November 15, 2011
by Bruce Schneier
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In this issue:
It's taken me a few years, but I've come around to this buzzword. It highlights an important characteristic of a particular sort of Internet attacker.
A conventional hacker or criminal isn't interested in any particular target. He wants a thousand credit card numbers for fraud, or to break into an account and turn it into a zombie, or whatever. Security against this sort of attacker is relative; as long as you're more secure than almost everyone else, the attackers will go after other people, not you. An APT is different; it's an attacker who -- for whatever reason -- wants to attack you. Against this sort of attacker, the absolute level of your security is what's important. It doesn't matter how secure you are compared to your peers; all that matters is whether you're secure enough to keep him out.
APT attackers are more highly motivated. They're likely to be better skilled, better funded, and more patient. They're likely to try several different avenues of attack. And they're much more likely to succeed.
This is why APT is a useful buzzword.
Interesting article on the criminal use of crowdsourcing.
A newly discovered piece of malware, Duqu, seems to be a precursor to the next Stuxnet-like worm and uses some of the same techniques as the original.
There's a patent application from Facebook that seems to cover tracking people even when they're not logged in to Facebook.
Blue Coat products enable web censorship in Syria. It's illegal for Blue Coat to sell its technology for this purpose, but there are lots of third parties who are willing to act as middlemen. Bet you anything that the Syrian Blue Coat products are registered, and that they receive all the normal code and filter updates.
The second document in this file is the recently unclassified "Guide to Historical Cryptologic Acronyms and Abbreviations, 1940-1980," from the NSA. Note that there are still some redactions.
The Twofish encryption algorithm is mentioned in the book "Abuse of Power."
Google releases statistics on law-enforcement demands for Google's data. I'm sure they have an office full of attorneys versed in the laws of various countries.
I don't follow historical cryptography, so all of this comes as a surprise to me. But something called the Copiale Cipher from the 18th Century has been cracked.
EFF reports on the security of SSL:
Brian Krebs has done some analysis on the attack that compromised RSA in March; it's something like 760 companies that were compromised.
Two articles from The Economist on lying:
I note that the three "industry leaders" speaking at the DARPA Cyber Colloquium next week have about 75 years of government experience among them.
Interesting research on how parents help their children lie about their age to get onto Facebook.
>From the "Journal of Strategic Studies": "Cyber War Will Not Take Place":
Here's another article: "The Non-Existent 'Cyber War' Is Nothing More Than A Push For More Government Control."
Cutting wallets out of drunks' pockets on New York City subways: it's a crime with finesse.
More SSL woes from Mikko Hypponen: "We found a malware sample. Which was signed. With a valid certificate. Belonging to the Government of Malaysia."
There's a group who charges to make social engineering calls to obtain missing personal information for identity theft. This doesn't surprise me at all. Fraud is a business, too.
This brazen tactic is from Malaysia. Robbers sabotage the machines, and then report the damage to the bank. When the banks send repair technicians to open and repair the machines, the robbers take the money at gunpoint.
It's hardly a technology-related attack. But from what I know about ATMs, the security of the money safe inside the machine is separate from the security of the rest of the machine. So it seems that the repair technicians might be given access to only the machine but not the safe inside.
Researchers have found a vulnerability in computer-controlled prison-door systems that allows them to be remotely opened over the Internet. This assumes that they're connected to the Internet in the first place, which some of them are.
The weirdest part of the article was this last paragraph.
"You could open every cell door, and the system would be telling
I guess that's a threat. But the *greatest* threat?
I'm speaking at Internetdagarna in Stockholm on November 21.
I'm speaking at The Register and Intel Live in London on November 22.
And I'm speaking at the CISO Executive Summit in Chicago on December 1.
Creating fake documents that alarm if opened seems like a decent approach to the problem of insider information theft, but it has a lot of practical problems.
In the wake of Wikileaks, the Department of Defense has stepped up
Details aside, this kind of thing falls into the general category of data tracking. It doesn't even have to be fake documents; you could imagine some sort of macro embedded into Word or pdf documents that phones home when the document is opened. (I have no idea if you actually can do it with those formats, but the concept is plausible.) This allows the owner of a document to track when, and possibly by what computer, a document is opened.
But by far the biggest drawback from this tech is the possibility
I'm less worried about false positives, and more concerned by how easy it is to get around this sort of thing. Detach your computer from the Internet, and the document no longer phones home. A fix is to combine the system with an encryption scheme that requires a remote key. Now the document *has* to phone home before it can be viewed. Of course, once someone is authorized to view the document, it would be easy to create an unprotected copy -- screen captures, if nothing else -- to forward along,
While potentially interesting, this sort of technology is not going to prevent large data leaks. But it's good to see research.
Since 1998, CRYPTO-GRAM has been a free monthly newsletter providing summaries, analyses, insights, and commentaries on security: computer and otherwise. You can subscribe, unsubscribe, or change your address on the Web at <http://www.schneier.com/crypto-gram.html>. Back issues are also available at that URL.
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CRYPTO-GRAM is written by Bruce Schneier. Schneier is the author of the best sellers "Schneier on Security," "Beyond Fear," "Secrets and Lies," and "Applied Cryptography," and an inventor of the Blowfish, Twofish, Threefish, Helix, Phelix, and Skein algorithms. He is the Chief Security Technology Officer of BT BCSG, and is on the Board of Directors of the Electronic Privacy Information Center (EPIC). He is a frequent writer and lecturer on security topics. See <http://www.schneier.com>.
Crypto-Gram is a personal newsletter. Opinions expressed are not necessarily those of BT.
Copyright (c) 2011 by Bruce Schneier.
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