Cryptography, Security and the Future
Communications of the ACM, v. 40, n. 1, January 1997, p. 138.
This article is also available in a French translation by Fernandes Gilbert.
From e-mail to cellular communications, from secure Web access to digital cash, cryptography is an essential part of today's information systems. Cryptography helps provide accountability, fairness, accuracy, and confidentiality. It can prevent fraud in electronic commerce and assure the validity of financial transactions. It can protect your anonymity or prove your identity. It can keep vandals from altering your Web page and prevent industrial competitors from reading your confidential documents. And in the future, as commerce and communications continue to move to computer networks, cryptography will become more and more vital.
But the cryptography now on the market doesn't provide the level of security it advertises. Most systems are not designed and implemented by cryptographers, but by engineers who think cryptography is like any other computer technology. It's not. You can't make systems secure by tacking on cryptography as an afterthought. You have to know what you are doing every step of the way, from conception through installation.
Billions of dollars are spent on computer security, and most of it is wasted on insecure products. After all, weak cryptography looks the same on the shelf as strong cryptography. Two e-mail encryption products may have almost the same user interface, yet one is secure while the other permits eavesdropping. A comparison chart may suggest that two programs have similar features, although one has gaping security holes that the other doesn't. An experienced cryptographer can tell the difference. So can a thief.
The people who break cryptographic systems don't follow rules; they cheat. They can attack a system using techniques the designers never thought of. Art thieves have burgled homes by cutting through the walls with a chain saw. Home security systems, no matter how expensive and sophisticated, won't stand a chance against this attack. Computer thieves come through the walls too. They steal technical data, bribe insiders, modify software, and collude. The odds favor the attacker: defenders have to protect against every possible vulnerability, but an attacker only has to find one security flaw to compromise the whole system.
Present-day computer security is a house of cards; it may stand for now, but it can't last. Many insecure products have not yet been broken because they are still in their infancy. But when these products are widely used, they will become tempting targets for criminals. The press will publicize the attacks, undermining public confidence in these systems. Ultimately, products will win or lose in the marketplace depending on the strength of their security.
No one can guarantee 100% security. But we can work toward 100% risk acceptance. Fraud exists in current commerce systems: cash can be counterfeited, checks altered, credit card numbers stolen. Yet these systems are still successful because the benefits and conveniences outweigh the losses. Privacy systems -- wall safes, door locks, curtains -- are not perfect, but they're often good enough. A good cryptographic system strikes a balance between what is possible and what is acceptable.
Strong cryptography can withstand targeted attacks up to a point -- the point at which it becomes easier to get the information some other way. A computer encryption program, no matter how good, will not prevent an attacker from going through someone's garbage. But it can prevent data-harvesting attacks absolutely; no attacker can go through enough trash to find every AZT user in the country.
The good news about cryptography is that we already have the algorithms and protocols we need to secure our systems. The bad news is that that was the easy part; implementing the protocols successfully requires considerable expertise. The areas of security that interact with people -- key management, human/computer interface security, access control -- often defy analysis. And the disciplines of public-key infrastructure, software security, computer security, network security, and tamper-resistant hardware design are very poorly understood.
Laws are no substitute for engineering. The U.S. cellular phone industry has lobbied for protective laws, instead of spending the money to fix what should have been designed corectly the first time. It's no longer good enough to install security patches in response to attacks. Computer systems move too quickly; a security flaw can be described on the Internet and exploited by thousands. Today's systems must anticipate future attacks. Any comprehensive system designed today is likely to remain in use for five years or more. It must be able to withstand the future: smarter attackers, more computational power, and greater incentives to subvert a widespread system. There won't be time to upgrade them in the field.
History has taught us: never underestimate the amount of money, time, and effort someone will expend to thwart a security system. It's always better to assume the worst. Assume your adversaries are better than they are. Assume science and technology will soon be able to do things they cannot yet. Give yourself a margin for error. Give yourself more security than you need today. When the unexpected happens, you'll be glad you did.
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