Friday Squid Blogging: The Unique Reproductive Habits of the Vampire Squid

Interesting:

While most female squid and octopuses have just one reproductive cycle before they die, vampire squid go through dozens of egg-making cycles in their lifetimes, scientists have found.

As usual, you can also use this squid post to talk about the security stories in the news that I haven't covered.

Posted on April 24, 2015 at 4:43 PM57 Comments

Federal Trade Commissioner Julie Brill on Obscurity

I think this is good:

Obscurity means that personal information isn't readily available to just anyone. It doesn't mean that information is wiped out or even locked up; rather, it means that some combination of factors makes certain types of information relatively hard to find.

Obscurity has always been an important component of privacy. It is a helpful concept because it encapsulates how a broad range of social, economic, and technological changes affects norms and consumer expectations.

Posted on April 24, 2015 at 12:42 PM11 Comments

The Further Democratization of QUANTUM

From my book Data and Goliath:

...when I was working with the Guardian on the Snowden documents, the one top-secret program the NSA desperately did not want us to expose was QUANTUM. This is the NSA's program for what is called packet injection­ -- basically, a technology that allows the agency to hack into computers. Turns out, though, that the NSA was not alone in its use of this technology. The Chinese government uses packet injection to attack computers. The cyberweapons manufacturer Hacking Team sells packet injection technology to any government willing to pay for it. Criminals use it. And there are hacker tools that give the capability to individuals as well. All of these existed before I wrote about QUANTUM. By using its knowledge to attack others rather than to build up the Internet's defenses, the NSA has worked to ensure that anyone can use packet injection to hack into computers.

And that's true. China's Great Cannon uses QUANTUM. The ability to inject packets into the backbone is a powerful attack technology, and one that is increasingly being used by different attackers.

I continued:

Even when technologies are developed inside the NSA, they don't remain exclusive for long. Today's top-secret programs become tomorrow's PhD theses and the next day's hacker tools.

I could have continued with "and the next day's homework assignment," because Michalis Polychronakis at Stony Book University has just assigned building a rudimentary QUANTUM tool as a homework assignment. It's basically sniff, regexp match, swap sip/sport/dip/dport/syn/ack, set ack and push flags, and add the payload to create the malicious reply. Shouldn't take more than a few hours to get it working. Of course, it would take a lot more to make it as sophisticated and robust as what the NSA and China have at their disposal, but the moral is that the tool is now in the hands of anyone who wants it. We need to make the Internet secure against this kind of attack instead of pretending that only the "good guys" can use it effectively.

End-to-end encryption is the solution. Nicholas Weaver wrote:

The only self defense from all of the above is universal encryption. Universal encryption is difficult and expensive, but unfortunately necessary.

Encryption doesn't just keep our traffic safe from eavesdroppers, it protects us from attack. DNSSEC validation protects DNS from tampering, while SSL armors both email and web traffic.

There are many engineering and logistic difficulties involved in encrypting all traffic on the internet, but its one we must overcome if we are to defend ourselves from the entities that have weaponized the backbone.

Yes.

And this is true in general. We have one network in the world today. Either we build our communications infrastructure for surveillance, or we build it for security. Either everyone gets to spy, or no one gets to spy. That's our choice, with the Internet, with cell phone networks, with everything.

Posted on April 24, 2015 at 8:55 AM38 Comments

An Incredibly Insecure Voting Machine

Wow:

The weak passwords -- which are hard-coded and can't be changed -- were only one item on a long list of critical defects uncovered by the review. The Wi-Fi network the machines use is encrypted with wired equivalent privacy, an algorithm so weak that it takes as little as 10 minutes for attackers to break a network's encryption key. The shortcomings of WEP have been so well-known that it was banished in 2004 by the IEEE, the world's largest association of technical professionals. What's more, the WINVote runs a version of Windows XP Embedded that hasn't received a security patch since 2004, making it vulnerable to scores of known exploits that completely hijack the underlying machine. Making matters worse, the machine uses no firewall and exposes several important Internet ports.

It's the AVS WinVote touchscreen Direct Recording Electronic (DRE). The Virginia Information Technology Agency (VITA) investigated the machine, and found that you could hack this machine from across the street with a smart phone:

So how would someone use these vulnerabilities to change an election?

