Side Channel Cryptanalysis of Product Ciphers

J. Kelsey, B. Schneier, D. Wagner, and C. Hall

Journal of Computer Security, v. 8, n. 2-3, 2000, pp. 141-158.

ABSTRACT: Building on the work of Kocher, we introduce the notion of side-channel cryptanalysis: cryptanalysis using implementation data. We discuss the notion of side-channel attacks and the vulnerabilities they introduce, demonstrate side-channel attacks against three product ciphers—timing attack against IDEA, processor-flag attack against RC5, and Hamming weight attack against DES—and then generalize our research to other cryptosystems.

Final Version
[full text – PDF (Acrobat)] [full text – Postscript]

Conference Version
(ESORICS ’98 Proceedings, Springer-Verlag, September 1998, pp. 97-110):
[full text – PDF (Acrobat)] [full text – Postscript]

Categories: Algorithm Analyses

Sidebar photo of Bruce Schneier by Joe MacInnis.