Surreptitiously Weakening Cryptographic Systems

B. Schneier, M. Fredrikson, T. Kohno, and T. Ristenpart

Cryptology ePrint Archive, Report 2015/097, 2015.

ABSTRACT:

Revelations over the past couple of years highlight the importance of understanding malicious and surreptitious weakening of cryptographic systems. We provide an overview of this domain, using a number of historical examples to drive development of a weaknesses taxonomy. This allows comparing different approaches to sabotage. We categorize a broader set of potential avenues for weakening systems using this taxonomy, and discuss what future research is needed to provide sabotage-resilient cryptography.

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