  1. Take your laptop to a polling place, and sit outside in the parking lot.
  2. Use a free sniffer to capture the traffic, and use that to figure out the WEP password (which VITA did for us).
  3. Connect to the voting machine over WiFi.
  4. If asked for a password, the administrator password is "admin" (VITA provided that).
  5. Download the Microsoft Access database using Windows Explorer.
  6. Use a free tool to extract the hardwired key ("shoup"), which VITA also did for us.
  7. Use Microsoft Access to add, delete, or change any of the votes in the database.
  8. Upload the modified copy of the Microsoft Access database back to the voting machine.
  9. Wait for the election results to be published.

Note that none of the above steps, with the possible exception of figuring out the WEP password, require any technical expertise. In fact, they're pretty much things that the average office worker does on a daily basis.

More.

Posted on April 23, 2015 at 7:19 AM65 Comments

"Hinky" in Action

In Beyond Fear I wrote about trained officials recognizing "hinky" and how it differs from profiling:

Ressam had to clear customs before boarding the ferry. He had fake ID, in the name of Benni Antoine Noris, and the computer cleared him based on this ID. He was allowed to go through after a routine check of his car's trunk, even though he was wanted by the Canadian police. On the other side of the Strait of Juan de Fuca, at Port Angeles, Washington, Ressam was approached by U.S. customs agent Diana Dean, who asked some routine questions and then decided that he looked suspicious. He was fidgeting, sweaty, and jittery. He avoided eye contact. In Dean's own words, he was acting "hinky." More questioning -- there was no one else crossing the border, so two other agents got involved -- and more hinky behavior. Ressam's car was eventually searched, and he was finally discovered and captured. It wasn't any one thing that tipped Dean off; it was everything encompassed in the slang term "hinky." But the system worked. The reason there wasn't a bombing at LAX around Christmas in 1999 was because a knowledgeable person was in charge of security and paying attention.

I wrote about this again in 2007:

The key difference is expertise. People trained to be alert for something hinky will do much better than any profiler, but people who have no idea what to look for will do no better than random.

Here's another story from last year:

On April 28, 2014, Yusuf showed up alone at the Minneapolis Passport Agency and applied for an expedited passport. He wanted to go "sightseeing" in Istanbul, where he was planning to meet someone he recently connected with on Facebook, he allegedly told the passport specialist.

"It's a guy, just a friend,"he told the specialist, according to court documents.

But when the specialist pressed him for more information about his "friend" in Istanbul and his plans while there, Yusuf couldn't offer any details, the documents allege.

"[He] became visibly nervous, more soft-spoken, and began to avoid eye contact," the documents say. "Yusuf did not appear excited or happy to be traveling to Turkey for vacation."

In fact, the passport specialist "found his interaction with Yusuf so unusual that he contacted his supervisor who, in turn, alerted the FBI to Yusuf's travel," according to the court documents.

This is what works. Not profiling. Not bulk surveillance. Not defending against any particular tactics or targets. In the end, this is what keeps us safe.

Posted on April 22, 2015 at 8:40 AM56 Comments

Hacking Airplanes

Imagine this: A terrorist hacks into a commercial airplane from the ground, takes over the controls from the pilots and flies the plane into the ground. It sounds like the plot of some "Die Hard" reboot, but it's actually one of the possible scenarios outlined in a new Government Accountability Office report on security vulnerabilities in modern airplanes.

It's certainly possible, but in the scheme of Internet risks I worry about, it's not very high. I'm more worried about the more pedestrian attacks against more common Internet-connected devices. I'm more worried, for example, about a multination cyber arms race that stockpiles capabilities such as this, and prioritizes attack over defense in an effort to gain relative advantage. I worry about the democratization of cyberattack techniques, and who might have the capabilities currently reserved for nation-states. And I worry about a future a decade from now if these problems aren't addressed.

