## MD6 Withdrawn from SHA-3 Competition

In other SHA-3 news, Ron Rivest seems to have withdrawn MD6 from the SHA-3 competition. From an e-mail to a NIST mailing list:

We suggest that MD6 is not yet ready for the next SHA-3 round, and we also provide some suggestions for NIST as the contest moves forward.

Basically, the issue is that in order for MD6 to be fast enough to be competitive, the designers have to reduce the number of rounds down to 30-40, and at those rounds, the algorithm loses its proofs of resistance to differential attacks.

Thus, while MD6 appears to be a robust and secure cryptographic hash algorithm, and has much merit for multi-core processors, our inability to provide a proof of security for a reduced-round (and possibly tweaked) version of MD6 against differential attacks suggests that MD6 is not ready for consideration for the next SHA-3 round.

EDITED TO ADD (7/1): This is a very classy withdrawal, as we expect from Ron Rivest — especially given the fact that there are no attacks on it, while other algorithms have been seriously broken and their submitters keep trying to pretend that no one has noticed.

EDITED TO ADD (7/6): From the MD6 website:

We are not withdrawing our submission; NIST is free to select MD6 for further consideration in the next round if it wishes. But at this point MD6 doesn’t meet our own standards for what we believe should be required of a SHA-3 candidate, and we suggest that NIST might do better looking elsewhere. In particular, we feel that a minimum “ticket of admission” for SHA-3 consideration should be a proof of resistance to basic differential attacks, and we don’t know how to make such a proof for a reduced-round MD6.

W • July 1, 2009 2:33 PM

Do similar proofs of resistance to differential attacks available for competing hashfunctions such as skein?