engagements

[2025.02.14] This is a current list of where and when I am scheduled to speak:

I’m speaking at Boskone 62 in Boston, Massachusetts, USA, which runs from February 14-16, 2025. My talk is at 4:00 PM ET on the 15th.
I’m speaking at the Rossfest Symposium in Cambridge, UK, on March 25, 2025.

The list is maintained on this page.

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Bruce Schneier is an internationally renowned security technologist, called a security guru by the Economist. He is the author of over one dozen books—including his latest, A Hacker’s Mind—as well as hundreds of articles, essays, and academic papers. His newsletter and blog are read by over 250,000 people. Schneier is a fellow at the Berkman Klein Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University; a Lecturer in Public Policy at the Harvard Kennedy School; a board member of the Electronic Frontier Foundation, AccessNow, and the Tor Project; and an Advisory Board Member of the Electronic Privacy Information Center and VerifiedVoting.org. He is the Chief of Security Architecture at Inrupt, Inc.