First, the airplanes. The problem the GAO identifies is one computer security experts have talked about for years. Newer planes such as the Boeing 787 Dreamliner and the Airbus A350 and A380 have a single network that is used both by pilots to fly the plane and passengers for their Wi-Fi connections. The risk is that a hacker sitting in the back of the plane, or even one on the ground, could use the Wi-Fi connection to hack into the avionics and then remotely fly the plane.

The report doesn't explain how someone could do this, and there are currently no known vulnerabilities that a hacker could exploit. But all systems are vulnerable--we simply don't have the engineering expertise to design and build perfectly secure computers and networks--so of course we believe this kind of attack is theoretically possible.

Previous planes had separate networks, which is much more secure.

As terrifying as this movie-plot threat is--and it has been the plot of several recent works of fiction--this is just one example of an increasingly critical problem: As the computers already critical to running our infrastructure become connected, our vulnerability to cyberattack grows. We've already seen vulnerabilities in baby monitors, cars, medical equipment and all sorts of other Internet-connected devices. In February, Toyota recalled 1.9 million Prius cars because of a software vulnerability. Expect similar vulnerabilities in our smart thermostats, smart light bulbs and everything else connected to the smart power grid. The Internet of Things will bring computers into every aspect of our life and society. Those computers will be on the network and will be vulnerable to attack.

And because they'll all be networked together, a vulnerability in one device will affect the security of everything else. Right now, a vulnerability in your home router can compromise the security of your entire home network. A vulnerability in your Internet-enabled refrigerator can reportedly be used as a launching pad for further attacks.

Future attacks will be exactly like what's happening on the Internet today with your computer and smartphones, only they will be with everything. It's all one network, and it's all critical infrastructure.

Some of these attacks will require sufficient budget and organization to limit them to nation-state aggressors. But that's hardly comforting. North Korea is last year believed to have launched a massive cyberattack against Sony Pictures. Last month, China used a cyberweapon called the "Great Cannon" against the website GitHub. In 2010, the U.S. and Israeli governments launched a sophisticated cyberweapon called Stuxnet against the Iranian Natanz nuclear power plant; it used a series of vulnerabilities to cripple centrifuges critical for separating nuclear material. In fact, the United States has done more to weaponize the Internet than any other country.

Governments only have a fleeting advantage over everyone else, though. Today's top-secret National Security Agency programs become tomorrow's Ph.D. theses and the next day's hacker's tools. So while remotely hacking the 787 Dreamliner's avionics might be well beyond the capabilities of anyone except Boeing engineers today, that's not going to be true forever.

What this all means is that we have to start thinking about the security of the Internet of Things--whether the issue in question is today's airplanes or tomorrow's smart clothing. We can't repeat the mistakes of the early days of the PC and then the Internet, where we initially ignored security and then spent years playing catch-up. We have to build security into everything that is going to be connected to the Internet.

This is going to require both significant research and major commitments by companies. It's also going to require legislation mandating certain levels of security on devices connecting to the Internet, and at network providers that make the Internet work. This isn't something the market can solve on its own, because there are just too many incentives to ignore security and hope that someone else will solve it.

As a nation, we need to prioritize defense over offense. Right now, the NSA and U.S. Cyber Command have a strong interest in keeping the Internet insecure so they can better eavesdrop on and attack our enemies. But this prioritization cuts both ways: We can't leave others' networks vulnerable without also leaving our own vulnerable. And as one of the most networked countries on the planet, we are highly vulnerable to attack. It would be better to focus the NSA's mission on defense and harden our infrastructure against attack.

Remember the GAO's nightmare scenario: A hacker on the ground exploits a vulnerability in the airplane's Wi-Fi system to gain access to the airplane's network. Then he exploits a vulnerability in the firewall that separates the passengers' network from the avionics to gain access to the flight controls. Then he uses other vulnerabilities both to lock the pilots out of the cockpit controls and take control of the plane himself.

It's a scenario made possible by insecure computers and insecure networks. And while it might take a government-led secret project on the order of Stuxnet to pull it off today, that won't always be true.

Of course, this particular movie-plot threat might never become a real one. But it is almost certain that some equally unlikely scenario will. I just hope we have enough security expertise to deal with whatever it ends up being.

This essay originally appeared on CNN.com.

EDITED TO ADD: News articles.

Posted on April 21, 2015 at 1:40 PM70 Comments

Hacker Detained by FBI after Tweeting about Airplane Software Vulnerabilities

This is troubling:

Chris Roberts was detained by FBI agents on Wednesday as he was deplaning his United flight, which had just flown from Denver to Syracuse, New York. While on board the flight, he tweeted a joke about taking control of the plane's engine-indicating and crew-alerting system, which provides flight crews with information in real-time about an aircraft's functions, including temperatures of various equipment, fuel flow and quantity, and oil pressure. In the tweet, Roberts jested: "Find myself on a 737/800, lets see Box-IFE-ICE-SATCOM, ? Shall we start playing with EICAS messages? 'PASS OXYGEN ON' Anyone ? :)" FBI agents questioned Roberts for four hours and confiscated his iPad, MacBook Pro, and storage devices.

Yes, the real issue here is the chilling effects on security research. Security researchers who point out security flaws is a good thing, and should be encouraged.

But to me, the fascinating part of this story is that a computer was monitoring the Twitter feed and understood the obscure references, alerted a person who figured out who wrote them, researched what flight he was on, and sent an FBI team to the Syracuse airport within a couple of hours. There's some serious surveillance going on.

Now, it is possible that Roberts was being specifically monitored. He is already known as a security researcher who is working on avionics hacking. But still...

Slashdot thread. Hacker News thread.

EDITED TO ADD (4/22): Another article, this one about the debate over disclosing security vulnerabilities.

Posted on April 21, 2015 at 5:26 AM114 Comments

Counting the US Intelligence Community Leakers

It's getting hard to keep track of the US intelligence community leakers without a scorecard. So here's my attempt:

  • Leaker #1: Chelsea Manning.

  • Leaker #2: Edward Snowden.

  • Leaker #3: The person who leaked secret documents to Jake Appelbaum, Laura Poitras, and others in Germany: the Angela Merkel surveillance story, the TAO catalog, the X-KEYSCORE rules. My guess is that this is either an NSA employee or contractor working in Germany, or someone from German intelligence who has access to NSA documents. Snowden has said that he is not the source for the Merkel story, and Greenwald has confirmed that the Snowden documents are not the source for the X-KEYSCORE rules. This might be the "high-ranking NSA employee in Germany" from this story -- or maybe that's someone else entirely.

  • Leaker #4: "A source in the intelligence community," according to the Intercept, who leaked information about the Terrorist Screening Database, the "second leaker" from the movie Citizen Four. Greenwald promises a lot from him: "Snowden, at a meeting with Greenwald in Moscow, expresses surprise at the level of information apparently coming from this new source. Greenwald, fearing he will be overheard, writes the details on scraps of paper." We have seen nothing since, though. This is probably the leaker the FBI identified, although we have heard nothing further about that, either.

  • Leaker #5: Someone who is leaking CIA documents.

  • Leaker #6: The person who leaked secret information about WTO spying to the Intercept and the New Zealand Herald. This isn't Snowden; the Intercept is very careful to identify him as the source when it writes about the documents he provided. Neither publication give any indication of how it was obtained. This might be Leaker #3, since it contains X-KEYSCORE rules.

  • Leaker #7: The person who just leaked secret information about the US drone program to the Intercept and Der Spiegel. This also might be Leaker #3, since there is a Germany connection. According to the Intercept: "The slides were provided by a source with knowledge of the U.S. government's drone program who declined to be identified because of fears of retribution." That implies someone new.

Am I missing anyone?

Harvard Law School professor Yochai Benkler has written an excellent law review article on the need for a whistleblower defense. And there's this excellent article by David Pozen on why government leaks are, in general, a good thing. I wrote about the value of whistleblowers in Data and Goliath.

Way back in June 2013, Glenn Greenwald said that "courage is contagious." He seems to be correct.

This post was originally published on the Lawfare blog.

EDITED TO ADD (4/22): News article.

In retrospect, I shouldn't have included Manning in this list. I wanted it to be a list of active leaks, not historical leaks. And while Snowden is no longer leaking information, the reporters who received his documents are still releasing bits and pieces.

Posted on April 20, 2015 at 11:18 AM25 Comments

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